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Abstract. In this dissertation we provide mathematical evidence that the concept of
learning can be used to give a new and intuitive computational semantics of classical
proofs in various fragments of Predicative Arithmetic.
First, we extend Kreisel modified realizability to a classical fragment of first order
Arithmetic, Heyting Arithmetic plus EM1 (Excluded middle axiom restricted to Σ
0
1 for-
mulas). We introduce a new realizability semantics we call “Interactive Learning-Based
Realizability”. Our realizers are self-correcting programs, which learn from their errors
and evolve through time, thanks to their ability of perpetually questioning, testing and
extending their knowledge. Remarkably, that capability is entirely due to classical princi-
ples when they are applied on top of intuitionistic logic.
Secondly, we extend the class of learning based realizers to a classical version PCFClass
of PCF and, then, compare the resulting notion of realizability with Coquand game se-
mantics and prove a full soundness and completeness result. In particular, we show there
is a one-to-one correspondence between realizers and recursive winning strategies in the
1-Backtracking version of Tarski games.
Third, we provide a complete and fully detailed constructive analysis of learning as it
arises in learning based realizability for HA+EM1, Avigad’s update procedures and epsilon
substitution method for Peano Arithmetic PA. We present new constructive techniques to
bound the length of learning processes and we apply them to reprove - by means of our
theory - the classic result of Go¨del that provably total functions of PA can be represented
in Go¨del’s system T.
Last, we give an axiomatization of the kind of learning that is needed to computation-
ally interpret Predicative classical second order Arithmetic. Our work is an extension of
Avigad’s and generalizes the concept of update procedure to the transfinite case. Trans-
finite update procedures have to learn values of transfinite sequences of non computable
functions in order to extract witnesses from classical proofs.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1. A Computational Semantics of Classical Proofs
In this dissertation we provide mathematical evidence that the concept of learning can
be used to give a new and intuitive computational semantics of classical proofs in various
fragments of Predicative Arithmetic. The main definite result in this sense is a new realiz-
ability semantics for HA + EM1, which we call “Interactive Learning Based Realizability”
(shortly, learning based realizability). HA + EM1 is first order intuitionistic Heyting Arith-
metic with the principle of excluded middle over Σ01 formulas, a classical axiom that eluded
computational semantics for a long time and, probably, never had an intuitive one.
EM1 has already been extensively studied in terms of Curry-Howard correspondence
(see [43]), that is, in terms of computational constructs that can be associated to it in
order to extract computational information from classical proofs. Thanks to this approach,
the constructive content of classical logic can be interestingly attained in terms of proof
transformations, or reduction rules applied to the corresponding computational constructs.
While these results are satisfying from the computational point of view, we feel they are not
satisfying in terms of human understanding. Though this issue may at first appear marginal,
it is not: classical proofs can now be “executed” thanks to Curry-Howard correspondence,
but extracted programs are still very difficult to understand. Nowadays, there are research
programs whose aim is precisely to understand programs extracted from classical proofs,
since without this understanding programs cannot be analyzed, neither optimized nor im-
proved, to begin with. Without high level grasp of a program, it is like having a black
box, that in some mysterious way gives always correct answers. This phenomenon probably
happens because classical principles are well understood only in terms of the computational
devices they are associated to. Therefore, when one has to interpret a classical proof, he is
forced to formalize it and then to extract the corresponding program. While this approach
is feasible with small proofs, it is unmanageable with complex ones without great technical
effort. This seems to explain why computational interpretations of classical logic are still
not universally used by mathematicians and computer scientists.
As for ourselves, we think that proof theory should offer a proof semantics: that is,
not only a way of extracting the computational content of classical proofs, but also a high
level explanation of what are the general ideas used by the programs extracted from proofs
and what is the constructive meaning of quantifiers, logical connectives and axioms in
the framework of classical logic. Only in this way, the general mathematician or computer
scientist could extract intuitively the computational content hidden in some proof he wishes
to analyze. Such a semantics was put forward a long time ago for intuitionistic logic -
starting from Heyting semantics, passing through Kleene realizability to arrive to Kreisel
modified realizability - but we think that in the case of classical logic there are still no
ultimate results.
1
2 1. INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, we put a major effort to lay the ground for a proof semantics of
Predicative Arithmetic based on the concept of learning. A learning based realizability in-
terpretation of HA+EM1 will be completely explained and formalized, compared with game
semantics and thoroughly analyzed by constructive means. We will define a computational
model of “intelligent” self-correcting programs, which learn from their errors and evolve
through time, thanks to their ability of perpetually questioning, testing and extending their
knowledge. Remarkably, that capability is entirely due to classical principles when they
are applied on top of intuitionistic logic. We shall thus conclude that the computational
content of classical fragment HA + EM1 can be described in terms of learning. Moreover,
we will introduce a more general concept of learning by levels, that generalizes Avigad’s one
[5] and will serve as a foundation for possible extensions of our learning based realizability
to full first order Peano Arithmetic and even Predicative Analysis. The learning based
computation interpretation of classical logic is a new and exciting field of research, but just
started: in this thesis we give substantial contributions, but the path to follow is still long.
In this chapter we give an overview of what are proof transformations, what are proofs
semantics and what are the general ideas of learning in classical logic. We start with a
short review of known results about intuitionistic logic, in order to explain how the issue
“proof transformation vs. proof semantics” was solved in that case. We then explain the
ideas behind epsilon substitution method, Coquand’s game semantics and Avigad’s update
procedures, the three major sources of inspiration for our work and where the concept of
learning first appeared, implicitly in the first case, explicitly and much more elegantly in the
second and the third. These pioneering contributions are also the underpinnings of the more
recent work of Berardi and de’ Liguoro [11], which will be the starting point of this thesis.
We conclude with a synopsis of the contribution and the structure of our dissertation.
1.2. Proof Transformations and Proof Semantics in Intuitionistic Arithmetic
Intuitionistic logic was the main method of reasoning used in mathematics until the
eighteenth century. Existence of objects with special properties was mainly established
by explicitly constructing objects with those properties. With Dedekind, Cantor, Hilbert,
Brouwer, Frege and many others, non constructive reasoning became central, thanks to
its great conceptual and simplifying power. Non constructive methods were immediately
questioned by mathematicians such as Kronecker and others, but soon became generally
employed and accepted. After the famous days of paradoxes in set theory and mathematics,
however, a new season of concerns and foundational efforts began in mathematical logic.
Brouwer, in particular, advocated the need for intuitionistic logic, which rejected some
classical principles such as the excluded middle and impredicative definitions.
Intuitionistic logic was born as a constructive logic, but what does that mean? Syntac-
tically, it is presented just as a set of axioms and inference rules in a formal language. And
the reason why, for example, excluded middle is left out remains inevitably obscure, if a
semantics for assertions in intuitionistic logic is not provided; the excluded middle is a very
natural and intuitive principle, after all, known in logic since Aristotle.
The issue is informally solved through the so called Heyting semantics (see for example
Girard [21]). According to Brouwer, in order to assert a statement, one has to provide some
sort of construction. What is a construction? The following is Heyting’s answer:
(1) A construction of an atomic formula is a computation showing its truth.
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(2) A construction of A∧B is a pair formed by a construction of A and a construction
of B.
(3) A construction of A ∨ B is a pair whose first element is a boolean i such that: if
i = True, then the second element of the pair is a construction of A, if i = False,
then the second element of the pair is a construction of B.
(4) A construction of A→ B is an algorithm taking as input a construction of A and
returning as output a construction of B.
(5) A construction of ∀xNA(x) is an algorithm taking as input a natural number n and
returning as output a construction of A(n).
(6) A construction of ∃xNA(x) is a pair whose first element is a number n such that
the the second element of the pair is a construction of A(n).
Thanks to Heyting semantics, one immediately recognizes why the excluded middle A∨
¬A is rejected by intuitionistic logic: a construction of A∨¬A would require to decide which
one among A,¬A is true, which is not generally possible in algorithmic way. In Heyting
semantics, each logical connective and quantifier is given a computational meaning, which
is enough clear as to be intuitively used by humans with the aim of devising constructive
proofs.
1.2.1. Proof Transformations in HA. Let us consider the formal system HA, Heyt-
ing Arithmetic, which is the intuitionistic version of the usual first order Peano Arithmetic
PA. Since HA is born as a constructive logic, one expects it to be sound with respect to
Heyting semantics. But since as a formal system HA does not mention at all the concept
of Heyting construction, it is not obvious, given any provable formula, how to extract a
construction from any of its proofs.
The first method for implicitly extracting such a computational content is due to
Gentzen [19], [20] and falls under the category of proof transformations. The idea is the
following. One defines a set of transformation rules mapping proofs of a formula into proofs
of the same formula. He then iterates these rules from the initial proof until he finds a
proof with a special syntactical structure, and from this proof he obtains the constructive
content “implicit” in the initial proof. We will not consider Gentzen technique (called “cut
elimination”) but instead a later one due to Prawitz, known as normalization, which applies
to natural deduction proofs. We start from recalling the inference rules of HA.
(1) A where A is a Peano axiom.
(2)
A B
A ∧B
A ∧B
A
A ∧B
B
(3)
A→ B A
B
B
A→ B
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(4)
A
A ∨B
B
A ∨B
A ∨B C C
C
(5)
∀αNA
A[t/α]
A
∀αNA
where t is a term in the language of HA
(6)
A[t/αN]
∃αN.A
∃αN.A C
C
(7)
A(0) ∀αN.A(α)→ A(S(α))
∀αNA
A natural deduction proof is a tree whose nodes are formulas obtained from their children by
inference rules. Leaves of a deduction tree are either hypotheses or discharged hypotheses
and all the standard management of discharged ones is assumed here (see for example van
Dalen [15]). As usual, quantifier rules must be applied under the usual restrictions on the
quantified variables.
We are interested in a set of rules that allow to transform any proof of any formula A
in a special normal form proof of A. We limit ourselves to the rules for implication and
induction and we refer to [15] for a complete treatment. The proof transformations defined
are the following. In any deduction, a sub-deduction
D1
B
A→ B
D2
A
B
is replaced by
D1[D2/A]
B
where D1[D2/A] is the deduction obtained from D1 by replacing all the hypotheses A with
the deduction D2 of A. Moreover, in any deduction, a sub-deduction
D1
A(0)
D2
∀αN.A(α)→ A(S(α))
∀αNA
A(n)
where n is a numeral, is replaced by a deduction Dn of A(n), where by induction D0 is
defined as
D1
A(0)
and for any numeral m, DS(m) is defined as
1.2. PROOF TRANSFORMATIONS AND PROOF SEMANTICS IN INTUITIONISTIC ARITHMETIC 5
D2
∀αN.A(α)→ A(S(α))
A(m)→ A(S(m))
Dm
A(m)
A(S(m))
It is possible to show that any natural deduction proof without hypotheses of a closed
formula A can be transformed into a closed normal proof of A. Just by inspection and some
straigthforward reasoning on the resulting proof shape, one can show that if A = ∃xNB,
then the last inference rule must be of the form
B[t/αN]
∃αN.B
Hence one automatically finds a witness t for ∃xNB. If A = B1 ∨B2, then the last inference
rule must be of the form
Bi
B0 ∨B1
with i ∈ 0, 1: again a witness a required by Heyting semantics. The constructive information
of the original proof of A can thus be found by normalization.
In general, by normalization, it is possible to show that every formula provable in HA
has a construction, in the sense of Heyting. There is a remark to be done: without Heyting
semantics, the process of normalization would be perfectly non intelligible. One would only
see a sequence of transformations performed on a initial proof until a normal form proof
is found and, magically, a witness pops out of nothing. Moreover, normalization is not
a technique that can be used in an intuitive way, because it requires full formalization of
proofs and then to understand how the normalization process proceeds.
1.2.2. Proof Semantics for HA. We now explain how a formal proof semantics for
HA can be formulated in terms of Kreisel modified realizability [34]. Modified realizability
is a formalization of Heyting semantics, carefully carved and designed for HAω (but we
shall consider its restriction to HA). The idea is to restrict the class of algorithms used
in Heyting’s definition: only algorithm representable in Go¨del’s system T (see chapter 2)
are allowed. This is an important restriction: only bounded iteration is explicitly used by
such algorithms and this property rules out the possibility that the computational content
of proofs may be found by blind search and other constructively unjustified techniques (as
it might happen with trivial Kleene-style realizers [31]).
We start by associating types to formulas as to mirror the structure of the programs
used in Heyting semantics.
Definition 1.2.1 . (Types for realizers) For each arithmetical formula A we define a type
|A| of T by induction on A:
(1) |P (t1, . . . , tn)| = N,
(2) |A ∧B| = |A| × |B|,
(3) |A ∨B| = Bool× (|A| × |B|),
(4) |A→ B| = |A| → |B|,
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(5) |∀xA| = N→ |A|,
(6) |∃xA| = N× |A|
We now define the Kreisel modified realizability relation t  C. It is clear that a
modified realizer represents a construction in the sense of Heyting.
Definition 1.2.2 (Modified Realizability). Assume t is a closed term of Go¨del’s sys-
tem T (see chapter 2), C is a closed formula, and t : |C|. Let ~t = t1, . . . , tn : N. We define
the relation t  C by induction and by cases according to the form of C:
(1) t  P (~t) if and only if P (~t) = True
(2) t  A ∧B if and only if π0t  A and π1t  B
(3) t  A ∨B if and only if either p0t = True and p1t  A, or p0t = False and p2t  B
(4) t  A→ B if and only if for all u, if u  A, then tu s B
(5) t  ∀xA if and only if for all numerals n, tn  A[n/x]
(6) t  ∃xA if and only for some numeral n, π0t = n and π1t  A[n/x]
Thanks to Kreisel modified realizability and to the correspondence between typed
lambda terms and natural deduction proofs, one can give a new intuitive meaning to the
normalization process for intuitionistic proofs. One does that by decorating inference rules
with terms of system T in such a way that each of the natural deduction transformation
rules we have previously seen correspond to a normalization step in the associated term.
We shall present in chapter 3 the full decoration, here we consider only the case for→-rules:
u ⊢ A→ B t ⊢ A
ut ⊢ B
u ⊢ B
λx|A|u ⊢ A→ B
We see that, finally, the idea of Heyting construction, in the form of modified realizability,
is explicitly associated to the proof. Each inference rule either uses a realizer to compute
something or defines a realizer. If we consider a decorated deduction D
D1
u ⊢ B
λx|A|u ⊢ A→ B
D2
t ⊢ A
(λx|A|u)t ⊢ B
the previously described proof transformation rule of D in D1[D2/A] corresponds to the
normalization step (λx|A|u)t = u[t/x], which is simply the evaluation of a function at its
argument.
The point to be made here is the following. First, one has a local interpretation of each
inference rule in terms of realizability, that helps to understand what the rule itself means
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and what it is going to accomplish from the computational point of view. Moreover, every
axiom and every formula in general is given a computational meaning through realizabil-
ity. In this way, one understands what arithmetical assertions mean from the constructive
standpoint and what one has to do in order to constructively prove them. Without such
a semantics, it would not be possible for a human to understand in a simple way what is
the intuitive computational content that a proof offers. The goal of this dissertation is to
extend this result to HA+ EM1.
1.3. Learning in Classical Arithmetic: A Brief History
In this dissertation we provide a realizability semantics of HA+ EM1 classical proofs in
terms of learning. The first question we have to answer is therefore the following: what is to
be learned by realizers of classical proofs? Surprisingly, the answer was anticipated a long
time ago by Hilbert and his epsilon substitution method.
1.3.1. Learning in the Epsilon Substitution Method. Kreisel’s modified realizers
have not enough computational power for deciding truth of formulas and thus they are
prevented to realize classical principles such as the excluded middle; this limitation in turn
prevents them to decorate classical proofs with the aim of finding witnesses for classically
provable existential statements. However, as proven by Kreisel himself [33], one can extract
from a classical proof in PA of any Π02 formula ∀x
N∃yNPxy, with P decidable, a non trivial
algorithm that given any number n finds a witness m such that Pnm is true. This result
implies that even non constructive proofs of existence hide constructive information.
Hilbert’s idea (for a modern account, see [5]) to circumvent the apparent inability of
constructive methods to computationally interpret classical proofs, at least for Π02 provable
formulas, was to introduce non computable functions and to define through them classical
witnesses. The role of those non computable functions, called epsilon substitutions, is to
assign values to some non effectively evaluable epsilon terms. For each arithmetical formula
A(x) one introduces a term ǫxA(x), whose intended denotation can be any number n such
that A(n) is true. Thus, ǫxA(x) reads as “an x such that A(x)”. For every term t, one has
therefore an axiom
A(t)→ A(ǫxA(x))
which captures completely the intended meaning of an epsilon term. Such an axiom is
said to be a critical formula. Epsilon terms are not effectively computable, so one starts
with an epsilon substitution S that gives to them dummy values. In order to extract
the computational content of a classical proof, one has to satisfy all the critical formulas
appearing in the proof. Fortunately, there is only a finite number of them in any proof and
so nothing in principle makes the goal impossible. It turns out that one can learn values of
epsilon terms by counterexamples. Suppose, for instance, that a critical formula
A(t)→ A(ǫxA(x))
is false under some substitution S. Then, if we denote with S(ǫxA(x)) the value associated
to ǫxA(x) by S, we have that A(S(ǫxA(x))) is false. However, if t evaluates to n under S,
A(n) must be true! So, one updates the substitution S as to give to ǫxA(x) the value n,
because he has learned a witness through a counterexample. Things, however, are not so
easy: if there are many critical formulas, this attempt of making true one of them, may
make false another. Hilbert’s Ansatz (approach) was to show that a specially defined series
of this learning steps must terminate.
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Hilbert’s idea is brilliant, but it has never been used to give a semantics of classical
proofs. As to ourselves, we shall use it and we can now anticipate that the goal of our
learning based realizers will be to learn values of non computable functions.
1.3.2. Learning in Coquand Game Semantics. The concept of learning in classical
logic has been beautifully improved and reframed in terms of special Tarski games, in
which the participating players are allowed to correct their moves: this is Coquand games
semantics [14]. The interest, for our purposes, of this semantics, lies in the fact that the
concept of recursive winning strategy in a standard Tarski game is nothing but a rephrasing
of realizability: an adaptation of Tarski games to classical logic offers an opportunity to
translate back the new intuitions in a realizability semantics, which is more suitable to proof
interpretations.
We first review what is a Tarski game (actually, the concept was explicitly defined
by Hintikka (see [29]) and it is a sort of folklore). In a Tarski game there are two players,
Eloise and Abelard, and a negation-and-implication-free formula B on the board (we assume
that for every atomic formula its negation can also be expressed as an atomic formula).
Intuitively, Eloise tries to show that the formula is true, while Abelard tries to show that
it is false. Turns, sets of possible moves and winners are defined accordingly to the form of
B:
(1) If B = ∃xNA(x), then Eloise has to choose a numeral n and B is replaced by the
formula A(n).
(2) If B = ∀xNA(x), then Abelard has to choose a numeral n and B is replaced by the
formula A(n).
(3) If B = A1 ∨ A2, then Eloise has to choose a numeral i ∈ {0, 1} and B is replaced
by the formula Ai.
(4) If B = A1 ∧A2, then Abelard has to choose a numeral i ∈ {0, 1} and B is replaced
by the formula Ai.
(5) If B is atomic and true, Eloise wins the game, otherwise Abelard wins.
Informally, Eloise has a recursive winning strategy in this Tarski game, if she has an
algorithm for choosing her next moves that enables her to win every play. It is possible
to show that a formula has a construction in the sense of Heyting if and only if Eloise
has a recursive winning strategy in its associated Tarski game. In this sense, Tarski games
rephrase Heyting semantics.
It is not surprising, then, that Eloise does not have a recursive winning strategy for every
instance of the excluded middle EM1. Coquand solved this impasse by allowing Eloise to
backtrack, i.e. to erase her moves and return to a previous state of the game (actually,
when interpreting the cut rule, Coquand allowed also Abelard to backtrack, but we will not
consider this case). Again, learning by counterexamples enters the scene. It is possible to
prove that Eloise has a recursive winning strategy in the backtracking version of the Tarski
game associated to EM1. Suppose, for example, that
EM1 := ∀x
N. ∃yNPxy ∨ ∀yN¬Pxy
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and consider any play: we show how Eloise can win. Abelard has to move and, for some n,
chooses the formula
∃yNPny ∨ ∀yN¬Pny
Then it is the turn of Eloise, who believes that no witness for ∃yNPny can be found. So she
chooses
∀yN¬Pny
Again, Abelard for some m chooses
¬Pnm
If Pnm is false, then Eloise wins. But if Pnm is true, she would have lost the standard
Tarski game. However, according to the new rules, she can now backtrack to a previous
position. Observe that Abelard has falsified Eloise’s belief in the non existence of witnesses
for the formula ∃yNPny, actually providing one witness. So Eloise backtracks to the position
∃yNPny ∨ ∀yN¬Pny
and this time chooses
∃yNPny
followed by
Pnm
and so she wins.
We remark how close is this kind of learning to the one in epsilon substitution method.
In both cases, some formula wished to be true is false. But from its falsehood one can
always learn a new positive fact: a witness for an existential statement.
1.3.3. Learning in Avigad’s Update Procedures. In [5], Avigad has formulated
an abstract axiomatization of learning as it implicitly appears in the epsilon substitution
method for first order Peano Arithmetic. He has explicitly introduced the non computable
functions needed by the epsilon method to elicit the computational content of classical
proofs and formulated in a clear way the notion of update procedure that formalizes what
we call “learning by levels”.
We give a definition slightly different from Avigad’s, but analogous. Intuitively, a k-
ary update procedure, with k ∈ N+, is a functional which takes as input a finite sequence
f = f1, . . . , fk of functions approximating some oracles Φ1, . . . ,Φk, such that each one of
those functions is defined in terms of the previous ones. Then, it uses those functions to
compute some witnesses for some provable Σ01 formula of PA. Afterwards, it checks whether
the result of its computation is sound. If it is not, it identifies some wrong value fi(n) used
in the computation and corrects it with a new one.
Definition 1.3.1 (Update Procedures). A k-ary update procedure, k ∈ N+, is a con-
tinuous function U : (N→ N)k → N3∪{∅} (i.e., its output is determined by a finite number
of values of the input functions) such that the following holds:
(1) for all function sequences f = f1, . . . , fk
Uf = (i, n,m) =⇒ 1 ≤ i ≤ k
(2) for all function sequences f = f1, . . . , fk and g = g1, . . . , gk, for all 1 ≤ i < k, if
i) for all j < i, fj = gj ;
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ii) Uf = (i, n,m), gi(n) = m and Ug = (i, h, l)
then h 6= n.
If U is a k-ary update procedure, a zero for U is a sequence f = f1, . . . , fk of functions such
that Uf = ∅.
Condition (2) of definition 1.3.1 means that the values of the i-th function depend on
the values of some of the functions fj, with j < i, and learning on level i is possible only
if all the lower levels j have “stabilized”. In particular, if U is a k-ary update procedure
and f : (N → N)k is a sequence of functions approximating the oracles Φ1, . . . ,Φk, there
are two possibilities: either f is a fine approximation and then Uf = ∅; or f is not and
then Uf = (i, n,m), for some numerals n,m: U says the function fi should be updated
as to output m on input n. Moreover, if Uf = (i, n,m), one in a sense has learned that
Φi(n) = m: by definition of update procedure, if g is a function sequence agreeing with f in
its first i− 1 elements, gi is another candidate approximation of Φi and gi(n) = m, then Ug
does not represent a request to modify the value of gi at point n, for Ug = (i, h, l) implies
h 6= n.
The main theorem about update procedures is that they always have zeros and these
latter can be computed through learning processes guided by the former. Intuitively a zero of
an update procedure represents a good approximation of the oracles used in a computation,
and in particular a good enough one to yield some sought classical witness.
1.4. Learning in Classical Arithmetic: Contributions and Structure of This
Dissertation
The aim of this dissertation is to study and describe the computational content of
classical proofs in terms of learning. In particular, the contributions and the structure of
this dissertation are the following.
1.4.1. Chapter 3. Our first contribution is to put together in a novel way the ideas
contained in the epsilon substitution method, Coquand game semantics and Avigad’s update
procedures in order to define a realizability semantics of proofs which extends in a simple way
Kreisel modified realizability to the classical system HA+EM1: we shall call it (interactive)
learning based realizability.
In a few words, learning based realizability describes a way of making oracle compu-
tations more effective, through the use of approximations of oracle values and learning of
new values by counterexamples. A learning based realizer is in the first place a term of
system TClass, which is a simple extension Go¨del’s system T plus some oracles of the same
Turing degree of an oracle for the Halting problem. Of course, if a realizer was only this,
it would be ineffective and hence useless. Therefore, learning based realizers are computed
with respect to approximations of the oracles of TClass and thus effectiveness is recovered.
Since approximations may be sometimes inadequate, results of computations may be wrong.
But a learning based realizer is also a self-correcting program, able to spot incorrect oracle
values used during computations and to correct them with right values. The new values
are learned, surprisingly, by realizers of EM1 and all the oracle values needed during each
particular computation are acquired through learning processes. Here is the fundamental
insight: classical principle may be computationally interpreted as learning devices.
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Our realizability semantics allows not only to extract realizers as usual by decorating
classical proofs, but also to understand the intuitive meaning, behaviour and goals of the
extracted realizers.
1.4.2. Chapter 4. Our second contribution is, first, to extend the class of learning
based realizers to a classical version PCFClass of PCF and, then, to compare the result-
ing notion of realizability with Coquand game semantics and prove a full soundness and
completeness result. In particular, we show there is a one-to-one correspondence between
realizers and recursive winning strategies in the 1-Backtracking version of Tarski games.
The soundness theorem should be useful to understand the significance and see possible
uses of learning based realizability. The idea is that playing games represents a way of
challenging realizers and of seeing how they react to the challenge by learning from failure
and counterexamples.
The proof of the completeness theorem in our view, moreover, has an interesting feature.
In a sense, it is the first application of the ideas of learning based realizability to a concrete
non trivial classical proof, which is our version of the one given by Berardi et al. [9]. That
proof classically shows that if Eloise has recursive winning strategy in the 1-Backtracking
Tarski game associated to a formula A, then she also has a winning strategy in the Tarski
game associated to A (but a non computable strategy, only recursive in an oracle for the
Halting problem). We manage to associate a constructive content to this seemingly ineffec-
tive proof and find out that it hides a learning mechanism to gain correct oracle values from
failures and counterexamples. We then transform this learning mechanism into a learning
based realizer.
1.4.3. Chapter 5. Our third contribution is a complete and fully detailed constructive
analysis of learning as it arises in learning based realizability for HA+EM1, Avigad’s update
procedures and epsilon substitution method for Peano Arithmetic PA. We present new
constructive techniques to bound the length of learning processes and we apply them to
reprove - by means of our theory - the classic result of Kreisel that provably total functions
of PA can be represented in Go¨del’s system T. An interesting novelty is that we develop type-
theoretic techniques to reason and prove in a new way theorems about update procedures
and epsilon substitution method. A notable byproduct of our work is the introduction of
a “constructive” non standard model of Go¨del’s system T. Our analysis is also a first step
toward an extension of learning based realizability to full PA.
1.4.4. Chapter 6. Our last contribution is an axiomatization of the kind of learning
that is needed to computationally interpret Predicative classical second order Arithmetic.
Our work is an extension of Avigad’s and generalizes the concept of update procedure to the
transfinite case. Transfinite update procedures have to learn values of transfinite sequences
of non computable functions in order to extract witnesses from classical proofs. We shall
present several proofs of the fact that transfinite update procedures have zeros. The last
one uses methods of type theory and in particular bar recursion: the algorithms presented
are powerful and yet quite simple. The interest of our results is twofold. First, we extend
Avigad’s intuitive description of the learning content of the epsilon substitution method to
the second order case. Secondly, we take a first step toward the extension of learning based
realizability to Predicative second order Arithmetic, since we have isolated the concept of
learning that will have to be employed.

CHAPTER 2
Technical Preliminaries
2.1. Background
This dissertation is almost self-contained from the technical point of view. We cover the
needed background here by reviewing what will be our main technical tool: Go¨del’s System
T.
2.1.1. Go¨del’s system T. Go¨del’s system T (see [21], for example) is simply typed
λ-calculus, enriched with natural numbers, booleans, conditional ifT and primitive recursion
RT in all types together with their associated reduction rules. We start by defining the types
of system T.
Definition 2.1.1 (Types of System T). The set of types of system T is defined induc-
tively as follows:
(1) N and Bool are types.
(2) If U, V are types, U × V , U → V are types.
The type N represents the set N of natural numbers and Bool represents the set B =
{True,False} of booleans, while product types T × U and arrows types T → U represent
respectively cartesian products and function spaces. We assume → associates to the left:
T → U → V = T → (U → V )
Definition 2.1.2 (Terms of System T). We define the terms of system T inductively
as follows:
(1) For all types U , the variables xU0 , . . . , x
U
n , . . . are terms of type U .
(2) 0 is a term of type N. True and False are terms of type Bool.
(3) For every type T , ifU is a term (constant) of type U := Bool→ T → T → T . Terms
of the form ifT t1t2t3 will be written in the more legible form if t1 then t2 else t3.
(4) For every type T , RU is a term (recursion constant) of type U := T → (N→ (T →
T )) → N → T . The type T in RT will be omitted whenever inferable from the
context.
(5) If t is of type N, then S(t) is a term of type N.
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(6) If t and u are terms of types respectively U → V and U , then tu is a term of type V .
(7) If t is a term of type U × V , then π0t and π1t are terms of types respectively U
and V .
(8) If u and v are terms of types respectively U and V , then 〈u, v〉 is a term of type
U × V .
(9) If v is a term of type V and xU a variable, then λxUv is a term of type U → V .
As usual, given two terms u and t and a variable x, with u[t/x] we shall denote the
term resulting from u by replacing all free occurrences of x in u with t, avoiding capture of
variables.
We now give the reduction rules that explain the computational meaning of the syntax
of system T.
Definition 2.1.3 (One Step β0 Reduction and β Reduction). We define a binary
relation β0 between terms of system T as the least relation satisfying the following properties:
(1) If u β0 u
′ and v β0 v
′, then for all terms u, v, it holds that uv β0 u
′v, uv β0 uv
′,
〈u, v〉 β0 〈u
′, v〉 and 〈u, v〉 β0 〈u, v
′〉.
(2) If u β0 u
′, then λxTu β0 λx
Tu′ and πiu β0 πiu
′ for i = 0, 1.
(3) (λxTu)t β0 u[t/x].
(4) πi〈u0, u1〉 β0 ui for i = 0, 1.
(5) Ruv0 β0 u.
(6) RuvS(t) β0 vt(Ruvt).
(7) if True then u1 else u2 β0 u1 and if False then u1 else u2 β0 u2.
(8) t β t′ if t = t′ or t β0 u1 β0 u2 β0 . . . β0 un β0 t
′ for some terms u1, u2 . . . , un.
(9) We say that t is in normal form if t β0 t
′ does not hold, for every t′.
We now define the equality rules for terms of system T. Throughout the dissertation
we will write u = t if the equation is provable by means of the following rules.
Definition 2.1.4 (Equational Theory of T ). We list the axioms of equality for system
T:
(1) t = t.
2.1. BACKGROUND 15
(2) If t = u, then u = t.
(3) If t = u and u = v, then t = v.
(4) If u = u′ and v = v′, then uv = u′v′ and 〈u, v〉 = 〈u′, v′〉.
(5) If u = u′, then λxV u = λxV u′ and πiu = πiu
′ for i = 0, 1.
(6) (λxTu)t = u[t/x].
(7) πi〈u0, u1〉 = ui for i = 0, 1.
(8) Ruv0 = u.
(9) RuvS(t) = vt(Ruvt).
(10) if True then u1 else u2 = u1 and if False then u1 else u2 = u2.
Every term of Go¨del’s system T has a unique normal form (see [21]).
Theorem 2.1.1 (Normalization and Church-Rosser Property). For every term t
of system T there exists n ∈ N such that t β0 t1 β0 . . . β0 tm implies m ≤ n. Hence, t has a
normal form.
Moreover, if t β t1 and t β t2, then there exists t
′ such that t1 β t
′ and t2 β t
′. As
consequence, t has a unique normal form.
A term is closed if it has no free variables; a numeral is a term of the form Sn(0), with
n ∈ N, having inductively defined S0(0) := 0 and Sn+1(0) := S(Sn(0)). We will constantly
use the following characterization of normal forms (see again [21]).
Theorem 2.1.2 (Normal Form Characterization for System T). Assume A is an
atomic type. Then any closed normal term t of T of type A is either a numeral n : N or a
boolean True, False : Bool.

CHAPTER 3
Interactive Learning-Based Realizability for Heyting
Arithmetic with EM1
Abstract. In this chapter, we extend Kreisel modified realizability to a classical fragment
of first order Arithmetic, Heyting Arithmetic plus EM1 (Excluded middle axiom restricted
to Σ01 formulas). In particular, we introduce a new realizability semantics we call “Interac-
tive Learning-Based Realizability”. Our realizers are self-correcting programs, which are
able to learn something from every failure and use the new knowledge to correct them-
selves. We build our semantics over Avigad’s fixed point result [5], but the same semantics
may be defined over different constructive interpretations of classical arithmetic (in [10],
continuations are used). Our notion of realizability extends intuitionistic realizability and
differs from it only in the atomic case: we interpret atomic realizers as “learning agents”.
3.1. Introduction
From now on, we will call HA Heyting Intuitionistic Arithmetic, with a language includ-
ing one symbol for each primitive recursive predicate or function (see [15] or section 3.3).
We call Σ01-formulas the set of all formulas ∃x.P (x, y) for some primitive recursive predicate
P , and EM1 the Excluded middle axiom restricted to Σ
0
1-formulas. For a detailed study of
the intuitionistic consequences of the sub-classical axiom EM1 we refer to [1].
This chapter is based on Aschieri and Berardi [3]. We extend Berardi and de’ Liguoro
([7], [10]) notion of atomic realizability - originally conceived for quantifier free primitive
recursive Arithmetic plus EM1 - to full predicate logic, namely Heyting Arithmetic with
EM1 (HA + EM1). Our idea is to interpret classical proofs as constructive proofs on a
suitable structure N for natural numbers and maps of Go¨del’s system T, by applying to
the semantics of Arithmetic the idea of “finite approximation” used to interpret Herbrand’s
Theorem. We extend intuitionistic realizability to a new notion of realizability, which we call
“Interactive learning-based Realizability”. We provide a term assignment for the standard
natural deduction system of HA + EM1, which is surprisingly equal in all respects to that
of HA, but for the fact that we have non-trivial realizers for atomic formulas and a new
realizer for EM1.
Our semantics is “local”: we do not introduce a global variable representing an “ex-
ternal” goal, different for each particular proof one wants to interpret, as in continuation
interpretation, in Friedman’s A-translation and in Krivine’s Classical Realizability. The
goal of realizers is fixed, “internal”, and is either to provide right constructions or to learn
new information about excluded middle. In this way, we interpret EM1 and thus classical
proofs locally and step-by-step, in order to solve a major problem of all computational
interpretations: global illegibility, which means that, even for simple classical proofs, it is
extremely difficult to understand how each step of the extracted program is related to the
ideas of the proof, and what it is the particular task performed by each subprogram of the
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extracted program. The main sources of inspiration of this chapter are works of Kleene,
Hilbert, Coquand, Hayashi, Berardi and de’ Liguoro and Avigad.
Intuitionistic Realizability revisited. Recall chapter 1. In [31], Kleene introduced the
notion of realizability, a formal semantics for intuitionistic arithmetic. Later, Kreisel [34]
defined modified realizability, the same notion but with respect to Go¨del’s system T in-
stead of Kleene’s formalism of partial recursive functions. Realizability is nothing but a
formal version of Heyting semantics for intuitionistic logic, translated into the language of
arithmetic.
Intuitively, realizing a closed arithmetical formula A means exhibiting a computer pro-
gram - called realizer - able to calculate all relevant information about the truth of A.
Hence, realizing a formula A ∨ B means realizing A or realizing B, after calculating which
one of the two is actually realized; realizing a formula ∃xA(x) means computing a numeral
n - called a witness - and realizing A(n).
These two cases are indeed the only ones in which we have relevant information to
calculate about the truth of the corresponding formula, and there is a decision to be made:
realizing a formula ∀xA means exhibiting an algorithm which takes as input a numeral n
and gives as output realizers of A(n); realizing a formula A ∧ B means realizing A and
realizing B; realizing A → B means providing an algorithm which takes as input realizers
of A and gives realizers of B; in these cases we provide no information about the formula
we realize and we only take the inputs we will use for realizing existential or disjunctive
formulas. Finally, realizing an atomic formula means that the formula is true: in this case,
the realizer does nothing at all.
Hence, intuitionistic realizability closely follows Tarski’s definition of truth - the only
difference being effectiveness: for instance, while Tarski, to assert that ∃xA is true, con-
tented himself to know that there exists some n such that A(n) is true, Kleene asked for a
program that calculates an n such that A(n) is true.
Intuitionistic natural deduction rules are perfectly suited to preserve realizability. In
order to actually build realizers from intuitionistic natural deductions, it suffices to give
realizers for the axioms. Since our goal is to interpret classical connectives using Heyting
and Kleene interpretation of intuitionistic connectives, then a first, quite naive idea would
be the following: if we devised realizers for Excluded Middle, we would be able to extend
realizability to all classical arithmetic.
Unfortunately, from the work of Turing it is well known that not every instance of
Excluded Middle is realizable. If Txyz is Kleene’s predicate, realizing ∀x∀y.∃zTxyz ∨
∀z¬Txyz implies exhibiting an algorithm which for every n,m calculates whether or not
the n-th Turing machine halts on input m: the halting problem would be decidable. Hence,
there is no hope of computing with effective programs all the information about the truth
of Excluded Middle.
However, not all is lost. A key observation is the following. Suppose we had a realizer O
of the Excluded Middle and we made a natural deduction of a formula ∃xA actually using
Excluded Middle; then, we would be able to extract from the proof a program u, containing
O as subprogram, able to compute the witness for ∃xA. Given the effectiveness of u, after a
finite number of steps - and more importantly, after a finite number of calls to O - u would
yield the required witness. It is thus clear that u, to perform the calculation, would use
only a finite piece of information about the Excluded Middle. This fundamental fact gives
us hope: maybe there is not always necessity of fully realizing Excluded Middle, since in
finite computations only a finite amount of information is used. If we were able to gain
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that finite information during the computation, as it is the case in the proof of Herbrand’s
Theorem, we could adapt intuitionistic realizability to Classical Logic.
Herbrand’s Theorem and the idea of “finite approximation”. (A corollary of) Herbrand’s
Theorem says that if a universal first order theory T , in a suitable language supporting
definition by cases, proves a statement ∃xP (x), then one can extract from any proof a term
t and closed instances A1, . . . , An of some universal formulas of T such that A1∧ . . .∧An →
P (t) is a propositional tautology. So, even using classical logic, one can define witnesses.
The problem is that the functions occurring in t may not be computable, because the
language of T is allowed to contain arbitrary functions. However, given the finiteness of the
information needed about any function used during any finite computation of t, in order
to carry out actual calculations one would only have to find finite approximations of the
non-computable functions involved, thus recovering effectiveness. We choose to follow this
intuition: we will add non-computable functions to our language for realizers and exploit
the existence of these ideal objects in order to find concrete computational solutions.
This general idea dates back to Hilbert’s ǫ-substitution method (for a neat reformulation
of the ǫ-method see for example Avigad [5]). As noted by Ackermann [2], the ǫ- substitution
method may be used to compute witnesses of provable existential statements of first order
Peano Arithmetic. The procedure is simple: introduce Skolem functions (equivalently, ǫ-
terms) and correspondent quantifier free Skolem axioms in order to reduce any axiom to
a quantifier free form; take a PA-proof of a sentence ∃xP (x) and translate it into a proof
using as axioms only universal formulas; then apply Herbrand’s theorem to the resulting
proof, obtaining a quantifier free proof of P (t), for some term t of the extended language;
finally, calculate a suitable finite approximation of the Skolem functions occurring in t and
calculate from t an n such that P (n) holds.
However, while proofs in quantifier free style are very simple combinatorial objects, they
lose the intuitive appeal, the general concepts, the structure of high level proofs. Hence, it
may be an impossible task to understand extracted programs. Moreover we have a com-
putational syntactic method but no semantics of proofs and logical operators based on the
idea of “finite approximation”, as the realizability interpretations are based on the idea of
“construction”. However, in the ǫ-method, albeit only for quantifier free formulas, we see in
action the method of intelligent learning, driven by the Skolem axioms used in the proofs.
One of the aims of this chapter is to extend this “semantics of learning” from atomic propo-
sitions to individuals, maps, logical connectives and quantifiers of full natural deduction
proofs. An important contribution comes from Coquand [14].
Coquand’s Game Semantics for Classical Arithmetic. Computing all relevant infor-
mation about the truth of a given formula A is not always possible. In [14] and in the
context of game semantics, Coquand introduced a new key idea around this problem: the
correspondence between backtracking (in game theory, retracting a move) and “learning”,
a refinement of the idea of “finite approximation”. If we cannot compute all the right in-
formation about the truth of a formula, maybe we could do this if we were allowed to make
finitely many mistakes and to learn from them.
Suppose, for instance, we have the formula ∀x.∃yPxy ∨ ∀y¬Pxy, but we have no algo-
rithm which, for all numeral n given as input, outputs false if ∀y¬Pny holds and outputs
true if ∃yPny holds. Then we may describe a learning algorithm r as follows. Initially,
for all n given as input, r outputs false. Intuitively, r is initially persuaded - following the
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principle “if I don’t see, I do not believe” - that for all numeral n there is no numeralm such
that Pnm holds. Hence, when asked for his opinion about the formula ∃yPny ∨ ∀y¬Pny,
r always says: ∃yPny is false. However, if someone - an opponent of r - to show that r
is wrong, comes out with an m such that Pnm holds, r realizes indeed to be mistaken,
and stores the information “Pnm is true”. Then, the next time being asked for an opinion
about ∃yPny ∨ ∀y¬Pny, r will say: true. In other words, such r, after at most one “mind
changing”, would be able to learn the correct answer to any question of the form: “which
one among ∃yPny, ∀y¬Pny does hold?”. This is actually learning by counterexamples and
is the key idea behind Coquand’s semantics.
Our question is now: can we formulate a realizability notion based on learning by
counterexamples in order to extend Kreisel’s interpretation to all individuals, maps and
connectives of the sub-classical Arithmetic HA+ EM1? Following Hayashi [28], in our solu-
tion we modify the notion of individual, in such a way that individuals change with time,
and realizers “interact” with them.
Hayashi’s Proof Animation and Realizability. In [28], Hayashi explains a notion of
realizability for a sub-classical arithmetic, called limit computable mathematics. Basing
his analysis on ideas of Gold [22], he defines a Kleene’s style notion of realizability equal
to the original one but for the fact that the notion of individual changes: the witnesses of
existential and disjunctive formulas are calculated by a stream of guesses and “learned in
the limit” (in the sense that the limit of the stream is a correct witness). An individual a is
therefore a computable map a : N → N, with a(t) representing the value of the individual
at time t.
For instance, how would Hayashi realize the formula ∀x.∃yPxy ∨ ∀y¬Pxy? He would
define an algorithm H as follows. Given any numeral n, H would calculate the truth
value of ∀y ≤ nPny. Then the correct answer to the question: “which one among ∃yPny,
∀y¬Pny does hold?” is learned in the limit by computing P (n, 0), P (n, 1), P (n, 2),. . . ,
P (n, k),. . . and thus producing a stream of guesses either of the form false, false, false,. . . ,
true, true,. . . , true,. . . or of the form false, false, false, . . . , false, . . . , the first stabilizing in
the limit to true, the second to false. Hayashi’s idea is to perform a completely blind and
exhaustive search: in such a way, the correct answer is guaranteed to be eventually learned
(classically). Hayashi’s realizers do not learn in an efficient way: in Hayashi’s notion of
realizability the only learning device is to look through all possible cases. Instead, we want
to combine the idea of individual as limit, taken from Hayashi, with notion of learning in
which the stream of guesses is driven by the proof itself, as in Coquand’s game semantics.
For the quantifier-free fragment, this was done by Berardi [7] and Berardi-de’ Liguoro [10].
Realizability Based on Learning: Berardi-de’ Liguoro interpretation. We explain [10]
using Popper’s ideas [40] as a metaphor. According to Popper, a scientific theory relies
on a set of unproved - and unprovable - hypotheses and, through logic, makes predictions
susceptible of being falsified by experiments. If a prediction is falsified, some hypothesis
is incorrect. In front of a counterexample to a theory’s prediction, one must modify the
set of hypotheses and build a better theory, which will be tested by experiments, and so
on. Laws of Nature are universal statements, that cannot be verified, but are suitable to
falsification. We may explain the link between falsifiable hypotheses and EM1. For every
n, given an instance ∃y.Pny ∨ ∀y.¬Pny of EM1 (with P atomic), we may formulate an
hypothesis about which side of the disjunction is true. If we know that Pnm is true for
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some m, we know that ∃y.Pny is true. Otherwise we may assume ∀y.¬Pny as hypothesis,
because it is a falsifiable hypothesis.
We formalize the process of making hypotheses about EM1 by a finite state of knowledge,
called S, collecting the instances Pnm which we know to hold, e.g. by direct calculation. If
we have evidence that Pnm holds for some m (that is, Pnm ∈ S) we know that ∃yPny is
true; in the other case, we assume that ∀y¬Pny is true. So S defines a set of hypotheses on
EM1, of the form ∀y¬Pny: universal falsifiable statements. Using S a realizer r may effec-
tively decide which side of a given instance of EM1 is true, at the price of making mistakes:
to decide if ∀y¬Pny is true, r looks for any Pnm in the finite state S and outputs “false”
if the research is successful, “true” otherwise. If and when from an hypothesis ∀y¬Pny we
obtain some false conclusion ¬Pnm, the realizer r returns the additional knowledge: “Pnm
is true”, to be added to S.
Extending Berardi-de’ Liguoro interpretation to HA+EM1. In our chapter, we interpret
each classical proof p of A in HA+ EM1 by a “learning realizer” r. r returns a “prediction”
of the truth of this formula, based on the information in S, and some additional knowledge
in the case the prediction is effectively falsified. For example, in front of a formula ∃x.A∧B,
a realizer r predicts that A(n) ∧ B(n) is true for some numeral n (and since n depends on
S, in our model we change the notion of individual, interpreting “numbers” as computable
maps from the set of bases of knowledge to N). Then r predicts, say, that B(n) is true,
and so on, until r arrives at some atomic formula, say ¬Pnm. Either Pnm is actually true,
or r is able to effectively find one or more flawed hypothesis ∀x.¬Q1n1x, . . . ,∀x.¬Qknkx
among the hypotheses used to predict that Pnm is true, and for each flawed hypothesis
one counterexample Q1n1m1, . . . , Qknkmk. In this case, r requires to enlarge our state of
knowledge S by including the information “Q1n1m1 is true”, . . . , “Qknkmk is true”.
Our Interactive Realizability differs from Intuitionistic Realizability in the notion of
individual (the value of an individual may depend on our knowledge state), and in the
realizability relation for the atomic case. In our interpretation, to realize an atomic formula
does not mean that the formula is true, but that the realizer requires to extend our state of
knowledge S if the formula is not true. The realizer is thought as a learning device. Each
extension of S may change the value of the individuals which are parameters of the atomic
formula, and therefore may make the atomic formula false again. Then the realizer requires
to extend S again, and so forth. The convergence of this “interaction” between a realizer
and a group of individuals follows by Avigad’s fixed point thm. [5] (a constructive proof
may be found in [7]), and it is the analogue of the termination of Hilbert’s ǫ-substitution
method.
Why the Arithmetic HA + EM1 instead of considering the full Peano Arithmetic? We
have two main reasons. First, we observe that EM1 enjoys a very good property: the
information about its truth can be computed in the limit, in the sense of Gold [22], as
we saw en passant when discussing Hayashi’s realizability. This implies that witnesses for
existential and disjunctive statements too can be learned in the limit, as shown in Hayashi
[28]. In chapter 4 we show that realizers which we will be able to extract from proofs have a
straightforward interpretation as winning strategies in 1-Backtracking games [9], which are
the most natural and simple instances of Coquand’s style games. Secondly, a great deal of
mathematical theorems are proved by using EM1 alone ([1], [8]). Third, as shown in chapter
5, already HA + EM1 - plus Go¨del’s double negation translation - suffices to interpret all
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provably total recursive functions of PA, with the advantage of eliminating the extra step
of Friedman or Dialectica translation (see Kohlenbach for [32] these latter)
Plan of the Chapter. The chapter is organized as follows. In §3.2 we define the term
calculus in which our realizers will be written: a version of Go¨del’s system T, extended
with some syntactic sugar, in order to represent bases of knowledge (which we shall call
states) and to manipulate them. Then we prove a convergence property for this calculus
(as in Avigad [5] or in [7]). In §3.3, we introduce the notion of realizability and prove our
Main Theorem, the Adequacy Theorem: “if a closed arithmetical formula is provable in
HA + EM1, then it is realizable”. In §3.4 we conclude the discussion about our notion of
realizability by comparing it with other notions of realizability for classical logic, then we
consider some possible future work.
3.2. The Term Calculus
In this section we formalize the intuition of “learning realizer” we discussed in the
introduction.
We associate to any instance ∃yPxy ∨ ∀y¬Pxy of EM1 (Excluded Middle restricted to
Σ01-formulas) two functions χP and ϕP . The function χP takes a knowledge state S, a
numeral n, and returns a guess for the truth value of ∃y.Pny. When this guess is “true”
the function ϕP returns a witness m of ∃y.Pny. The guess for the truth value of ∃y.Pny
is computed w.r.t. the knowledge state S, and it may be wrong. For each constant s
denoting some knowledge state S, the function λxN χP (s, x) is some “approximation” of an
ideal map λxN XP (x), the oracle returning the truth value of ∃y.Pxy. In the same way,
the function λxN φP (s, x) is some “approximation” of an ideal map λx
N ΦP (x), the Skolem
map for ∃y.Pxy, returning some y such that Pxy if any, and 0 otherwise. The Skolem
axioms effectively used by a given proof take the place of a set of experiments testing the
correctness of the predictions made by ϕP (s, x), χP (s, x) about XP (x),ΦP (x) (we do not
check the correctness of ϕP , χP in an exhaustive way, but only on the values required by
the Skolem axioms used by a proof).
Our Term Calculus is an extension of Go¨del’s system T (see chapter 2 or [21]). From
now on, if t, u are terms of T with t = u we denote provable equality in T. If k ∈ N, the
numeral denoting k is the closed normal term k = Sk(0) of type N. All closed normal terms
of type N are numerals (see chapter 2). We recall that any closed normal term of type Bool
in T is True or False.
We introduce a notation for ternary projections: if T = A× (B ×C), with p0, p1, p2 we
respectively denote the terms π0, λx : T.π0(π1(x)), λx : T.π1(π1(x)). If u = 〈u0, 〈u1, u2〉〉 :
T , then piu = ui in T for i = 0, 1, 2. We abbreviate 〈u0, 〈u1, u2〉〉 : T with 〈u0, u1, u2〉 : T .
We formalize the idea of “finite information about EM1” by the notion of state of knowledge.
Definition 3.2.1 (States of Knowledge and Consistent Union). We define:
(1) A k-ary predicate of T is any closed normal term P : Nk → Bool of T.
(2) An atom is any triple 〈P,~n,m〉, where P is a (k+ 1)-ary predicate, ~n,m are k+ 1
numerals, and P~nm = True in T.
(3) Two atoms 〈P,~n,m〉, 〈P ′, ~n′,m′〉 are consistent if P = P ′ and ~n = ~n′ implym = m′.
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(4) A state of knowledge, shortly a state, is any finite set S of pairwise consistent atoms.
(5) Two states S1, S2 are consistent if S1 ∪ S2 is a state.
(6) S is the set of all states of knowledge.
(7) The consistent union S1US2 of S1, S2 ∈ S is S1 ∪ S2 ∈ S minus all atoms of S2
which are inconsistent with some atom of S1.
We think of an atom 〈P,~n,m〉 as the code of a witness for ∃y.P (~n, y). Consistency
condition allows at most one witness for each ∃y.P (~n, y) in each knowledge state S. Two
states S1, S2 are consistent if and only if each atom of S1 is consistent with each atom of
S2.
S1US2 is an non-commutative operation: whenever an atom of S1 and an atom of S2
are inconsistent, we arbitrarily keep the atom of S1 and we reject the atom of S2, therefore
for some S1, S2 we have S1US2 6= S2US1. U is a “learning strategy”, a way of selecting a
consistent subset of S1 ∪ S2. It is immediate to show that U is an associative operation on
the set of consistent states, with neutral element ∅, with upper bound S1∪S2, and returning
a non-empty state whenever S1 ∪ S2 is non-empty.
Lemma 3.2.2 . Assume i ∈ N and S1, . . . , Si ∈ S.
(1) S1U . . .USi ⊆ S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Si
(2) S1U . . .USi = ∅ implies S1 = . . . = Si = ∅.
In fact, the whole realizability Semantics is a Monad [12]. In [12], it is proved that our
realizability Semantics is parametric with respect to the definition we choose for U . Any
associative operation U , with neutral element ∅ and satisfying the two properties of Lemma
3.2.2, defines a different but sound realizability Semantics, corresponding to a different
“learning strategy”. An immediate consequence of Lemma 3.2.2 is:
Lemma 3.2.3 . Assume S, S1, S2 ∈ S.
(1) If S is consistent with S1, S2, then S is consistent with S1US2.
(2) If S is disjoint with S1, S2, then S is disjoint with S1US2.
For each state of knowledge S we assume having a unique constant s denoting it. We
denote the state denoted by a constant s with |s| and as usual with | |−1 the inverse of | |;
that is, ||s||−1 = s. We assume ∅ is the state constant denoting the empty state ∅; that is,
|∅| = ∅. We define with
TS = T+ S+ {s | |s| ∈ S}
the extension of T with one atomic type S denoting S, and a constant s for each state
S ∈ S, and no new reduction rule. We denote states by S, S′, . . . and state constants by
s, s′, . . .. Any closed normal form of type N, Bool, S in TS is, respectively, some numeral n,
some boolean True, False, some state constant s. Computation on states will be defined
by some suitable set of algebraic reduction rules we call “functional”.
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Definition 3.2.4 (Functional set of rules). Let C be any set of constants, each one of
some type A1 → . . .→ An → A, for some A1, . . . , An, A ∈ {Bool, N, S}. We say that R is a
functional set of reduction rules for C if R consists, for all c ∈ C and all a1 : A1, . . . , an : An
closed normal terms of TS, of exactly one rule ca1 . . . an 7→ a, for some closed normal term
a : A of TS.
Theorem 3.2.5 . Assume that R is a functional set of reduction rules for C (def. 3.2.4).
Then TS + C + R enjoys: i) strong normalization; ii) weak-Church-Rosser (uniqueness of
normal forms) for all closed terms of atomic types.
Proof. (Sketch) For strong normalization, see Berger [13] (the constants s : S and
c ∈ C are trivially strongly computable). For weak Church-Rosser property, we start from
the fact that there is the canonical set-theoretical modelM of TS+C+R. The interpretation
of Bool, N, S in M consists of all closed normal form of these types. Arrows and pairs are
interpreted set-theoretically. Each constant c ∈ C is interpreted by some map fc, defined
by fc(a1, . . . , an) = a for all reduction rules (ca1 . . . an 7→ a) ∈ R. Assume u, v : A are
closed normal term, A = Bool, N, or S is an atomic type, and u, v are equal in TS +C +R,
in order to prove that u, v are the same term. u, v are equal in M becauseM is a model of
TS + C +R. By induction on w we prove that if w is a closed normal form of atomic type
T + C + R, then w is a numeral, or True, False, or a state constant, and therefore w is
interpreted by itself in M. From u, v equal in M we conclude that u, v are the same term
of TS + C +R.

We define two extensions of TS: an extension TClass with symbols denoting the non-
computable maps XP ,ΦP and no computable reduction rules, another extension TLearn,
with the computable approximations χP , φP of XP ,ΦP , and a computable set of reduction
rules. We use the elements of TClass to represent non-computable realizers, and the elements
of TLearn to represent a computable “approximation” of a realizer. In the next definition,
we denote terms of type S by ρ, ρ′, . . ..
Definition 3.2.6 . Assume P : Nk+1 → Bool is a k + 1-ary predicate of T. We introduce
the following constants:
(1) XP : N
k → Bool and ΦP : N
k → N.
(2) χP : S→ N
k → Bool and ϕP : S→ N
k → N.
(3) ⋒ : S→ S→ S.
(4) AddP : N
k+1 → S and addP : S→ N
k+1 → S.
We denote ⋒ρ1ρ2 with ρ1 ⋒ ρ2.
(1) ΞS is the set of all constants χP , ϕP ,⋒, addP .
(2) Ξ is the set of all constants XP ,ΦP ,⋒,AddP .
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(3) TClass = TS + Ξ.
(4) A term t ∈ TClass has state ∅ if it has no state constant different from ∅.
Let ~t = t1 . . . tk. We interpret χP s~t and ϕP s~t respectively as a “guess” for the values
of the oracle and the Skolem map XP and ΦP for ∃y.P~ty, guess computed w.r.t. the
knowledge state denoted by the constant s. There is no set of computable reduction rules
for the constants ΦP ,XP ∈ Ξ, and therefore no set of computable reduction rules for TClass.
If s1, s2 are state constants, we interpret s1⋒s2 as denoting the consistent union |s1|U|s2|.
AddP denotes the map constantly equal to the empty state ∅. addP s~nm denotes the empty
state ∅ if we cannot add the atom 〈P,~n,m〉 to |s|, either because 〈P,~n, l〉 ∈ |s| for some
numeral l, or because P~nm = False; addP s~nm denotes the state {〈P,~n,m〉} otherwise. We
define a system TLearn with reduction rules over ΞS by a functional reduction set RS.
Definition 3.2.7 (The System TLearn). Let s, s1, s2 be state constants. Let 〈P,~n,m〉 be
an atom. RS is the following functional set of reduction rules for ΞS:
χP s~n 7→
{
True if ∃m. 〈P,~n,m〉 ∈ |s|
False otherwise
ϕP s~n 7→
{
m if ∃m. 〈P,~n,m〉 ∈ |s|
0 otherwise
addP s~nm 7→
{
∅ if ∃l. 〈P,~n, l〉 ∈ |s| ∨ P~nm = False
|{〈P,~n,m〉}|−1 otherwise
s1 ⋒ s2 7→ s3, where s3 is the state constant such that |s3| = |s1|U|s2|
We define TLearn = TS + ΞS +RS.
Remark. TLearn is nothing but TS with some “syntactic sugar”. By Theorem 3.2.5,
TLearn is strongly normalizing and has the weak Church-Rosser property for closed term of
atomic types. TLearn satisfies a Normal Form Property.
Lemma 3.2.8 (Normal Form Property for TLearn). Assume A is either an atomic
type or a product type. Then any closed normal term t ∈ TLearn of type A is: a numeral
n : N, or a boolean True, False : Bool, or a state constant s : S, or a pair 〈u, v〉 : B × C.
Proof. (Sketch) By induction over t. For some ~v, either t is (λ~x.u)(~v), or t is 〈u,w〉(~v),
or t is x(~v) for some variable x, or t is c(~v) for some constant c, and either c = 0,S, True, False, s,
RT , ifT , πi is some constant of TS, or c ∈ ΞS. If t = (λ~x.u)(~v), then t has an arrow type
if ~v = ∅, while t is not normal if ~v 6= ∅. If t = 〈u,w〉(~v), then ~v = ∅ and we are done. If
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t = x(~v) then t is not closed. The only case left is t = c(~u) : A. A is not an arrow type,
therefore all arguments of c are in ~u. If t = 0 we are done, if t = S(u) we apply the induction
hypothesis, if t = True, False : Bool or t = s : S or t = 〈u, v〉 we are done. Otherwise
either t = RT (n, f, a)~t, ifT (b, a1, a2)~t, πi(v)~t, or t = χP (u, ~w) : N, or t = ϕP (u, ~w) : N, or
t = ⋒(u1, u2) : S, or t = addP (u, ~w) : S. The proper subterms n,w1, . . . , wk : N, b : Bool,
v : A×B, u, u1, u2 : S of t have atomic or product type and are closed normal. By induction
hypothesis they are, respectively, a numeral, a boolean, a pair, a state constant. In all cases,
t is not normal.

Let t1t2 ∈ TLearn be two closed terms of type S. We abbreviate “the normal forms
of t1, t2 denote two states which are consistent and disjoint” by: t1, t2 are consistent and
disjoint. ∅, s are consistent and disjoint for every state constant s. The maps denoted by
⋒, addP preserve the relation “to be consistent and disjoint”.
Lemma 3.2.9 . Assume s, s1, s2 are state constants and 〈P,~n,m〉 is an atom.
(1) s, (addP s~nm) are consistent and disjoint.
(2) Assume s, s1 are consistent and disjoint, and s, s2 are consistent and disjoint. Then
s, s1 ⋒ s2 are consistent and disjoint.
Proof. (1) If addP s~nm denotes the empty state the thesis is immediate. Oth-
erwise addP s~nm denotes {〈P,~n,m〉} and 〈P,~n, l〉 6∈ |s| for all numerals l. Then
{〈P,~n,m〉} is consistent and disjoint with |s|.
(2) By Lemma 3.2.3.

Each (in general, non-computable) term t ∈ TClass is associated to a set {t[s] |s is a
state constant} ⊆ TLearn of computable terms we call its “approximations”, one for each
state constant s.
Definition 3.2.10 (Approximation at state s). Assume t ∈ TClass and s is a state
constant. We call “approximation of t at state s” the term t[s] of TLearn obtained from t
by replacing each constant XP with χP s, each constant ΦP with ϕP s, each constant AddP
with addP s.
We interpret any t[s] ∈ TLearn as a learning process evaluated w.r.t. the information
taken from a state constant s (the same s for the whole term).
Assume t ∈ TClass is closed, t : S and s is a state constant. Then t[s] is a closed term of
TLearn, and its normal form, by the Normal Form Property 3.2.8, is some state constant s
′.
We conclude t[s] = s′ in TLearn. We prove that s, s
′ are consistent and disjoint.
Lemma 3.2.11 . Assume s is a state constant, t ∈ TClass, t : S is closed, and all state
constants in t are consistent and disjoint with s.
(1) If t[s] reduces to t′[s], then all state constants in t′ are consistent and disjoint with s.
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(2) s, t[s] are consistent and disjoint.
(3) If u ∈ TClass, u : S and all state constants in u are ∅, then s, u[s] are consistent
and disjoint.
Proof. (1) It is enough to consider a one-step reduction. Suppose that t[s] re-
duces to t′[s] by contraction of a redex r of t[s]. If r is (λxu)t or RTuvS(w) or
ifT (b, a1, a2) or πi〈v1, v2〉 or χP s~n, or ϕP s~n, then its contractum r
′ does not con-
tain any new state constant; hence, all state constants in t′ are consistent and
disjoint with s. If r is s1 ⋒ s2 or addP s~nm, then both s, s1 and s, s2 are consistent
and disjoint state constants by hypothesis on t; therefore, by Lemma 3.2.9, in both
cases s and the contraction of r are consistent and disjoint; so all state constants
in t′ are consistent and disjoint with s.
(2) Every reduct of t[s] is t′[s] for some t′ ∈ TClass. If t[s] reduces to a normal form
t′[s] ≡ s′, then the only possibility is t′ ≡ s′. By the previous point 1, we conclude
that s′ is consistent and disjoint with s.
(3) By the previous point 2, and the fact that the only state constant ∅ in u is
consistent and disjoint with any s.

We introduce now a notion of convergence for families of terms {t[si]}i∈N ⊆ TLearn,
defined by some t ∈ TClass and indexed over a set of state constants {si}i∈N. Informally,
“t convergent” means that the normal form of t[s] eventually stops changing when the
knowledge state s increases. If s1, s2 are state constants, we write s1 ≤ s2 for |s1| ⊆ |s2|.
We say that a sequence {si}i∈N of state constants is a weakly increasing chain of states (is
w.i. for short), if si ≤ si+1 for all i ∈ N.
Definition 3.2.12 (Convergence). Assume that {si}i∈N is a w.i. sequence of state
constants, and u ∈ TClass.
(1) u converges in {si}i∈N if ∃i ∈ N.∀j ≥ i.u[sj ] = u[si] in TLearn.
(2) u converges if u converges in every w.i. sequence of state constants.
We remark that if u is convergent, we do not ask that u is convergent to the same
value on all w.i. chain of states. The value learned by u may depend on the information
contained in the particular chain of state constants by which u gets the knowledge. The
chain of states, in turn, is selected by the particular definition we use for the “learning
strategy” U . Different “learning strategies” may learn different values.
Theorem 3.2.13 (Stability Theorem). Assume t ∈ TClass is a closed term of atomic
type A (A ∈ {Bool, N, S}). Then t is convergent.
Proof. (Classical). Assume S is any consistent and possibly infinite set of atoms. We
define some (in general, not computable) functional reduction set R(S) for the set Ξ of
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constants and for TClass. The reductions for XP ,ΦP ,AddP are those for χP , φP , addP in
TLearn:
(1) If 〈P,~n,m〉 ∈ S, then (XP~n 7→ True), (ΦP~n 7→ m) ∈ R(S), else
(XP~n 7→ False), (ΦP~n 7→ 0) ∈ R(S).
(2) AddP~nm 7→ ∅ ∈ R(S) if either 〈P,~n, l〉 ∈ S for some numeral l or P~nm = False;
otherwise, AddP~nm 7→ |{〈P,~n,m〉}|
−1 ∈ R(S).
and the reduction for ⋒ in R(S) is the reduction for ⋒ in TLearn. By theorem 3.2.5,
TClass + R(S) is strongly normalizing and weak-CR for all closed terms of atomic type,
for any consistent set of atoms S. For the rest of the proof, let {si}i∈N be a w.i. chain of
state constants. Assume t ∈ TClass is a closed term of atomic type A.
Claim. For any state constant s, the map u 7→ u[s] is a bijection from the reduction tree of
t in TClass +R(|s|) to the reduction tree of t[s] in TLearn.
Proof of the Claim. By induction over the reduction tree of t[s]. Every reduction β, π, ifT , RT ,⋒
over t[s] may be obtained from the same reduction over t. All occurrences of χP , ϕP , addP
in the reduction tree of t[s] are of the form χP s, ϕP s, addP s, therefore every reduction over
χP , ϕP , addP may be obtained from the corresponding reduction over XP ,ΦP ,AddP .
Assume now a is the (unique, by weak-CR) normal form of t in TClass +R(|s|). By the
Claim, a[s] is the normal form of t[s] in TLearn. Since a is normal in TClass +R(|s|), there
is no XP ,ΦP ,AddP in a. Thus a and a[s] are the same term: t and t[s] have the same
normal form respectively in TClass +R(|s|) and in TLearn. Let {si}i∈N be a given sequence
of state constants. Define Sω = ∪i∈N|si|. By strong normalization, the reduction tree of
t in TClass + R(Sω) is finite. Therefore in this reduction tree are used only finitely many
reduction rules from R(Sω), and for some numeral n it is equal to the reduction tree of t
in TClass +R(|sn|), and in TClass +R(|sm|) for all m ≥ n. We deduce that for all m ≥ n the
normal forms of t in TClass +R(|sm|) are the same. Thus, the normal form in TLearn of all
t[sm] with m ≥ n are the same, as we wished to show. 
Remark 3.2.14 . The idea of the proof of theorem 3.2.13 corresponds exactly to the
intuition of the introduction. During any computation, the oracles XP and ΦP are consulted
a finite number of times and hence asked for a finite number of values. When our state of
knowledge is great enough, we can substitute the oracles with their approximation χP s and
ϕP s for some state constant s, and we will obtain the same oracle values and hence the
same results.
The proof, though non constructive, is short and explains well why the result is true.
However, provided we replace the notion of convergence used in this chapter with the
intuitionistic notion introduced in [7], we are able to reformulate and prove theorem 3.2.13 in
a purely intuitionistic way, achieving thus a constructive description of learning in HA+EM1.
Being the intuitionistic proof much more elaborated and less intuitive than the present one
and connected with other foundationally interesting results, it will be the subject of chapter
5.
Our proof of convergence follows the pattern of Avigad’s one in [5]. A closed term
t ∈ TClass of atomic type and in the constants c1, . . . , cn ∈ Ξ, may be seen as a functional Ft
which maps functions f1, . . . , fn of the same type of c1, . . . cn into an object of atomic type:
Ft(f1, . . . , fn) is defined as the normal form of t in TClass + R, where R = {cia1 . . . an 7→
a | fi(a1, . . . , an) = a and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. Ft is continuous in the sense of Avigad. Moreover,
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since XP and AddP have a set-theoretical definition in terms of ΦP , we may assume Ft
depends only on the functions which define in R the reduction rules for ΦP1 , . . .ΦPn . Then,
if t is of type S, it is not difficult to see that Ft represents an update procedure with respect
to any of its argument. The fact that Ft is an update procedure implies convergence for t
and the zero theorem 3.2.15.
As last result of this section, we prove that if we start from any state constant s and we
repeatedly apply any closed term t : S of TClass of state ∅ (see definition 3.2.6), we obtain
a “zero” of t, that is a state constant sn such that t[sn] = ∅. We interpret this by saying
that any term t represents a terminating learning process.
Theorem 3.2.15 (Zero Theorem). Let t : S be a closed term of TClass of state ∅ and s
any state constant. Define, by induction on n, a sequence {sn}n∈N of state constants such
that: s0 = s and sn+1 = sn ⋒ t[sn]. Then, there exists an n such that t[sn] = ∅.
Proof. s0, s1, s2, . . . is a weakly increasing chain of state constants by construction. By
theorem 3.2.13, t converges over this chain: there exists k ∈ N such that for every j ≥ k,
t[sj] = t[sk]. By choice of k
sk+2 = sk+1 ⋒ t[sk+1]
= (sk ⋒ t[sk]) ⋒ t[sk+1]
= (sk ⋒ t[sk]) ⋒ t[sk]
= sk ⋒ t[sk]
= sk+1
Since sk+2 = sk+1 and sk+1, t[sk+1] are consistent and disjoint by lemma 3.2.11, we conclude
t[sk+1] = ∅.

3.3. An Interactive Learning-Based Notion of Realizability
In this section we introduce the notion of realizability for HA+EM1, Heyting Arithmetic
plus Excluded Middle on Σ01-formulas, then we prove our main Theorem, the Adequacy
Theorem: “if a closed arithmetical formula is provable in HA+ EM1, then it is realizable”.
We first define the formal system HA+EM1, from now on “Extended EM1 Arithmetic”.
We represent atomic predicates of HA + EM1 with (in general, non-computable) closed
terms of TClass of type Bool. Terms of HA + EM1 may include function symbols XP , ΦP
denoting non-computable functions: oracles and Skolem maps for Σ01-formulas ∃x.Px~n,
with P predicate of T. We remark that our realizability can be formulated already for the
standard language of Arithmetic: we add non computable functions to the language for
greater generality. We assume having in T some terms ⇒Bool: Bool, Bool → Bool,¬Bool :
Bool→ Bool, . . ., implementing boolean connectives. If t1, . . . , tn, t ∈ T have type Bool and
are made from free variables all of type Bool, using boolean connectives, we say that t is a
tautological consequence of t1, . . . , tn in T (a tautology if n = 0) if all boolean assignments
making t1, . . . , tn equal to True in T also make t equal to True in T.
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Definition 3.3.1 (Extended EM1 Intuitionistic Arithmetic: HA+ EM1). The lan-
guage LClass of HA+ EM1 is defined as follows.
(1) The terms of LClass are all t ∈ TClass with state ∅, such that t : N and FV (t) ⊆
{xN1, . . . , x
N
n} for some x1, . . . , xn.
(2) The atomic formulas of LClass are all Qt1 . . . tn ∈ TClass, for some Q : N
n → Bool
closed term of TClass of state ∅, and some terms t1, . . . , tn of LClass.
(3) The formulas of LClass are built from atomic formulas of LClass by the connectives
∨,∧,→ ∀,∃ as usual.
A formula of HA is a formula of HA+ EM1 in which all predicates and terms are terms
of T.
Deduction rules for HA + EM1 are as in van Dalen [15], with: (i) an axiom schema for
EM1; (ii) the induction rule; (iii ) as Post rules: all axioms of equality and ordering on N,
all equational axioms of T, and one schema for each tautological consequences of T. (iv) the
axiom schemas for oracles: P (~t, t)⇒Bool XP~t and for Skolem maps: XP~t⇒Bool P (~t, (ΦP~t)),
for any predicate P of T.
We denote with ⊥ the atomic formula False and will sometimes write a generic atomic
formula as P (t1, . . . , tn) rather than in the form Pt1 . . . tn. Finally, since any arithmetical
formula has only variables of type N, we shall freely omit their types, writing for instance
∀x.A in place of ∀xN.A. Post rules cover many rules with atomic assumptions and conclusion
as we find useful, for example, the rule: “if f(z) ≤ 0 then f(z) = 0”.
We defined ⇒Bool: Bool, Bool → Bool as a term implementing implication, therefore,
to be accurate, the axiom P (t1, . . . , tn, t) ⇒Bool XP t1 . . . tn is not an implication between
two atomic formulas, but it is equal to the single atomic formula Qt1 . . . tnt, where
Q = λxN1 . . . λx
N
n+1.⇒Bool (Px1 . . . xnxn+1)(XPx1 . . . xn+1)
Similarly, ¬BoolP (~t, t) will denote a single atomic formula. Any atomic formula A of
LClass is a boolean term of TClass, therefore for any state constant s we may form the “finite
approximation” A[s] : Bool, A[s] ∈ TLearn of A. In A[s] we replace all oracles XP and all
Skolem maps ΦP we have in A by their finite approximation χP s, φP s, computed with
respect to the state constant s. We denote with LLearn the set of all expressions A[s] with
A ∈ LClass and s a state constant. All A[s] ∈ LLearn may be interpreted by first order
arithmetical formulas having all closed atomic subformulas decidable.
Using the metaphor explained in the introduction, we use a set of falsifiable hypotheses
determined by s to predict a computable truth value A[s] : Bool in TLearn for an atomic for-
mula A ∈ LClass that we cannot effectively evaluate. Our definition of realizability provides
a formal semantics for the Extended Intuitionistic Arithmetic HA+EM1, and therefore also
for the more usual language of Arithmetic HA, in which all functions represent recursive
maps.
Definition 3.3.2 (Types for realizers). For each arithmetical formula A we define a
type |A| of T by induction on A:
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(1) |P (t1, . . . , tn)| = S,
(2) |A ∧B| = |A| × |B|,
(3) |A ∨B| = Bool× (|A| × |B|),
(4) |A→ B| = |A| → |B|,
(5) |∀xA| = N→ |A|,
(6) |∃xA| = N× |A|
We now define the realizability relation t  A, where t ∈ TClass, A ∈ LClass, t has state
∅ and t : |A|.
Definition 3.3.3 (Realizability). Assume s is a state constant, t ∈ TClass is a closed
term of state ∅, C ∈ LClass is a closed formula, and t : |C|. Let ~t = t1, . . . , tn : N. We define
first the relation t s C by induction and by cases according to the form of C:
(1) t s P (~t) if and only if t[s] = ∅ in TLearn implies P (~t)[s] = True
(2) t s A ∧B if and only if π0t s A and π1t s B
(3) t s A ∨B if and only if either p0t[s] = True in TLearn and p1t s A, or
p0t[s] = False in TLearn and p2t s B
(4) t s A→ B if and only if for all u, if u s A, then tu s B
(5) t s ∀xA if and only if for all numerals n, tn s A[n/x]
(6) t s ∃xA if and only for some numeral n, π0t[s] = n in TLearn and π1t s A[n/x]
We define t  A if and only if for all state constants s, t s A.
The definition of  formalizes all the idea we sketched in the introduction. A realizer
is a term t of TClass, possibly containing the non-computable functions XP ,ΦP ; if such
functions were computable, t would be an intuitionistic realizer. Since in general t is not
computable, we calculate its approximation t[s] at state s, which is a term of TLearn, and we
require it to satisfy the indexed-by-state realizability clauses. Realizers of disjunctions and
existential statements provide a witness, which is an individual depending on an actual state
of knowledge, representing all the hypotheses used to approximate the non-computable. The
actual behavior of a realizer depends upon the current state of knowledge. The state is used
only when there is relevant information about the truth of a given formula to be computed:
the truth value P (t1, . . . , tn)[s] of an atomic formula and the disjunctive witness p0t[s] and
the existential witness π0u[s] are computed w.r.t. the constant state s. A realizer t of
A ∨ B uses s to predict which one between A and B is realizable (if p0t[s] = True then
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A is realizable, and if p0t[s] = False then B is realizable). A realizer u of ∃xA uses s to
predict that π0u[s] equals an n, some witness for ∃xA (i.e. that A[n/x] is realizable). These
predictions need not be always correct; hence, it is possible that a realized atomic formula
is actually false; we may have t s P and P [s] = False in TLearn. If an atomic formula,
although predicted to be true, is indeed false, then we have encountered a counterexample
and so our theory is wrong, our approximation still inadequate; in this case, t[s] 6= ∅ by
definition of t s P , and the atomic realizer t takes s and extends it to a larger state
s′, union of s and t[s]. That is to say: if something goes wrong, we must learn from our
mistakes. The point is that after every learning, the actual state of knowledge grows, and
if we ask to the same realizer new predictions, we will obtain “better” answers.
Indeed, we can say more about this last point. Suppose for instance that t  A ∨ B
and let {si}i∈N be a w.i. sequence. Then, since t : Bool × |A| × |B|, then p0t : Bool is a
closed term of TClass, converging in {si}i∈N to a boolean; thus the sequence of predictions
{p0t[si]}i∈N eventually stabilizes, and hence a witness is eventually learned in the limit.
In the atomic case, in order to have t s P (t1, . . . , tn), we require that if t[s] = ∅, then
P (t1, . . . , tn)[s] = True in TLearn. That is to say: if t has no new information to add to s,
then t must assure the truth of P (t1, . . . , tn) w.r.t. s. By the zero theorem 3.2.15, when t : S
is closed, there is plenty of state constants s such that t[s] = ∅; hence search for truth will
be for us computation of a zero, driven by the excluded-middle instances and the Skolem
axioms used by the proof, rather than exhaustive search for counterexamples. In chapter 5
we will prove that, actually, zeros for terms of TClass can be computed by learning processes
whose length can be bounded through constructive reasoning.
It is useful to give a slightly different definition of indexed realizability, which in some
situations is slightly easier to reason with. The difference with definition 4.2.4 is only that
the relation we are going to define now is between terms of TLearn and formulas of LLearn,
which are from the beginning approximations at some state s respectively of terms of TClass
and formulas of LClass.
Definition 3.3.4 (Variant of Indexed Realizability). Let s be a state constant.
Assume t ∈ TLearn and A ∈ LLearn are of the form t = t
′[s], A = A′[s] for some closed
t′ ∈ TClass of state ∅ and some closed A
′ ∈ LClass. We define t s A for any state constant
s by induction on A.
(1) t s P (t1, . . . , tn) if and only if t = ∅ in TLearn implies P (t1, . . . , tn) = True
(2) t s A ∧B if and only if π0t s A and π1t s B
(3) t s A ∨B if and only if: either p0t = True in TLearn and p1t s A, or p0t = False
and p2t s B
(4) t s A→ B if and only if for all u, if u s A, then tu s B
(5) t s ∀xA if and only if for all numerals n, tn s A[n/x]
(6) t s ∃xA if and only if for some numeral n π0t = n in TLearn and π1t s A[n/x]
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The realizability relation is compatible with equality in TLearn:
Lemma 3.3.5 . If t1 s A[u1/x], t1 = t2 and u1 = u2 in TLearn, then t2 s A[u2/x]
Proof. By straightforward induction on A.

We can now characterize  in the following way.
Lemma 3.3.6 (Alternative Characterization of Realizability). Assume t ∈ TClass
is a closed term, A ∈ LClass is a closed formula, and t : |A|. Then
t  A if and only if for all state constants s, t[s] s A[s]
Proof. By definition unfolding and by induction on A, one shows that t s A if and
only if t[s] s A[s].

Example 3.3.7 . The most remarkable feature of our Realizability Semantics is the exis-
tence of a realizer EP for EM1. Assume that P is a predicate of T and define
EP := λ~α
N〈XP ~α, 〈ΦP ~α, ∅〉, λn
N AddP ~αn〉
Indeed EP realizes its associated instance of EM1.
Proposition 3.3.8 (Realizer EP of EM1).
EP  ∀~x. ∃y P (~x, y) ∨ ∀y¬BoolP (~x, y)
Proof. Let ~m be a vector of numerals. EP ~m[s] is equal to
〈χP s~m, 〈ϕP s~m, ∅〉, λn
N addP s~mn〉
and we want to prove that
EP ~m[s] s ∃y P (~m, y) ∨ ∀y¬BoolP (~m, y)
We have p0EP ~m[s] = χP s~m in TLearn. There are two cases.
(1) χP s~m = True. Then 〈P, ~m, n〉 ∈ |s| for some numeral n such that P (~m, n) = True,
and we have to prove
p1EPm[s] s ∃y P (~m, y)
By definition of ϕP s~m
p1EPm[s] = 〈ϕP s~m,∅〉 = 〈n,∅〉
Thus
π0(p1EPm)[s] = π0〈n,∅〉 = n
and
π1(p1EPm)[s] s P (~m, n)
because P (~m, n) = True. We conclude
p1EPm[s] s ∃y P (~m, y)
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(2) χP s~m = False. Then 〈P, ~m, l〉 6∈ |s| for all numerals l. We have to prove
p2EP ~m[s] = λn addP s~mn s ∀y¬BoolP (m, y)
i.e. that given any numeral n
addP s~mn s ¬BoolP (m,n)
By the definition of realizer in this case, we have to assume that addP s~mn = ∅,
and prove that ¬BoolP (~m, n)[s] = True. The substitution (.)[s] has an empty effect
over P (~m, n), therefore we have to prove that ¬BoolP (~m, n) = True, that is, that
P (~m, n) = False. Assume for contradiction that P (~m, n) = True. We already
proved that 〈P, ~m, l〉 6∈ |s|, for all numerals l: from this and P (~m, n) = True we
deduce that by definition addP s~mn = |{〈P, ~m, n〉}|
−1, contradiction.

EP works according to the ideas we sketched in the introduction. It uses χP to make
predictions about which one between ∃y P (~m, y) and ∀y¬BoolP (~m, y) is true. χP , in turn,
relies on the constant s denoting the actual state to make its own prediction. If χP sm =
False, given any n, ¬BoolP (m,n) is predicted to be true; if it is not the case, we have
a counterexample and addP requires to extend the state with 〈P, ~m, n〉. On the contrary,
if χP sm = True, there is unquestionable evidence that ∃yP (~m, y) holds; namely, there is
some numeral n such that 〈P, ~m, n〉 is in s; then ϕP is called, and it returns ϕP s~m = n.
This is the basic mechanism by which we implement learning: every state extension is
linked with an assumption about an instance of EM1 which we used and turned out to be
wrong (this is the only way to come across a counterexample); in next computations, the
actual state will be bigger, the realizer will not do the same error, and hence will be “wiser”.
As usual for a realizability interpretation, we may extract from any realizer t  ∀x.∃y.P (x, y),
with P ∈ T, some recursive map f from the set of numerals to the set of numerals, such
that P (n, f(n)) for all numerals n.
Example 3.3.9 (Program Extraction via Learning Based Realizability). Let t
be a term of TClass and suppose that t  ∀x
N∃yNPxy, with P atomic. Then, from t one can
effectively define a recursive function f from the set of numerals to the set of numerals such
that for every numeral n, Pn(f(n)) = True.
Proof. Let
v := λmN π1(tm)
v is of type N → S. By zero theorem 3.2.15, there exists a recursive function zero from the
set of numerals to the set of state constants such that vn[zero(n)] = ∅ for every numeral n.
Define f as the function
m 7→ π0(tm)[zero(m)]
and fix a numeral n. By unfolding the definition of realizability with respect to the state
zero(n), we have that
tn zero(n) ∃y
NPny
and hence
π1(tn) zero(n) Pn(f(n))
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that is to say
vn[zero(n)] = ∅ =⇒ Pn(f(n)) = True
and therefore
Pn(f(n)) = True
which is the thesis.

Remark 3.3.10 . In chapter 5 we shall prove that the map f constructed in example 3.3.9 is
even definable in Go¨del’s T. This result formally proves that our realizability interpretation
is a constructive semantics and that f is not a brute force search algorithm. More precisely,
we can argue as follows. The numeral f(n) is computed by finding a zero of vn = π1(tn),
i.e. a state s such that π1(tn)[s] = ∅. By the Zero theorem 3.2.15, this zero is computed
step by step by constructing the sequence s0 = ∅, sn+1 = sn ⋒ t[sn] and stopping at the
first m such that π1(tn)[sm] = ∅.
First, we observe that each portion of sm is efficiently constructed: for each n, the state
sn is efficiently extended to sn+1, through the addition of new oracle values learned by
t by counterexamples, i.e. by the falsification of some excluded middle or Skolem axiom
instances. No brute force search whatsoever, thus, for new oracle values: they are all
efficiently produced by t[sn], which, modulo some trivial coding, is a term of Go¨del’s T and
just cannot search blindly for oracle values, since it is a primitive recursive functional of
finite type.
Secondly, an upper bound to m can be computed in Go¨del’s T, as proven in chapter 5,
theorem 5.6.2. Moreover, this upper bound results from a constructive proof of the Zero
theorem. Hence, sm and thus f(n) can be defined by a primitive recursive functional of
finite type, which, again, by construction cannot explore blindly the infinite search space of
the knowledge states in order to find a zero.
Moreover, from the low level computational point of view and in the language of ǫ-
substitution method, our realizers represent convergent procedures to find out a “solving
substitution”, i.e. a state representing an approximation of Skolem functions (i.e., ǫ-terms)
which makes true the Skolem axioms instances used in a proof of an existential statement.
The advantage of our semantics is the possibility of defining such procedures directly from
high level proofs, by means of Curry-Howard correspondence, hence avoiding the round-
about route which forces to use a quantifier free deduction system. In the case of a provable
formula in the language of Peano Arithmetic (that is, one not containing the symbols XP
or ΦP ) we do not need at all to modify the language of its proof and to use the Skolem
axioms χ,ϕ.
Now we explain how to turn each proof D of a formula A ∈ LClass in HA + EM1 into
a realizers D∗ of the same A. By induction on D, we define a “decoration with realizers”
DReal of D, in which each formula B of D is replaced by a new statement u ⊢ B, for some
u ∈ TClass of state ∅. If t ⊢ A is the conclusion of D
Real, we set D∗ = t. Then we will prove
that if D is closed and without assumptions, then D∗ ∈ TClass and D
∗
 A. The decoration
DReal of D with realizers is completely standard: we have new realizers only for EM1 and
for atomic formulas. For notation simplicity, if xi is the label for the set of occurrences of
some assumption Ai of D, we use xi also as a name of one free variable in D
∗ of type |Ai|.
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If T is any type of TS, we denote with d
T a dummy term of type T , defined by dN = 0,
dBool = False, dS = ∅, dA→B = λ A.dB (with A any variable of type A), dA×B = 〈dA, dB〉.
Definition 3.3.11 (Term Assignment Rules for HA + EM1). Assume D is a proof
of A ∈ LClass in HA + EM1, with free assumptions A1, . . . , An denoted by proof variables
xA11 , . . . , x
An
n and free integer variables α
N
1, . . . , α
N
m. By induction on D, we define a deco-
rated proof-tree DReal, in which each formula B is replaced by u ⊢ B for some u ∈ TClass, and
the conclusion A with some t ⊢ A, with FV (t) ⊆ {x
|A1|
1 , . . . , x
|A1|
1 , α
N
1, . . . , α
N
m}. Eventually
we set D∗ = t.
(1) x|A| ⊢ A if D consists of a single free assumption A ∈ LClass labeled x
A.
(2)
u ⊢ A t ⊢ B
〈u, t〉 ⊢ A ∧B
u ⊢ A ∧B
π0u ⊢ A
u ⊢ A ∧B
π1u ⊢ B
(3)
u ⊢ A→ B t ⊢ A
ut ⊢ B
u ⊢ B
λx|A|u ⊢ A→ B
(4)
u ⊢ A
〈True, u, dB〉 ⊢ A ∨B
u ⊢ B
〈False, dA, u〉 ⊢ A ∨B
u ⊢ A ∨B w1 ⊢ C w2 ⊢ C
if p0u then (λx
|A|w1)(p1u) else (λx
|B|w2)(p2u) ⊢ C
where dA and dB are dummy closed terms of TClass of type |A| and |B|
(5)
u ⊢ ∀αA
ut ⊢ A[t/α]
u ⊢ A
λαNu ⊢ ∀αA
where t is a term of LClass and α
N does not occur free in any free assumption
B of the subproof of D of conclusion A.
(6)
u ⊢ A[t/αN]
〈t, u〉 ⊢ ∃αN.A
u ⊢ ∃αN.A t ⊢ C
(λαNλx|A| t)(π0u)(π1u) ⊢ C
where αN is not free in C nor in any free assumption B different from A in the
subproof of D of conclusion C.
(7)
u ⊢ A(0) v ⊢ ∀α.A(α)→ A(S(α))
λαNRuvα ⊢ ∀αA
(8)
u1 ⊢ A1 u2 ⊢ A2 · · · un ⊢ An
u1 ⋒ u2 ⋒ · · · ⋒ un ⊢ A
where n > 0 and A1, A2, . . . , An, A are atomic formulas of LClass, and the rule
is a Post rule for equality or ordering, or a tautological consequence.
(9) ∅ ⊢ A
where A is an atomic axiom of HA+ EM1 (an axiom of equality or of ordering
or a tautology or an equation of T)
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(10) EP ⊢ ∀~x. ∃y P (~x, y) ∨ ∀y¬BoolP (~x, y)
where P is a predicate of T.
(11) AddP~t, t ⊢ P (~t, t)⇒Bool XP~t , χ-Axiom
(12) ∅ ⊢ XP~t⇒Bool P (~t, (ΦP~t)) , ϕ-Axiom
The term decorating the conclusion of a Post rule is of the form u1 ⋒ · · · ⋒ un. In this
case, we have n different realizers, whose learning capabilities are put together through a
sort of union. By Lemma 3.2.2.2, if u1 ⋒ · · · ⋒ un[s] = ∅, then u1[s] = . . . = un[s] = ∅,
i.e. all ui “have nothing to learn”. In that case, each ui must guarantee Ai to be true, and
therefore the conclusion of the Post rule is true, because true premises A1, . . . , An spell a
true conclusion A.
We now prove our main theorem, that every theorem of HA+ EM1 is realizable.
Theorem 3.3.12 (Adequacy Theorem). Suppose that D is a proof of A in the system
HA + EM1 with free assumptions x
A1
1 , . . . , x
An
n and free variables α1 : N, . . . , αk : N. Let
w = D∗. For all state constants s and for all numerals n1, . . . , nk, if
t1[s] s A1[n1/α1 · · · nk/αk][s], . . . , tn[s] s An[n1/α1 · · ·nk/αk][s]
then
w[t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n n1/α1 · · ·nk/αk][s] s A[n1/α1 · · · nk/αk][s]
Proof. Notation: for any term v and formula B, we denote
v[t1/x
|A1|
1 · · · tn/x
|An|
n n1/α1 · · · nk/αk][s]
with v and B[n1/α1 · · ·nk/αk][s] with B. We have |B| = |B| for all formulas B. We denote
with = the provable equality in TLearn. We proceed by induction on w. Consider the last
rule in the derivation D:
(1) If it is the rule for variables, then w = x
|Ai|
i = x
|Ai| and A = Ai. So w = ti s
Ai = A.
(2) If it is the ∧I rule, then w = 〈u, t〉, A = B ∧ C, u ⊢ B and t ⊢ C. Therefore,
w = 〈u, t〉. By induction hypothesis, π0w = u s B and π1w = t s C; so, by
definition, w s B ∧ C = A.
(3) If it is a ∧E rule, say left, then w = π0u and u ⊢ A∧B. So w = π0u s A, because
u s A ∧B by induction hypothesis.
(4) If it is the → E rule, then w = ut, u ⊢ B → A and t ⊢ B. So w = ut s A, for
u s B → A and t s B by induction hypothesis.
(5) If it is the → I rule, then w = λx|B|u, A = B → C and u ⊢ C. Thus, w = λx|B|u.
Suppose now that t s B; by induction hypothesis on u, wt = u[t/x
|B|] s C.
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(6) If it is a ∨I rule, say left, then w = 〈True, u, dC 〉, A = B ∨ C and u ⊢ B. So,
w = 〈True, u, dC〉 and hence p0w = True. We indeed verify that p1w = u s B
with the help of induction hypothesis.
(7) If it is a ∨E rule, then
w = if p0u then (λx
|B|w1)p1u else (λy
|C|w2)p2u
and u ⊢ B ∨ C,w1 ⊢ D,w2 ⊢ D,A = D. So,
w = if p0u then (λx
|B|w1)p1u else (λy
|C|w2)p2u
Assume p0u = True. Then by inductive hypothesis p1u s B, and again by in-
duction hypothesis, w = w1[p1u/x
|B|] s D. Symmetrically, if p0u = False, then
w s D.
(8) If it is the ∀E rule, then w = ut, A = B[t/α] and u ⊢ ∀αB. So, w = ut. For
some numeral n we have n = t. By inductive hypothesis u s ∀αB, therefore
ut = un s B[n/α] = B[t/α] = A.
(9) If it is the ∀I rule, then w = λαNu, A = ∀αB and u ⊢ B. So, w = λαNu. Let n be
a numeral; we have to prove that wn = u[n/α] s B[n/α], which is true, indeed,
by induction hypothesis.
(10) If it is the ∃E rule, then w = (λαNλx|B|t)(π0u)(π1u), t ⊢ A and u ⊢ ∃α
N.B. Assume
n = π0u, for some numeral n. Then
t[n/αN, π1u/x
|B[n/αN]|] s A[n/α] = A
by inductive hypothesis, whose application being justified by the fact, also by
induction, that u s ∃α
N.B and hence π1u s B[n/α
N]. We thus obtain
w = t[π0u/α
N π1u/x
|B|] s A[n/α] = A
(11) If it is the ∃I rule, then w = 〈t, u〉, A = ∃αB, u ⊢ B[t/α]. So, w = 〈t, u〉; and,
indeed, π1w = u s B[π0w/α] = B[t/α] since by induction hypothesis u s B[t/α].
(12) If it is the induction rule, then w = λαN Ruvα, A = ∀αB, u ⊢ B(0) and
v ⊢ ∀α.B(α) → B(S(α)). So, w = λαNRuvα. Now let n be a numeral. A
plain induction on n shows that wn = Ruvn s B[n/α], for u s B(0) and
vi s B(i)→ B(S(i)) for all numerals i by induction hypothesis.
(13) If it is a Post rule, then w = u1⋒u2⋒ · · ·⋒un and ui ⊢ Ai. So, w = u1⋒u2⋒ · · ·⋒un.
Suppose now that w[s] = ∅; then we have to prove that A = True. It suf-
fices to prove that A1 = A2 = · · · = An = True. By Lemma 3.2.2 we have
u1 = · · · = un = ∅ and by induction hypothesis A1 = · · · = An = True, since
ui s Ai, for i = 1, . . . , n.
(14) If it is a χ-axiom rule, then w = AddP t1 . . . tnt and
A = P (t1, . . . , tn, t)⇒ XP t1 . . . tn
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Let ~t = t1, . . . , tn. For some numeral m we have m = t. Suppose by contra-
diction that w = ∅ and P (~t, t) = P (~t,m) = True and χP s~t = False. From
χP s~t = False we get 〈P,~t,m
′〉 6∈ s for all numeralsm′. We deduce w = addP s~tm =
|{〈P,~t,m〉}|−1, contradiction.
(15) w realizes an EM1 axiom: this is Proposition 3.3.8.
(16) If it is a ϕ-axiom rule, then w = ∅ and
A = XP t1 . . . tn ⇒ P (t1, . . . , tn, (ΦP t1 . . . tn))
We have w = ∅. Let us denote ~t = t1 . . . tn. Suppose that χP s~t = True. Then
for some numeral m we have 〈P,~t,m〉 ∈ s and P~tm = True and ϕP s~t = m. By
definition of ϕP we have
P (~t, (ϕP s~t)) = True
We conclude that A = True.

Corollary 3.3.13 . If A is a closed formula provable in HA + EM1, then there exists
t ∈ TClass such that t  A.
3.4. Conclusion and further works
Many notions of realizability for Classical Logic already exists. A notion similar to our
one in spirit and motivations is Goodman’s notion of Relative realizability [24]. However,
there is an intrinsic difference between our solution and Goodman’s solution. Goodman uses
forcing to obtain a “static” description of learning. His “possible worlds” are learning states,
but there is no explicit operation updating a world to a larger word. The dynamic aspect of
learning (which is represented by a winning strategy in Game Semantics) is therefore lost.
Using our realizability model, a realizer of an atomic formula, instead of being a trivial map,
is a map extending worlds, whose fixed points are the worlds in which the atomic formula
is true. Extending a world represents, in our realizability Semantics, the idea of “learning
by trial-and-error” that we have in game semantics, while fixed points represent the final
state of the game.
A second notion related to our realizability Semantics is Avigad’s idea of “update proce-
dure” [5]. A state s in our chapter corresponds to a finite model of skolem maps in Avigad.
An “update procedure” is a construction “steering” the future evolution of a finite partial
model s of skolem maps, to which our individuals belong, in a wanted direction. The main
difference with our work is that we express this idea formally, by interpreting an “update
procedure” as a realizer (in the sense of Kreisel) for a Skolem axiom. Another important
difference is that our realizability relation is defined for all first-order formulas with Skolem
maps, while the theory of “update procedures” is defined only for quantifier-free formulas
with Skolem maps.
Another difference with the other realizability or Kripke models for Classical Logic is
in the notion of individual and in the equality between individuals. Assume that m is the
output of a skolem map for ∃y.P (n, y), with P decidable, and m = {m[s]|s ∈ S} a family of
values depending on the finite partial model s. Then our realizer for Skolem axioms “steers”
40 3. INTERACTIVE LEARNING-BASED REALIZABILITY FOR HEYTING ARITHMETIC WITH EM1
the evolution of s towards some universe in which the axiom ∃y.P (n, y) ⇒ P (n,m[s]) is
true. Modifying the evolution of s may modify the value of m[s]. In our realizability Seman-
tics we introduce a notion of individuality which is “dynamical” (depending on a state s)
and “interactive” (the value of the individual depends on what a realizer does). This second
aspect is new. A realizer may “try” to equate an individual a = {a[s]|s ∈ S} with another
individual b = {b[s]|s ∈ S}. Whenever this is possible, the realizer defines a construction
over the evolution of the universe s producing such an effect, while a random evolution of
s (without an “interaction” with the realizer) does not guarantee that eventually we have
a[s] = b[s]. This is why, in our realizability model, even equality among concrete objects is
not a “statical” fact, but it is the effect of applying a realizer (which is a construction over
the evolution of the state or “world” s). In the other models either equality is “static”, or,
even when it is “dynamical”, and it changes with time, it is not “interactive”: the final truth
value of an equality is not the effect of the application of the realizer, but it is eventually
the same in all future evolutions of the current world.
Many aspects of this chapter will require some further work. A challenging idea is to
iterate the construction we had for EM1, in order to provide a learning model for the entire
classical Arithmetic. In this case the leading concepts would be the game-theoretical notion
of “level of backtracking”, introduced in [9] and [11], a notion related to the more informal
notion of non-monotonic learning.
Another aspect deserving further work is comparing the programs extracted from clas-
sical proofs with our method and with other methods, say, with Friedman A-translation.
Our interpretation, explaining in term of learning how the extracted program work, should
allow us to modify and improve the extracted program in a way impossible for the more
formal (but very elegant) A-translation.
We remarked that our interpretation is implicitly parametric with respect to the op-
eration U merging the realizers of two atomic formulas. As explained in [12], by choos-
ing different variant of this operation we may study different evaluation strategies for the
extracted programs: sequential and parallel, left-to-right and right-to-left, confluent and
non-confluent. We would like to study whether by choosing a particular evaluation strategy
we may extract a more efficient program.
CHAPTER 4
Learning Based Realizability and 1-Backtracking Games
Abstract. We prove a soundness and completeness result for learning based realizability
with respect to 1-Backtracking Coquand game semantics. First, we prove that interactive
learning based classical realizability is sound with respect to Coquand game semantics. In
particular, any realizer of an implication-and-negation-free arithmetical formula embodies
a winning recursive strategy for the 1-Backtracking version of Tarski games. We also give
examples of realizer and winning strategy extraction for some classical proofs. Secondly,
we extend our notion of realizability to a total recursive learning based realizability and
show that the notion is complete with respect to Coquand semantics, when it is restricted
to 1-Backtracking games.
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter we show that learning based realizability (see chapter 3) relates to 1-
Backtracking Tarski games as intuitionistic realizability (see Kleene [31]) relates to Tarski
games, when one considers implication-and-negation-free formulas. The relationship we
refer to is between realizability on one hand, and existence of winning strategies on the
other. In particular, it is known that a negation-and-implication-free arithmetical formula
is Kleene realizable if and only if Eloise has a recursive winning strategy in the associated
Tarski game. We show as well that an implication-and-negation-free arithmetical formula
is “learning realizable” if and only if Eloise has recursive winning strategy in the associated
1-Backtracking Tarski game.
It is well known that Tarski games (which were actually introduced by Hintikka, see
[29] and definition 4.3.3) are just a simple way of rephrasing the concept of classical truth
in terms of a game between two players - the first one, Eloise, trying to show the truth of
a formula, the second, Abelard, its falsehood - and that a Kleene realizer gives a recursive
winning strategy to the first player. The result is quite expected: since a realizer gives a
way of computing all the information about the truth of a formula, the player trying to
prove the truth of that formula has a recursive winning strategy. However, not at all any
classically provable arithmetical formula allows a winning recursive strategy for that player;
otherwise, the decidability of the Halting problem would follow.
In [14], Coquand introduced a new game semantics for Peano Arithmetic, centered on
the concept of “Backtracking Tarski game”: a special Tarski game in which players have
the additional possibility of correcting their moves and backtracking to a previous position
of the game anytime they wish. Coquand then showed that for any provable negation-
and-implication-free arithmetical formula A, Eloise has a recursive winning strategy in the
Backtracking Tarski game associated to A. Remarkably, a proof in Peano Arithmetic thus
hides a non trivial computational content that can be described as a recursive strategy that
produces witnesses in classical Arithmetic by interaction and learning.
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In the first part of this chapter, we show that learning based realizers have direct
interpretation as recursive winning strategies in 1-Backtracking Tarski games (which are a
particular case of Coquand games: see Berardi et al [9] and definition 4.3.2 below). The
result was wished, because interactive learning based realizers, by design, are similar to
strategies in games with backtracking: they improve their computational ability by learning
from interaction and counterexamples in a convergent way; eventually, they gather enough
information about the truth of a formula to win its associated game.
An interesting but incomplete step towards our result was the Hayashi realizability
[27]. Indeed, a realizer in the sense of Hayashi represents a recursive winning strategy in
1-Backtracking games. However, from the computational point of view, Hayashi realizers
do not relate to 1-Backtracking games in a significant way: Hayashi winning strategies work
by exhaustive search and, actually, do not learn from the game and from the interaction
with the other player. As a result of this issue, constructive upper bounds on the length
of games cannot be obtained, whereas using our realizability it is possible. For example, in
the case of the 1-Backtracking Tarski game for the formula ∃x∀yf(x) ≤ f(y), the Hayashi
realizer checks all the natural numbers to be sure that an n such that ∀yf(n) ≤ f(y) is
eventually found. On the contrary, our realizer yields a strategy for Eloise which bounds
the number of backtrackings by f(0), as shown in this paper; moreover, what the strategy
learns is uniquely determined by interaction with the other player. In this case, the Hayashi
strategy is the same one suggested by the classical truth of the formula, whereas ours is the
constructive strategy suggested by its classical proof.
Since learning based realizers are extracted from proofs in HA+EM1 (Heyting Arithmetic
with excluded middle over existential sentences, see chapter 3), one also has an interpreta-
tion of classical proofs as strategies with 1-Backtracking. Moreover, studying learning based
realizers in terms of 1-Backtracking games also sheds light on their behaviour and offers an
interesting case study in program extraction and interpretation in classical arithmetic.
In the second part of the chapter, we extend the class of learning based realizers from
a classical version of Go¨del’s system T to a classical version of PCF and define a more gen-
eral “total recursive learning based realizability”. This step is analogous to the (conceptual,
rather than chronological) step leading from Kreisel realizability to Kleene realizability: one
extends the computational power of realizers. We then prove a completeness theorem: for
every implication-and-negation-free arithmetical formula A, if Eloise has recursive winning
strategy in the 1-Backtracking Tarski game associated to A, then A is also realizable.
The plan of the chapter is the following. In section §4.2, we recall the definitions and
results from chapter 3 that we shall need in the present one. In section §4.3, we prove our
first main theorem: a realizer of an arithmetical formula embodies a winning strategy in
its associated 1-Backtracking Tarski game. In section §4.4, we extract realizers from two
classical proofs and study their behavior as learning strategies. In section §4.5, we define
an extension of the learning based realizability of chapter 3 and in section §4.6 prove its
completeness with respect to 1-Backtracking Tarski games.
4.2. Learning-Based Realizability for the Standard Language of Arithmetic
In this chapter, we will use a standard language of Arithmetic: the symbols XP ,ΦP will
not occur in the language of formulas, but only in realizers. We recall the definition and
results we need here.
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Definition 4.2.1 (Convergence). Assume that {si}i∈N is a w.i. sequence of state con-
stants, and u, v ∈ TClass.
(1) u converges in {si}i∈N if ∃i ∈ N.∀j ≥ i.u[sj ] = u[si] in TLearn.
(2) u converges if u converges in every w.i. sequence of state constants.
We will make use of the following two theorems of chapter 3.
Theorem 4.2.1 (Stability Theorem). Assume t ∈ TClass is a closed term of atomic type
A (A ∈ {Bool, N, S}). Then t is convergent.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Zero Theorem). Let t : S be a closed term of TClass of state ∅ and s
any state constant. Define, by induction on n, a sequence {sn}n∈N of state constants such
that: s0 = s and sn+1 = sn ⋒ t[sn]. Then, there exists an n such that t[sn] = ∅.
We now define a language for Peano Arithmetic and then formulate a realizability
relation between terms of TClass and formulas of the language.
Definition 4.2.2 (The language L of Peano Arithmetic). We define:
(1) The terms of L are all terms t of Go¨del’s system T, such that t : N and FV (t) ⊆
{xN1, . . . , x
N
n} for some x1, . . . , xn.
(2) The atomic formulas of L are all terms Qt1 . . . tn of Go¨del’s system T, for some
Q : Nn → Bool closed term of T, and some terms t1, . . . , tn of L.
(3) The formulas of L are built from atomic formulas of L by the connectives ∨,∧,→
∀,∃ as usual.
We now define the types realizers as in chapter 3 (we only use a different notation in
order to avoid confusion in the rest of the chapter).
Definition 4.2.3 (Types for realizers). For each arithmetical formula A we define
a type [A] of T by induction on A: [P (t1, . . . , tn)] = S, [A ∧ B] = [A] × [B], [A ∨ B] =
Bool× ([A]× [B]), [A→ B] = [A]→ [B], [∀xA] = N→ [A], [∃xA] = N× [A]
We give the simplified notion of learning-based realizability we shall use in the following.
Definition 4.2.4 (Learning-Based Realizability). Assume s is a state constant, t ∈
TClass is a closed term of state ∅, A ∈ L is a closed formula, and t : [A]. Let ~t = t1, . . . , tn : N.
(1) t s P (~t) if and only if t[s] = ∅ in TLearn implies P (~t) = True
(2) t s A ∧B if and only if π0t s A and π1t s B
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(3) t s A ∨B if and only if either p0t[s] = True in TLearn and p1t s A, or
p0t[s] = False in TLearn and p2t s B
(4) t s A→ B if and only if for all u, if u s A, then tu s B
(5) t s ∀xA if and only if for all numerals n, tn s A[n/x]
(6) t s ∃xA if and only for some numeral n, π0t[s] = n in TLearn and π1t s A[n/x]
We define t  A if and only if t s A for all state constants s.
For the soundness result we shall need this theorem of chapter 3.
Theorem 4.2.3 . If A is a closed formula of L provable in HA + EM1, then there exists
t ∈ TClass such that t  A.
4.3. Games, Learning and Realizability
In this section, we define the abstract notion of game, its 1-Backtracking version and
Tarski games. We also prove our main theorem, connecting learning based realizability and
1-Backtracking Tarski games.
Definition 4.3.1 (Games). We define:
(1) A game G between two players is a quadruple
(V,E1, E2,W )
where V is a set, E1, E2 are subsets of V × V such that Dom(E1)∩Dom(E2) = ∅,
where Dom(Ei) is the domain of Ei, and W is a set of sequences, possibly infinite,
of elements of V . The elements of V are called positions of the game; E1, E2 are
the transition relations respectively for player one and player two: (v1, v2) ∈ Ei
means that player i can legally move from the position v1 to the position v2.
(2) We define a play to be a walk, possibly infinite, in the graph (V,E1 ∪ E2), i.e.
a sequence, possibly void, v1 :: v2 :: . . . :: vn :: . . . of elements of V such that
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E1 ∪ E2 for every i. A play of the form v1 :: v2 :: . . . :: vn :: . . . is said
to start from v1. A play is said to be complete if it is either infinite or is equal
to v1 :: . . . :: vn and vn /∈ Dom(E1 ∪ E2). W is required to be a set of complete
plays. If p is a complete play and p ∈W , we say that player one wins in p. If p is
a complete play and p /∈W , we say that player two wins in p.
(3) Let PG be the set of finite plays. Consider a function f : PG → V . A play
v1 :: . . . :: vn :: . . . is said to be f -correct if f(v1 :: . . . :: vi) = vi+1 for every i
such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E1. f is said to be a strategy for player i if for every play
p = v1 :: . . . :: vn such that vn ∈ Dom(Ei), v1 :: . . . :: vn :: f(p) is a play.
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(4) A winning strategy from position v for player one is a strategy ω : PG → V such
that every complete ω-correct play v :: v1 :: . . . :: vn :: . . . belongs to W .
Notation (Concatenation of Sequences). If for i ∈ N, i = 1, . . . , n we have that
pi = (pi)0 :: . . . :: (pi)ni is a finite sequence of elements of length ni, with p1 :: . . . :: pn we
denote the sequence
(p1)0 :: . . . :: (p1)n1 :: . . . :: (pk)0 :: . . . :: (pk)nk
where (pi)j denotes the j-th element of the sequence pi.
Suppose that a1 :: a2 :: . . . :: an is a play of a game G, representing, for some reason,
a bad situation for player one (for example, in the game of chess, an might be a configura-
tion of the chessboard in which player one has just lost his queen). Then, learnt the lesson,
player one might wish to erase some of his moves and come back to the time the play was
just, say, a1, a2 and choose, say, b1 in place of a3; in other words, player one might wish to
backtrack. Then, the game might go on as a1 :: a2 :: b1 :: . . . :: bm and, once again, player
one might want to backtrack to, say, a1 :: a2 :: b1 :: . . . :: bi, with i < m, and so on... As
there is no learning without remembering, player one must keep in mind the errors made
during the play. This is the idea of 1-Backtracking games (for more motivations, we refer
the reader to [9]) and here is our definition.
Definition 4.3.2 (1-Backtracking Games). Let G = (V,E1, E2,W ) be a game.
(1) We define 1back(G) as the game (PG, E
′
1, E
′
2,W
′), where:
(2) PG is the set of finite plays of G
(3)
E′2 := {(p :: a, p :: a :: b) | p ∈ PG, p :: a ∈ PG, (a, b) ∈ E2}
and
E′1 := {(p :: a, p :: a :: b) | p ∈ PG, p :: a ∈ PG, (a, b) ∈ E1} ∪
{(p :: a :: q, p :: a) | p, q ∈ PG, p :: a :: q ∈ PG, a ∈ Dom(E1)
(q = q′ :: d⇒ d /∈ Dom(E2)), p :: a :: q /∈W};
(4) W ′ is the set of finite complete plays p1 :: . . . :: pn of (PG, E
′
1, E
′
2) such that pn ∈W .
Note. The pair (p :: a :: q, p :: a) in the definition above of E′2 codifies a backtracking
move by player one (and we point out that q might be the empty sequence).
Remark. Differently from [9], in which both players are allowed to backtrack, we only
consider the case in which only player one is supposed do that (as in [27]). It is not that
our results would not hold: we claim that the proofs in this paper would work just as fine
for the definition of 1-Backtracking Tarski games given in [9]. However, as noted in [9], any
player-one recursive winning strategy in our version of the game can be effectively trans-
formed into a winning strategy for player one in the other version the game. Hence, adding
backtracking for the second player does not increase the computational challenge for player
one. Moreover, the notion of winner of the game given in [9] is strictly non constructive
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and games played by player one with the correct winning strategy may even not terminate.
Whereas, with our definition, we can formulate our main theorem as a program termination
result: whatever the strategy chosen by player two, the game terminates with the win of
player one. This is also the spirit of realizability and hence of this paper: the constructive
information must be computed in a finite amount of time, not in the limit.
In the well known Tarski games, there are two players and a formula on the board. The
second player - usually called Abelard - tries to show that the formula is false, while the
first player - usually called Eloise - tries to show that it is true. Let us see the definition.
Definition 4.3.3 (Tarski Games). Let A be a closed implication and negation free
arithmetical formula of L. We define the Tarski game forA as the game TA = (V,E1, E2,W ),
where:
(1) V is the set of all subformula occurrences of A; that is, V is the smallest set of
formulas such that, if either A∨B or A∧B belongs to V , then A,B ∈ V ; if either
∀xA(x) or ∃xA(x) belongs to V , then A(n) ∈ V for all numerals n.
(2) E1 is the set of pairs (A1, A2) ∈ V × V such that A1 = ∃xA(x) and A2 = A(n), or
A1 = A ∨B and either A2 = A or A2 = B;
(3) E2 is the set of pairs (A1, A2) ∈ V × V such that A1 = ∀xA(x) and A2 = A(n), or
A1 = A ∧B and A2 = A or A2 = B;
(4) W is the set of finite complete plays A1 :: . . . :: An such that An = True.
Note. We stress that Tarski games are defined only for implication-and-negation-free
arithmetical formulas. Indeed, 1back(TA), when A contains implications, would be much
more involved and less intuitive (for a definition of Tarski games for every arithmetical
formula see for example Lorenzen’s [18]).
What we want to show is that if t  A, then t gives to player one a recursive winning
strategy in 1back(TA). The idea of the proof is the following. Suppose we play as player
one. Our strategy is relativized to a knowledge state and we start the game by fixing the
actual state of knowledge as ∅. Then we play in the same way as we would do in the Tarski
game. For example, if there is ∀xA(x) on the board and A(n) is chosen by player two,
we recursively play the strategy given by tn; if there is ∃xA(x) on the board, we calculate
π0t[∅] = n and play A(n) and recursively the strategy given by π1t. If there is A∨B on the
board, we calculate p0t[∅], and according as to whether it equals True or False, we play
the strategy recursively given by p1t or p2t. If there is an atomic formula on the board, if it
is true, we win; otherwise we extend the current state with the state ∅⋒ t[∅], we backtrack
and play with respect to the new state of knowledge and trying to keep as close as possible
to the previous game. Eventually, we will reach a state large enough to enable our realizer
to give always correct answers and we will win. Let us consider first an example and then
the formal definition of the winning strategy for Eloise.
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Example (EM1). Given a predicate P of T , and its boolean negation predicate ¬P
(which is representable in T ), the realizer EP of
EM1 := ∀x. ∃y P (x, y) ∨ ∀y¬P (x, y)
is defined as
λαN〈XPα, 〈ΦPα, ∅〉, λm
N AddPαm〉
We now compute a winning strategy for Eloise in the 1-Backtracking game associated to
EM1. According to the rules of the game 1back(TEM1), Abelard is the first to move and, for
some numeral n, chooses the formula
∃y P (n, y) ∨ ∀y¬P (n, y)
Now is the turn of Eloise and she plays the strategy given by the term
〈XPn, 〈ΦPn, ∅〉, λm
N AddPnm〉
Hence, she computes XPn[∅] = χP∅n = False (by definition 3.2.7), so she plays the
formula
∀y¬P (n, y)
and Abelard chooses m and plays
¬P (n,m)
If ¬P (n,m) = True, Eloise wins. Otherwise, she plays the strategy given by
(λmN AddPnm)m[∅] = addP∅nm = {〈P, n,m〉}
So, the new knowledge state is now {〈P, n,m〉} and she backtracks to the formula
∃y P (n, y) ∨ ∀y¬P (n, y)
Now, by definition 3.2.7, XPn[{〈P, n,m〉}] = True and she plays the formula
∃y P (n, y)
calculates the term
π0〈ΦPn, ∅〉[{〈P, n,m〉}] = ϕP {〈P, n,m〉}n = m
plays P (n,m) and wins.
Notation. In the following, we shall denote with upper case letters A,B,C closed arith-
metical formulas, with lower case letters p, q, r plays of TA and with upper case letters
P,Q,R plays of 1back(TA) (and all those letters may be indexed by numbers). To avoid
confusion with the plays of TA, plays of 1Back(TA) will be denoted as p1, . . . , pn rather
than p1 :: . . . :: pn. Moreover, if P = q1, . . . , qm, then P, p1, . . . , pn will denote the sequence
q1, . . . , qm, p1, . . . pn.
We now define, given a play p of TA, a term ρ(p), which we call “the realizer associated
to p” and which represents the term that should be consulted by Eloise in a position Q, p
of the game 1back(TA).
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Definition 4.3.4 . Fix u such that u  A. Let p be a finite play of TA starting with
A. We define by induction on the length of p a term ρ(p) ∈ TClass (read as ‘the realizer
associated to p’) in the following way:
(1) If p = A, then ρ(p) = u.
(2) If p = (q :: ∃xB(x) :: B(n)) and ρ(q :: ∃xB(x)) = t, then ρ(p) = π1t.
(3) If p = (q :: ∀xB(x) :: B(n)) and ρ(q :: ∀xB(x)) = t, then ρ(p) = tn.
(4) If p = (q :: B0 ∧B1 :: Bi) and ρ(q :: B0 ∧B1) = t, then ρ(p) = πit.
(5) If p = (q :: B1 ∨B2 :: Bi) and ρ(q :: B1 ∨B2) = t, then ρ(p) = pit.
Given a play P = Q, q :: B of 1back(TA), we set ρ(P ) = ρ(q :: B).
A play P of 1back(TA) may involve a number of backtracking moves by Eloise. In the
winning strategy we are going to define, each time Eloise backtracks, she must extend the
current state of knowledge by means of a realizer. In the above definition, we explain how
Eloise calculates the state associated to P .
Definition 4.3.5 . Fix u such that u  A. Let ρ be as in definition 4.3.4 and P be a
finite play of 1back(TA) starting with A. We define by induction on the length of P a state
Σ(P ) (read as ‘the state associated to P ’) in the following way:
(1) If P = A, then Σ(P ) = ∅.
(2) If P = (Q, p :: B, p :: B :: C) and Σ(Q, p :: B) = s, then Σ(P ) = s.
(3) If P = (Q, p :: B :: q, p :: B) and Σ(Q, p :: B :: q) = s and ρ(Q, p :: B :: q) = t, then
if t : S, then Σ(P ) = s ⋒ t[s], else Σ(P ) = s.
We are now in a position to define a winning strategy for Eloise. Given a play Q, p of
1back(TA), she computes the state associated to Q, p and then calls the realizer associated
to p, which returns to her the next move to be performed.
Definition 4.3.6 (Winning strategy for 1back(TA)). Fix u such that u  A. Let ρ
and Σ be respectively as in definitions 4.3.4 and 4.3.5. We define a function ω from the
set of finite plays of 1back(TA) to set of finite plays of TA; ω is intended to be a recursive
winning strategy from A for player one in 1back(TA).
(1) If ρ(P, q :: ∃xB(x)) = t, Σ(P, q :: ∃xB(x)) = s and (π0t)[s] = n, then
ω(P, q :: ∃xB(x)) = q :: ∃xB(x) :: B(n)
(2) If ρ(P, q :: B ∨ C) = t and Σ(P, q :: B ∨ C) = s, then if (p0t)[s] = True then
ω(P, q :: B ∨ C) = q :: B ∨ C :: B
else
ω(P, q :: B ∨ C) = q :: B ∨ C :: C
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(3) If An is atomic, An = False, ρ(P,A1 :: · · · :: An) = t and Σ(P,A1 :: · · · :: An) = s,
then
ω(P,A1 :: · · · :: An) = A1 :: · · · :: Ai
where i is equal to the smallest j < n such that ρ(A1 :: · · · :: Aj) = w and either
Aj = ∃xC(x) ∧Aj+1 = C(n) ∧ (π0w)[s ⋒ t[s]] 6= n
or
Aj = B1 ∨B2 ∧Aj+1 = B1 ∧ (p0w)[s ⋒ t[s]] = False
or
Aj = B1 ∨B2 ∧Aj+1 = B2 ∧ (p0w)[s ⋒ t[s]] = True
If such j does not exist, we set i = n.
(4) In the other cases, ω(P, q) = q.
Lemma 4.3.1 . Suppose u  A and ρ,Σ, ω as in definition 4.3.6. Let Q be a finite ω-correct
play of 1back(TA) starting with A, ρ(Q) = t, Σ(Q) = s. If Q = Q
′, q′ :: B, then t s B.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the length of Q.
(1) If Q = A, then t = ρ(Q) = u s A.
(2) If Q = P, q :: ∃xB(x), q :: ∃xB(x) :: B(n), then let t′ = ρ(P, q :: ∃xB(x)). By
definition of Σ, s = Σ(P, q :: ∃xB(x)). Since Q is ω-correct and (q :: ∃xB(x), q ::
∃xB(x) :: B(n)) ∈ E1, we have ω(P, q :: ∃xB(x)) = q :: ∃xB(x) :: B(n) and so
n = (π0t
′)[s]. Moreover, by definition of ρ, t = π1t
′; by induction hypothesis,
t′ s ∃xB(x); so, t = π1t
′
s B(n).
(3) If Q = P, q :: B ∨ C, q :: B ∨ C :: B, then let t′ = ρ(P, q :: B ∨ C). By definition of
Σ, s = Σ(P, q :: B ∨C). Since Q is ω-correct and (q :: B ∨C, q :: B ∨C :: B) ∈ E1,
we have ω(P, q :: B ∨ C) = q :: B ∨ C :: B and so (p0t
′)[s] = True. Moreover, by
definition of ρ, t = p1t
′; by induction hypothesis, t′ s B ∨ C; so, t = p1t
′
s B.
The other case is analogous.
(4) If Q = P, q :: ∀xB(x), q :: ∀xB(x) :: B(n), then let t′ = ρ(P, q :: ∀xB(x)). By
definition of Σ, s = Σ(P, q :: ∀xB(x)). By definition of ρ, t = t′n; by induction
hypothesis, t′ s ∀xB(x); hence, t = t
′n s B(n).
(5) If Q = P, q :: B ∧ C, q :: B ∧ C :: B, then let t′ = ρ(P, q :: B ∧ C). By definition
of Σ, s = Σ(P, q :: B ∧ C). By definition of ρ, t = π0t′; by induction hypothesis,
t′ s B ∧C; hence, t = π0t
′
s B. The other case is analogous.
(6) If Q = P,A1 :: · · · :: An, A1 :: · · · :: Ai, i < n, An atomic, then A1 = A. Further-
more, if Σ(P,A1 :: · · · :: An) = s
′ and t′ = ρ(P,A1 :: · · · :: An), then s = s
′
⋒ t′[s′].
Let tj = ρ(A1 :: · · · :: Aj), for j = 1, . . . , i. We prove by induction on j that
tj s Aj , and hence the thesis. If j = 1, then t1 = ρ(A1) = ρ(A) = u s A = A1.
If j > 1, by induction hypothesis tk s Ak, for every k < j. If either Aj−1 =
∀xC(x) or Aj−1 = C0 ∧C1, then either tj = tj−1n and Aj = C(n), or tj = πmtj−1
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and Aj = Cm: in both cases, we have tj s Aj , since tj−1 s Aj−1. Therefore,
by definition of ω and i and the ω-correctness of Q, the remaining possibilities
are that either Aj−1 = ∃xC(x), Aj = C(n), tj = π1tj−1, with (π0tj−1)[s] = n;
or Aj−1 = C1 ∨ C2, Aj = Cm, tj = pmtj−1 and (p0tj−1)[s] = True if and only if
m = 1; in both cases, we have tj s Aj.

Theorem 4.3.1 (Soundness Theorem). Let A be a closed negation and implication free
arithmetical formula. Suppose that u  A and consider the game 1back(TA). Let ω be as
in definition 4.3.6. Then ω is a recursive winning strategy from A for player one.
Proof. We begin by showing that there is no infinite ω-correct play.
Let P = p1, . . . , pn, . . . be, for the sake of contradiction, an infinite ω-correct play, with
p1 = A. Let A1 :: · · · :: Ak be the longest play of TA such that there exists j such that
for every n ≥ j, pn is of the form A1 :: · · · :: Ak :: qn. A1 :: · · · :: Ak is well defined,
because: pn is of the form A :: q
′
n for every n; the length of pn is at most the degree of the
formula A; the sequence of maximum length is unique because any two such sequences are
one the prefix of the other, and therefore are equal. Moreover, let {ni}i∈N be the infinite
increasing sequence of all indexes ni such that pni is of the form A1 :: · · · :: Ak :: qni and
pni+1 = A1 :: · · · :: Ak (indeed, {ni}i∈N must be infinite: if it were not so, then there would
be an index j′ such that for every n ≥ j′, pn = A1 :: · · · :: Ak :: Ak+1 :: q, violating the
assumption on the maximal length of A1 :: · · · :: Ak). Ak, if not atomic, is a disjunction or
an existential statement.
Let now si = Σ(p1, . . . , pi) and t = ρ(A1 :: · · · :: Ak). For every i, si ≤ si+1, by definition of
Σ. There are three cases:
1) Ak = ∃xB(x). Then, by the Stability Theorem (Theorem 4.2.1), there exists m such
that for every a, if na ≥ m, then (π0t)[sna] = (π0t)[sm]. Let
h := (π0t)[sna ⋒ t1[sna ]] = (π0t)[sna+1]
where t1 = ρ(p1, . . . , pna). So let a be such that na ≥ m; then
pna+2 = ω(p1, . . . , pna+1) = ω(p1, . . . , A1 :: · · · :: Ak) = A1 :: · · · :: Ak :: B(h)
Moreover, by hypothesis, and since pna+1 = A1 :: · · · :: Ak, we have
pn(a+1) = A1 :: · · · :: Ak :: qn(a+1) = A1 :: · · · :: Ak :: B(h) :: q
′
for some q′ and pn(a+1)+1 = A1 :: · · · :: Ak: contradiction, since
h = (π0t)[sna+1] = (π0t)[sn(a+1)+1] = (π0t)[sn(a+1) ⋒ t2[sn(a+1) ]]
where t2 = ρ(p1, . . . , pn(a+1)), whilst h 6= (π0t)[sn(a+1) ⋒ t2[sn(a+1) ]] should hold, by definition
of ω (point (3)).
2) Ak = B ∨ C. This case is totally analogous to the preceding.
3) Ak is atomic. Then, for every n ≥ j, pn = A1 :: · · · :: Ak. So, for every n ≥ j,
sn+1 = sn ⋒ t[sn] and hence, by Theorem 4.2.2 there exists m ≥ j such that t[sm] = ∅.
But t sm Ak, by Lemma 4.3.1; hence, Ak must equal True, and so it is impossible that
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(pm, pm+1) = (A1 :: · · · :: Ak, A1 :: · · · :: Ak) ∈ E
′
1: contradiction.
Let now p = p1, . . . , pn be a complete finite ω-correct play. pn must equal B1 :: · · · :: Bk,
with Bk atomic and Bk = True: otherwise, p wouldn’t be complete, since player one would
lose the play pn in TA and hence would be allowed to backtrack by definition 4.3.2.

4.4. Examples
In this section we include two natural deduction classical proofs of two simple combi-
natorial statements, using only Excluded Middle for semi-decidable statements, then we
extract a constructive content using our realizability semantics. For each of them, we in-
terpret the program we shall extract using our game interpretation of the learning based
realizability semantics.
4.4.1. Minimum Principle for Functions over Natural Numbers. The mini-
mum principle states that every function f over natural numbers has a minimum value, i.e.
there exists a f(n) ∈ N such that for every m ∈ N f(m) ≥ f(n). We can prove this principle
in HA + EM1, for any f in the language. We assume P (y, x) ≡ f(x) < y, but, in order to
enhance readability, we will write f(x) < y rather than the obscure P (y, x). We define:
Lessef(n) := ∃αf(α) ≤ n
Lessf(n) := ∃αf(α) < n
Notlessf(n) := ∀αf(α) ≥ n
Then we formulate - in equivalent form - the minimum principle as:
Hasminf := ∃y. Notlessf(y) ∧ Lessef(y)
The informal argument goes as follows. We prove by induction on n that for every k, if
f(k) ≤ n, then f has minimum value. If n = 0, we just observe that f(k) ≤ 0, implies f(k)
is the minimum value of f . Suppose now n > 0. If Notlessf(f(k)) holds true, we are done,
f(k) is the minimum of f . Otherwise, Lessf(f(k)) holds, and hence f(α) < f(k) ≤ n for
some α given by an oracle. Hence f(α) ≤ f(k) − 1 ≤ n − 1 and we conclude that f has a
minimum value by induction hypothesis.
Now we give the formal proofs, which are natural deduction trees, decorated with terms
of TClass, as formalized in chapter 3. We first prove that ∀n. (Lessef(n) → Hasminf) →
(Lessef(S(n))→ Hasminf) holds.
EP : ∀n. Notlessf(S(n)) ∨ Lessf(S(n))
EPn : Notlessf(S(n)) ∨ Lessf(S(n))
[Notlessf(S(n))]
T1
Hasminf
[Lessf(S(n))]
T2
Hasminf
D : Hasminf
λw2D : Lessef(S(n))→ Hasminf
λw1λw2D : (Lessef(n)→ Hasminf)→ (Lessef(S(n))→ Hasminf)
λnλw1λw2D : ∀n(Lessef(n)→ Hasminf)→ (Lessef(S(n)→ Hasminf)
where for lack of space the term D is defined later, T1 is the tree
v1 : Notlessf(S(n)) w2 : Lessef(S(n))
〈v1, w2〉 : Notlessf(S(n)) ∧ Lessef(S(n))
〈S(n), 〈v1, w2〉〉 : Hasminf
and T2 is the tree
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v2 : [Lessf(S(n))]
w1 : [Lessef(n)→ Hasminf ]
[x2 : f(z) < S(n)]
x2 : f(z) ≤ n
〈z, x2〉 : Lessef(n)
w1〈z, x2〉 : Hasminf
w1〈π0v2, π1v2〉 : Hasminf
We prove now that Lessef(0)→ Hasminf
w : [Lessef(0)]
x1 : [f(z) ≤ 0]
x1 : f(z) = 0
x1 : f(α) ≥ f(z)
λαx1 : Notlessf(f(z))
∅ : f(z) ≤ f(z)
〈z,∅〉 : Lessef(f(z))
〈λαx1, 〈z,∅〉〉 : Notlessf(f(z)) ∧ Lessef(f(z))
〈f(z), 〈λαx1, 〈z,∅〉〉〉 : Hasminf
〈f(π0w), 〈λαπ1w, 〈π0w,∅〉〉〉 : Hasminf
F := λw〈f(π0w), 〈λαπ1w, 〈π0w,∅〉〉〉 : Lessef(0)→ Hasminf
Therefore we can conclude with the induction rule that
λαN RF (λnλw1λw2D)α : ∀x.Lessef(x)→ Hasminf
And now the thesis:
∅ : f(0) ≤ f(0)
〈0,∅〉 : Lessef(f(0))
λαN RF (λnλw1λw2D)α : ∀x.Lessef(x)→ Hasminf
RF (λnλw1λw2D)f(0) : Lessef(f(0))→ Hasminf
M := RF (λnλw1λw2D)f(0)〈0,∅〉 : Hasminf
Let us now define
D := if XPS(n) then w1〈ΦPS(n),∅〉 else 〈S(n), 〈λβ (AddP )S(n)β,w2〉〉
Let s be a state and let us considerM , the realizer ofHasminf , in the base case of the recur-
sion and after in its general form during the computation: RF (λnλw1λw2D)f(0)〈m,∅〉[s].
If f(0) = 0,
M [s] = RF (λnλw1λw2D)f(0)〈0,∅〉[s] =
= F 〈0,∅〉 = 〈f(0), 〈λα∅, 〈0,∅〉〉
If f(0) = S(n), we have two other cases. If χP sS(n) = True, then
RF (λnλw1λw2D)S(n)〈m,∅〉[s] =
= (λnλw1λw2D)n(RF (λnλw1λw2D)n)〈m,∅〉[s] =
= RF (λnλw1λw2D)n〈ΦP (S(n)),∅〉[s]
If χP sS(n) = False, then
RF (λnλw1λw2D)S(n)〈m,∅〉[s] =
= (λnλw1λw2D)n(RF (λnλw1λw2D)n)〈m,∅〉[s] =
= 〈S(n), 〈λβ (addP )sS(n)β, 〈m,∅〉〉〉
In the first case, the minimum value of f has been found. In the second case, the operator
R, starting from S(n), recursively calls itself on n; in the third case, it reduces to its nor-
mal form. From these equations, we easily deduce the behavior of the realizer of Hasminf .
In a pseudo imperative programming language, for the witness of Hasminf we would write:
n := f(0);
4.4. EXAMPLES 53
while (χP sn = True, i.e. ∃m such that f(m) < n ∈ s)
do n := n− 1;
return n;
Hence, when f(0) > 0, we have, for some numeral k
M [s] = 〈k, 〈λβ (addP )skβ, 〈ϕP sk,∅〉〉〉
It is clear that k is the minimum value of f , according to the partial information provided by
s about f , and that f(ϕP sk) ≤ k. If s is sufficiently complete, then k is the true minimum
of f .
The normal form of the realizerM ofHasminf is so simple that we can immediately extract
the winning strategy ω for the 1-Backtraking version of the Tarski game for Hasminf .
Suppose the current state of the game is s. If f(0) = 0, Eloise chooses the formula
Notlessf(0) ∧ Lessef(0)
and wins. If f(0) > 0, she chooses, for k defined as above,
Notlessf(k) ∧ Lessef(k) = ∀α f(α) ≥ k ∧ ∃α f(α) ≤ k
If Abelard chooses ∃α f(α) ≤ k, she wins, because she responds with f(ϕP sk) ≤ k, which
holds. Suppose hence Abelard chooses
∀α f(α) ≥ k
and then f(β) ≥ k. If it holds, Eloise wins. Otherwise, she adds to the current state s
(λβ (addP )skβ)β = (addP )skβ = {f(β) < k}
and backtracks to Hasminf and then plays again. This time, she chooses
Notlessf(f(β)) ∧ Lessef(f(β))
(using f(β), which was Abelard’s counterexample to the minimality of k and is smaller than
her previous choice for the minimum value). After at most f(0) backtrackings, she wins.
4.4.2. Coquand’s Example. We investigate now an example - due to Coquand -
in our framework of realizability. We want to prove that for every function over natural
numbers and for every a ∈ N there exists x ∈ N such that f(x) ≤ f(x+ a). Thanks to the
minimum principle, we can give a very easy classical proof:
Hasminf
[Notlessf(µ) ∧ Lessef(µ)]
Lessef(µ)
[Notlessf(µ) ∧ Lessef(µ)]
Notlessf(µ)
f(z + a) ≥ µ [f(z) ≤ µ]
f(z) ≤ f(z + a)
∃xf(x) ≤ f(x+ a)
∀a∃xf(x) ≤ f(x+ a)
∀a∃xf(x) ≤ f(x+ a)
∀a∃xf(x) ≤ f(x+ a)
The extracted realizer is
λa〈π0π1π1M,π0π1M(π0π1π1M + a) ⋒ π1π1π1h〉
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where M is the realizer of Hasminf . m := π0π1π1M [s] is a point the purported minimum
value µ := π0M of f is attained at, accordingly to the information in the state s (i.e.
f(m) ≤ µ). So, if Abelard chooses
∃x f(x) ≤ f(x+ a)
Eloise chooses
f(m) ≤ f(m+ a)
We have to consider the term
U [s] := π0π1M(π0π1π1M + a) ⋒ π1π1π1M [s]
which updates the current state s. Surely, π1π1π1M [s] = ∅. π0π1M [s] is equal either to
λβ (addP )sµβ or to λα∅. So, what does U [s] actually do? We have:
U [s] = π0π1M(π0π1π1M + a)[s] = π0π1M(m+ a)[s]
with either π0π1M(m+ a)[s] = ∅ or
π0π1M(m+ a)[s] = {f(m+ a) < f(m)}
So U [s] tests if f(m+a) < f(m); if it is not the case, Eloise wins, otherwise she enlarges the
state s, including the information f(m+ a) < f(m) and backtracks to ∃xf(x) ≤ f(x+ a).
Starting from the state ∅, after k+1 backtrackings, it will be reached a state s′, which will
be of the form {f((k + 1)a) < f(ka), . . . , f(2a) < f(a), f(a) < f(0)} and Eloise will play
f((k + 1)a) ≤ f((k + 1)a + a). Hence, the extracted algorithm for Eloise’s witness is the
following:
n := 0;
while f(n) > f(n+ a)
do n := n+ a;
return n;
4.5. Total Recursive Learning-Based Realizability
The realizability notion introduced in definition 4.2.4 is very interesting from the con-
structive point of view. But precisely for that reason, the system TClass fails to realize every
formula for which an Eloise recursive winning strategy exists in its associated 1-Backtracking
Tarski game, as the following theorem implies:
Theorem 4.5.1 (Incompleteness of TClass). There is a Π
0
2 arithmetical sentence A such
that Eloise has recursive winning strategy in 1back(TA), but no term of system TClass realizes
A.
Proof. Take any total recursive function f : N → N not representable by any term of
system T of type N → N. Let n be the code of f in the enumeration of Turing machines
assumed by Kleene’s primitive recursive predicate Txyz. Then the formula A := ∀y∃zTnyz
asserts the totality of f and hence it is true. Clearly, Eloise has a winning recursive strategy
in 1back(TA): for any y, she may backtrack until she finds an m such that Tnym holds.
Suppose, along the way of contradiction, that for some t of system TClass, t  A. Then, as
proven in chapter 5, there exists a term u : N→ N of system T such that, for every numeral
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l, Tnl(ul) holds. From this, it easily follows that f can be coded by a term of system T,
which is a contradiction.

The only way around this issue, which is the purpose of this section, is to extend our
notion of realizability and increase the computational power of our realizers, in order to be
able to represent any partial recursive function and in particular every recursive strategy of
1-Backtracking Tarski games. So, we choose to add to our calculus a fixed point combinator
Y, such that for every term u : A→ A, Yu = u(Yu), getting the full power of PCF (see for
example Gunter [25]).
Definition 4.5.1 (Systems PCFClass and PCFLearn ). We define PCFClass and PCFLearn
to be, respectively, the extensions of TClass and TLearn obtained by adding for every type A
a constant YA of type (A → A) → A and a new equality axiom YAu = u(YAu) for every
term u : A→ A.
Since in PCFClass there is a schema for unbounded iteration, properties like convergence
do not hold anymore, for terms may even not have a normal form. So we have to ask our
realizers to be convergent. Hence, for each type A of PCFClass we define a set ‖A‖ of terms
u : A which we call the set of stable terms of type A. We define stable terms by lifting the
notion of convergence from atomic types to arrow and product types.
Definition 4.5.2 (Convergence for PCFClass). Assume that {si}i∈N is a w.i. sequence
of state constants, and u, v ∈ PCFClass.
(1) u converges in {si}i∈N if there exists a normal form v such that ∃i∀j ≥ i.u[sj ] = v
in PCFLearn.
(2) u converges if u converges in every w.i. sequence of state constants.
Definition 4.5.3 (Stable Terms). Let {si}i∈N be a w.i. chain of states and s ∈ S.
Assume A is a type. We define a set ‖A‖ of terms t ∈ PCFClass of type A, by induction on
A.
(1) ‖S‖ = {t : S | t converges}
(2) ‖N‖ = {t : N | t converges}
(3) ‖Bool‖ = {t : Bool | t converges}
(4) ‖A×B‖ = {t : A×B | π0t ∈ ‖A‖, π1t ∈ ‖B‖}
(5) ‖A→ B‖ = {t : A→ B | ∀u ∈ ‖A‖, tu ∈ ‖B‖}
If t ∈ ‖A‖, we say that t is a stable term of type A.
Now we extend the notion of realizability with respect to PCFClass and PCFLearn.
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Definition 4.5.4 (Total Recursive Learning-Based Realizability). Assume s is
a state constant, t ∈ PCFClass is a closed term of state ∅, A ∈ L is a closed formula, and
t ∈ ‖[A]‖. Let ~t = t1, . . . , tn : N.
(1) t s P (~t) if and only if t[s] = ∅ in PCFLearn implies P (~t) = True
(2) t s A ∧B if and only if π0t s A and π1t s B
(3) t s A ∨B if and only if either p0t[s] = True in PCFLearn and p1t s A, or
p0t[s] = False in PCFLearn and p2t s B
(4) t s A→ B if and only if for all u, if u s A, then tu s B
(5) t s ∀xA if and only if for all numerals n, tn s A[n/x]
(6) t s ∃xA if and only for some numeral n, π0t[s] = n in PCFLearn and π1t s A[n/x]
We define t  A if and only if t s A for all state constants s.
We observe that theorem 4.2.2 holds as well for the stable terms of PCFClass, for it is
a consequence of the Stability theorem 4.2.1. Hence, the Soundness theorem 4.3.1, which
depends only on the definition of realizability, stability and theorem 4.2.2, also holds for
realizers of PCFClass. That is, we have
Theorem 4.5.2 (Soundness Theorem (PCFClass)). Let A be a closed negation-and-
implication free arithmetical formula. Suppose that u ∈ PCFClass and u  A and consider
the game 1back(TA). Let ω be as in definition 4.3.6. Then ω is a recursive winning strategy
from A for player one.
4.6. Completeness
4.6.1. Idea of the Proof. In this section, we prove our completeness theorem: if an
implication-and-negation-free arithmetical formula has a winning recursive strategy in its
associated 1-Backtracking Tarski game, then it is realizable by a term of PCFClass.
The idea of the proof follows naturally from the very meaning of learning based re-
alizability. In order to realize a formula, one has to provide in the first place a Kleene-
Kreisel-style realizer of the formula, recursive in an oracle for the Halting problem. This
corresponds to the fact that the terms of TClass contain symbols for non computable func-
tions which are in the same Turing degree of the aforementioned oracle. That is why one can
see learning based realizability as a way of “programming with non computable functions”.
Hence, one would like to apply directly Berardi et al. [9] result: given an implication-and-
negation-free arithmetical formula, if there exists a recursive winning strategy for Eloise
in its associated 1-Backtracking Tarski game, then there also exists a winning strategy for
Eloise in its associated Tarski game, recursive in an oracle for the Halting problem.
However, that result is not enough for our purposes. According to learning based re-
alizability, together with an oracle-equipped Kleene-Kreisel-style realizer, one has also to
provide an effective method for learning oracle values in a convergent way and show that
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the realizer is always defined, whatever oracle approximations are used. Hence, we have to
refine Berardi et al. result and prove that oracle values can be learned by counterexamples
and the program is not “perturbed” by the oracle approximations used. More precisely, we
show that the ineffective oracle strategy given in [9] can be made more effective by using the
novel ideas of learning based realizability: we first approximate the strategy by allowing it
to use in the computations only approximated oracles; then we show that good enough ap-
proximations can be attained by a process of intelligent learning by counterexamples. One
this task will be accomplished, the completeness theorem will follow just by formalizing the
argument.
We now give an informal overview of the construction to be carried out. This should
serve the reader as a guide to the next technical sections. Suppose that ω is a recursive
winning strategy for Eloise in 1back(TA). We start by describing a winning strategy for
Eloise in TA, which is recursive in some oracle for the Halting problem. We begin with
some terminology.
Definition 4.6.1 (Improvable, Optimal Plays). We say that a ω-correct play
Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai
of 1back(TA), with Ai of the form ∃xB or B ∨ C, is improvable if there exists a ω-correct
play of 1back(TA) of the form
Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q
′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai
and we call this latter play an improvement of the former. Moreover, a play is said to be
optimal if it is not improvable.
The reason why a play
Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q
′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai
is called an improvement of Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai is that the former gives more information to
the strategy ω in order to choose the next move for Eloise. Moreover, if Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai is
optimal, whatever ω-correct continuation of the game we may consider, ω will not backtrack
to A0 :: . . . :: Ai anymore. Since any such continuation will extend the play
Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai, A0 :: . . . :: Ai :: Ai+1
where
ω(Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai) = A0 :: . . . :: Ai :: Ai+1
the choice of Ai+1 operated by ω is the best possible.
The oracle XE that we consider answers to questions of the form: is the play Q,A0 ::
. . . :: Ai improvable? To facilitate computations we also consider an oracle ΦE which given
the code of a play Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai returns the code of a play
Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q
′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai
whenever Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai is improvable and returns a dummy code otherwise. Observe
that the two oracles XE and ΦE are of the same Turing degree, so exactly one of them
would suffice. Furthermore, observe that one can define a program taking as input a code
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of an improvable play Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai and returning the code of an optimal improvement
of the form
Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q
′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai
(just iterate ΦE).
Suppose now that A0 :: . . . :: ∃xB is a position in the game TA. How should Eloise
move? The idea, coming from [9], is to compute, using our oracles, an optimal play of
1back(TA) of the form
Q,A0 :: . . . :: ∃xB
Then, Eloise should respond by first computing
ω(Q,A0 :: . . . :: ∃xB) = A0 :: . . . :: ∃xB :: B(n)
and then choosing the formula B(n). The idea is that B(n) is a good choice, since no
backtracking to A0 :: . . . :: ∃xA is ever to be done, following the strategy ω.
More precisely, Eloise, while playing, simultaneously constructs a sequence of plays
Q0, . . . , Qk of 1back(TA) in the following way. She first defines Q0 to be an optimal im-
provement of A. Then, suppose k > 0 and that she is in the position
A0 :: . . . :: Ak
of the game TA and has constructed a sequence of plays Q0, . . . , Qk of 1back(TA) such that
i) each play Qi is of the form Q
′
i, A0 :: . . . :: Ai;
ii) For all i < k, Qi+1 extends Qi;
iii) For all i, Qi is optimal;
iv) For all i, Qi is ω-correct.
Then if Abelard has to move and chooses Ak+1, Eloise defines Qk+1 as an optimal
improvement of
Qk, A0 :: . . . :: Ak :: Ak+1
which she can compute using the oracles. If Eloise has to move, she computes
ω(Qk) = A0 :: . . . :: Ak :: Ak+1
she chooses as next move Ak+1 and she defines Qk+1 as an optimal improvement of
Qk, A0 :: . . . :: Ak :: Ak+1
which she can again compute using the oracles. It is clear that the sequence Q1, . . . , Qk+1
still satisfies all properties i)-iv).
Suppose now that a complete play A0 :: . . . :: An of TA has been played by Eloise
following the above strategy and suppose by contradiction that An = False. Then, since
by iv) Qn is ω-correct and ω is winning, we have
ω(Qn) = A0 :: . . . :: Ai
for some i ≤ n, which represents a backtracking move performed by ω. Since by ii) Qn
extends Qi, we have that Qn, A0 :: . . . :: Ai can be written as
Qi, Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai
4.6. COMPLETENESS 59
for some Q. As a consequence, Qi = Q
′
i, A0 :: . . . Ai can be improved, which contradicts the
optimality of Qi stated at point iii).
Thus we have a winning strategy for Eloise, recursive in the oracles XE,ΦE. Now,
however, we want Eloise to follow the very same strategy, but using approximations of
those oracles in the place of the original ones. Of course, responses of approximated oracles
are not to be always trustable. However, we will prove that correct oracle values can be
learned by counterexamples and therefore that the use of the oracles may be replaced by a
learning mechanism. According to learning based realizability, we will have in particular to
prove that whenever the “approximated” strategy does not lead Eloise to win TA, then some
new value of the oracles can be learned: at least, from a failure Eloise corrects something
old and gains something new, which is a perfect example of a self-correcting strategy.
Now, suppose that a complete play A0 :: . . . :: An of TA has been played by Eloise
following the new “approximated” strategy. We still may suppose that Q0, . . . , Qn satisfy
i), ii), iv). However, they satisfy only the following weaker
iii)′ For all i, Qi is optimal, according to the response of the current oracle approxima-
tions.
In other words, it might happen that our approximated oracles believe Qi to be not im-
provable, whilst Qi actually is. Since iii) does not hold any more, the previous argument
- that has shown An = True - now fails and it might still occur that An = False. How
Eloise is to learn from this counterexample? She computes ω(Qn), which is of the form
A0 :: . . . :: Ai, since it represents a backtracking move performed by ω. Then as before she
writes Qn, A0 :: . . . :: Ai as
Q′i, A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai
As a consequence, she finds out that Q′i, A0 :: . . . Ai can be extended as to contradict the
approximated-oracle prediction of point iii)′ and hence collects a new value of the oracle.
In the next two sections, we spell out the details of the construction and prove that the
above Eloise strategy is sound and in fact convergent. In order to enhance readability and
separate the important ideas from technicalities, we split the construction into two parts.
First, we define the concept of learning strategy, which represents a translation of our
realizability notion into the language of game theory, and show that any winning strategy
in 1back(TA) can be transformed into a learning strategy in TA. Secondly, we show that in
fact any learning strategy in TA can be translated into a learning based realizer of A.
4.6.2. Winning 1-Backtracking Strategies into Learning Strategies. For the
rest of the paper, fix a closed implication-and-negation-free arithmetical formula A and let
TA be its associated Tarski game. Fix moreover a primitive recursive enumeration of the
plays of 1back(TA) and let ω be a winning recursive strategy from A for player one in the
game 1back(TA). We assume, without loss of generality, that ω performs backtracking moves
only in front of atomic formulas; that is, we assume that for every play Q,A0 :: . . . :: An, if
ω(Q,A0 :: . . . :: An) = A0 :: . . . :: Ai
then An is atomic. Clearly, any winning strategy can be transformed accordingly to this
requirement: any backtracking move can be delayed by dummy moves and be performed in
front of an atomic formula.
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First of all, we formalize the coding of plays into numbers which has to be represented
in our calculus.
Definition 4.6.2 (Abstract Plays of TA, Coding terms). A sequence of arithmeti-
cal formulas A0 :: . . . :: An is said to be an abstract play of TA, if A0 = A and for all i
i) if Ai = ∀xB or Ai = ∃xB, then Ai+1 = B;
ii) if Ai = B0 ∧B1 or Ai = B0 ∨B1, then Ai+1 = B0 or Ai+1 = B1.
Let moreover p = A0 :: . . . :: Ak be any abstract play of TA. By |p| : N, we denote a
term of PCFClass having as free variables precisely the variables occuring free in the for-
mulas of p and such that, for every sequence of numerals ~n and sequence of variables ~x
comprising all the free variables of p, |p|[~n/~x] is equal to the numeric code of the play
q = A0[~n/~x] :: . . . :: Ak[~n/~x].

We define now a translation of learning based realizability into the language of Tarski
games. The translation consists of a pair (g0, g1) of terms of PCFClass: the first one describes
a strategy for Eloise in TA, and the second one decides when Eloise should backtrack.
Definition 4.6.3 (Learning Strategy). Let TA = (V,E1, E2,W ). Let g = (g0, g1) be
a pair of terms of PCFClass respectively of types N→ N and N→ S.
For every state s, we say that a play A0 :: . . . :: An of TA is g[s]-correct if for every i < n
such that (Ai, Ai+1) ∈ E1
g0[s](|A0 :: . . . :: Ai|) = |Ai+1|
holds.
g is said to be a learning strategy from A if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) (Soundness) For every state s and play p = A :: A0 :: . . . :: An such that
An ∈ Dom(E1), if g0[s](|p|) = |An+1|, then A :: A0 :: . . . :: An :: An+1 is a
play.
(2) (Convergence) For every play p starting from A, g0(|p|) and g1(|p|) converge.
(3) (Learning) For every state s and complete g[s]-correct play p starting from A, if
g1[s](|p|) = ∅ =⇒ p ∈W
We observe that conditions (2) and (3) of definition 4.6.3 correspond respectively to the
convergence property that PCFClass realizers must have and to the learning condition in
realizability for atomic formulas.
We now define a predicate E : N2 → Bool of T, which codes the improvement relation
between plays of 1back(TA) we are interested in. In the following, our terms of PCFClass will
make use only of the oracle constants XE and ΦE, which are in the syntax of TClass (recall
chapter 3, definition 3.2.6) and hence of PCFClass. Moreover, we define a term Ψ : N → N,
which will be our fundamental computational engine. Given a code of a ω-correct play, Ψ
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is intended to return the code itself or the code of an optimal improvement, according to
the oracles XE,ΦE . Ψ is in general non computable and by using Ψ as it is, we could only
write strategies recursive in the oracles XE,ΦE , as in [9]. Therefore, we shall compute its
approximations Ψ[s], by which we will be able to write the “approximated” strategy for
Eloise we have discussed in section 4.6.1.
Definition 4.6.4 (Improvement Relation, Optimality Operator Ψ). Let E : N2 →
Bool a predicate of Go¨del’s T such that Enm = True iff n and m are numerals coding
respectively ω-correct plays P, p :: A and P, p :: A,Q, p :: A of 1back(TA), with A = ∃xB(x)
or A = B0 ∨B1.
We want to define now a term Ψ : N → N of PCFClass such that the following equation is
provable in the equational theory of PCFClass:
Ψz = if XEz then Ψ(ΦEz) else z
In order to do that, it is enough to let
α := λyN→NλzNif XEz then y(ΦEz) else z
and take Ψ := Y(α).
The term Ψ, given a number n, checks whether XEn = True, i.e. whether there exists a
numberm such that Enm = True. In that case, it computes such an m by calling ΦEn, and
continues the computation by calling itself on m; otherwise, it returns n. The termination
of Ψn is guaranteed by the fact that there are no infinite ω-correct plays and each recursive
call made by Ψ extends a current ω-correct play (see [9]). If XE,ΦE are interpreted as
oracles, Ψn returns an optimal improvement of the play coded by n. But when XE,ΦE are
approximated through a particular state s, in general Ψn[s] will return only an improvement
of the play coded by n, or even n itself.
We now have to prove the crucial property that for any finite approximation of the oracles
XE,ΦE - that is, for any state s - the term Ψn[s] has a normal form and that Ψn converge:
Ψ is “stable” with respect to oracle approximations.
Proposition 4.6.1 (Stability of Ψ). Ψ ∈ ‖N→ N‖
Proof. Let {si}i∈N be a w.i. chain of states. By definition 4.5.3, we have to prove
that, for every term t ∈ ‖N‖, Ψt converges. Since t converges to a numeral, it is enough to
show that for every numeral n, Ψn converges. First of all, we observe that for any state s,
χEsm is equal to True only for a finite number of arguments m. Moreover, by definition
4.6.4
Ψn[s] = if χEsn then Ψ(ϕEsn) else n
Hence, by direct computation it can be seen that, for every i ∈ N, Ψn[si] has a normal form
and it is equal, for some k ∈ N, to (ϕEsi)
kn, having defined by induction
(ϕEsi)
0n := n, (ϕEsi)
m+1n := ϕEsi((ϕEsi)
mn)
Moreover, for every m < k
χEsi((ϕEsi)
mn) = True (4.1)
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does hold and hence (ϕEsi)
m+1n codes a play properly extending the play coded by (ϕEsi)
mn.
Now, if Ψn did not converge, then there would be two increasing infinite sequences of num-
bers k0, k1, k2, . . . and m0,m1,m2, . . . such that, for every i ∈ N, Ψn[smi ] = (ϕEsmi)
kin.
Furthermore, since smi ≤ smi+1 and, by (4.1), for every m < ki
〈E, (ϕEsmi)
mn,ϕEsmi((ϕEsmi)
mn)〉 ∈ smi
we have that for every m ≤ ki
(ϕEsmi+1)
mn = (ϕEsmi)
mn
as it can be seen by induction on m. Hence, for every i, letting a = ki+1 − ki
(ϕEsmi+1)
ki+1n = (ϕEsm+1)
a((ϕEsmi+1)
kin) = (ϕEsm+1)
a((ϕEsmi)
kin)
would be the code of a ω-correct play of 1back(TA) properly extending the play coded by
(ϕEsmi)
kin. Therefore, it would exist an infinite ω-correct play of 1back(TA), which is
impossible since ω is a winning strategy by hypothesis.

We are going to define three terms Λ,Π,Ω that will implement the learning strategy
for Eloise in TA sketched in section 4.6.1. For the sake of readability, we will describe only
the properties that such terms must satisfy, without explicitly write down those terms. It
is trivial, however, to actually code our definitions in PCFClass.
We start by defining a term Λ : N → S, which is supposed to code the function g1 of
definition 4.6.3. Λ[s] takes the code of a play of 1back(TA) and builds a state containing
values of the oracles XE and ΦE that can be drawn from the input play and are not already
in s.
Definition 4.6.5 (Learning Term). Let Λ : N → S be a term of PCFClass described as
follows. Λ takes as argument a numeralm. Then, it checks whetherm codes a ω-correct play
Q = P,A0 :: . . . :: An of 1back(TA), with A0 :: . . . :: An complete play of TA and An = False.
If not, it returns a dummy state: ∅. Otherwise, it computes ω(Q) = A0 :: . . . :: Ai, and,
for any state s, returns Λ[s]m, which equals the state containing all the triples 〈E,n0, n1〉
not belonging to s and such that
i) n0 codes a play Q0, A0 :: . . . :: Ai;
ii) n1 codes a play Q0, A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q1, A0 :: . . . :: Ai;
iii) Q0, A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q1, A0 :: . . . :: Ai = Q,A0 :: . . . :: Ai.
Note. The term Λ must make use of the constant AddE to create its output Λ[s]m,
which is a state, and that is why the triples 〈E,n0, n1〉 of the above definition 4.6.5 are not
in s.
Recall subsection 4.6.1. We have explained that Eloise, while playing in TA and in
position A0 :: . . . :: Ai, simultaneously constructs a sequence of plays Q0, . . . , Qi satisfying
some properties i)-iv). We now define a term Π : N → N of PCFClass, which will be used
to construct that sequence. In particular, Π takes the code of a play p = A0 :: . . . :: Ai
and yields the code of a play Qi = Q, p of 1back(TA). Again, if Π is interpreted as a
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program recursive in the oracles XE,ΦE, it will yield an optimal play Q, p. But when Π[s]
is computed, the result Q, p may not be optimal because XE,ΦE have been approximated
through the state s.
Definition 4.6.6 (Sequence Constructor Π). We describe the behaviour of a term
Π : N→ N of PCFClass, intended to take the code |p| of a play p of TA and return the code
|Q, p| of a play Q, p of 1back(TA). The definition of Π[s](|p|) runs by induction over the
length of p and is distinguished by cases:
(1) If p = A, then Π[s](|p|) = Ψ[s](|A|).
(2) If p = (q :: B) and
Π[s](|q|) = |Q, q|
then
Π[s](|p|) = Ψ[s](|Q, q, q :: B|)

We now prove the convergence of Λ and Π.
Proposition 4.6.2 (Stability of Λ and Π). Λ ∈ ‖N→ S‖ and Π ∈ ‖N→ N‖.
Proof. Again, to prove that Λ ∈ ‖N→ S‖ it is enough to show that for every numeral
n, Λn converges. Let then {si}i∈N be a w.i. chain of states. By definition 4.6.5, whatever
si is, Λ[si]n construct a finite set of triples 〈E,n0, n1〉, which depends only on n, and then
decides to output some of the triples, according as to whether they are in si or not. This
determination stabilizes for large enough sm; that is, for all m
′ ≥ m, Λ[sm′ ]n = Λ[sm].
The convergence of Πn follows by straightforward induction on the length of the play
coded by n and by the convergence of Ψ.

We now put together the terms Ψ,Λ,Π in order to define a learning strategy for Eloise
in TA.
Definition 4.6.7 (Learning Strategy for TA). We describe the behavior of a pair of
terms Ω = (Ω0,Ω1) respectively of type N→ N and N→ S of PCFClass, intended to represent
a learning strategy for TA. The definition of Ωi[s](|p|) is distinguished by cases:
(1) If p = q :: ∃xB(x) and
Π[s](|q :: ∃xB(x)|) = |Q, q :: ∃xB(x)|
and
ω(Q, q :: ∃xB(x)) = q :: ∃xB(x) :: B(n)
then Ω0[s](|p|) = |B(n)|.
(2) If p = q :: B0 ∨B1 and
Π[s](|q :: B0 ∨B1|) = |Q, q :: B0 ∨B1|
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and
ω(Q, q :: B0 ∨B1) = q :: B0 ∨B1 :: Bi
then Ω0[s](|p|) = |Bi|.
(3) If p = q :: B, with B atomic, and
Π[s](|q :: B|) = |Q, q :: B|
then Ω1[s](|p|) = Λ[s](|Q, q :: B|).
(4) In all other (trivial) cases, Ωi[s](|p|), for i = 0, 1, can be arbitrarily defined as 0 or
True.
Proposition 4.6.3 (Stability of Ω0 and Ω1). Ω0 ∈ ‖N→ N‖ and Ω1 ∈ ‖N→ S‖.
Proof. Trivial, by proposition 4.6.2.

We need first prove that the 1back(TA) plays constructed by Π are ω-correct, when Π
starts from Ω[s]-correct plays of TA built by Ω (this property correspond to property iv) of
section 4.6.1).
Lemma 4.6.1 . Suppose p := A0 :: . . . :: An is a Ω[s]-correct play of TA. Then
Π[s](|A0 :: . . . :: An|) = |Q,A0 :: . . . :: An|
and Q,A0 :: . . . :: An is ω-correct.
Proof. Routine induction on n. If n = 0, then p = A0. By definition of Π and Ψ
Π[s](|A0|) = Ψ[s](|A0|) = |Q,A0|
with Q,A0 ω-correct by construction of Ψ.
Suppose now n > 0. By induction hypothesis
Π[s](|A0 :: . . . :: An−1|) = |Q,A0 :: . . . :: An−1| (4.2)
and Q,A0 :: . . . :: An−1 is ω-correct. If An−1 = ∃xB or An−1 = B ∨ C, then by definition
of Ω, by equation (4.2) and Ω[s]-correctness of A0 :: . . . :: An, we have that
Ω0[s](|A0 :: . . . :: An−1|) = |An|
with
ω(Q,A0 :: . . . :: An−1) = A0 :: . . . :: An
By definition 4.6.6 and equation (4.2)
Π[s](|A0 :: . . . :: An|) = Ψ[s](|Q,A0 :: . . . :: An−1, A0 :: . . . :: An|)
which is ω-correct. If An−1 = B ∧ C or An−1 = ∀xB, then
Ψ[s](|Q,A0 :: . . . :: An−1, A0 :: . . . :: An|)
is automatically ω-correct.

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We now prove the main theorem of this section: any recursive winning strategy ω for
Eloise in 1back(TA) can be translated into a learning strategy from A for Eloise in TA.
Theorem 4.6.4 (1-Backtracking Strategies into Learning Strategies). Ω is a
learning strategy for TA.
Proof. The fact that Ω satisfies properties 1 and 2 of definition 4.6.3 is trivial and
follows from proposition 4.6.3. So we prove property 3. Let s be a state and assume
p = A0 :: . . . :: An is a complete Ω[s]-correct play of TA. Suppose that A0 :: . . . :: An /∈ W
and hence An = False. We have to prove that Ω1[s]|p| 6= ∅. By definition 4.6.7 of Ω, we
have
Ω1[s]|p| = Λ[s](|Q,A0 :: . . . :: An|)
with
Π[s](|A0 :: . . . :: An|) = |Q,A0 :: . . . :: An|
By lemma 4.6.1 |Q,A0 :: . . . :: An| is ω-correct, since A0 :: . . . :: An is Ω[s]-correct. By
definition 4.6.5 of Λ, Ω1[s]|p| contains all triples
〈E, |Q0, A0 :: . . . :: Ai|, |Q0, A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q1, A0 :: . . . :: Ai|〉
not in s such that
ω(Q,A0 :: . . . :: An) = A0 :: . . . :: Ai
and
Q,A0 :: . . . :: An, A0 :: . . . :: Ai = Q0, A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q1, A0 :: . . . :: Ai
As implied by very definition 4.6.6 of Π, for every j < n, Π[s](|A0 :: . . . :: Aj+1|) codes a
play extending the play coded by Π[s](|A0 :: . . . :: Aj |). Furthermore, for some Q
′, Q′′
Π[s](|A0 :: . . . :: Ai|) = Ψ[s]|Q
′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai| = |Q
′′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai|
So, there is some Q′′′ such that
Q′′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q
′′′ = Q,A0 :: . . . :: An
and most importantly, by definition of Ψ[s]|Q′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai|
χEs|Q
′′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai| = False
Therefore the triple
〈E, |Q′′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai|, |Q
′′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai, Q
′′′, A0 :: . . . :: Ai|〉
belongs to Ω1[s]|p|, since it is not in s, by definition of XEs.

4.6.3. Learning Strategies into Realizers. In this section, we prove that the learn-
ing strategy Ω for TA can be translated into a learning based PCFClass realizer of A, thus
proving our main completeness theorem.
We begin with a bit of coding.
Definition 4.6.8 . Let ΩN0 : N→ N and Ω
B
0 : N→ Bool be terms of PCFClass such that:
(1) for every play p :: ∃xB of TA
ΩN0|p :: ∃xB| = n ⇐⇒ Ω0|p :: ∃xB| = |B(n)|
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(2) for every play p :: B0 ∨B1
ΩB0 |p :: B0 ∨B1| = True ⇐⇒ Ω0|p :: B0 ∨B1| = |B0|

As a special case of the following definition, we get a candidate realizer for A.
Definition 4.6.9 (Realizer for A). Let p be an abstract play of TA. We define by
induction and by cases a term tp of PCFClass, with free variables among those occurring
free in some formula of p, as follows:
(1) p = q :: ∀xB.
tq::∀xB = λx tq::∀xB::B
(2) p = q :: ∃xB.
tq::∃xB = 〈Ω
N
0|q :: ∃xB|, tq::∃xB::B[t1/x]〉
where t1 := Ω
N
0|q :: ∃xB|.
(3) p = B0 ∨B1.
tq::B0∨B1 = 〈Ω
B
0 |q :: B0 ∨B1|, tq::B0∨B1::B0 , tq::B0∨B1::B1〉
(4) p = B0 ∧B1.
tq::B0∧B1 = 〈tq::B0∧B1::B0 , tq::B0∧B1::B1〉
(5) p = q, with q complete.
tq = Ω1|q|

Lemma 4.6.2 (Completeness Lemma). (1) Let ~m = m0, . . . ,mk a sequence of closed
stable type-N terms of PCFClass and ~x = x0, . . . , xk a sequence of variables con-
taining all the free variables of p :: B. Then
tp::B[~m/~x] ∈ ‖[B]‖
(2) Let s be a state, ~m = m0, . . . ,mk a sequence of closed type-N terms of PCFClass,
~x = x0, . . . , xk a sequence of variables and (p :: B)[~m[s]/~x] a Ω[s]-correct play of
TA. Then
tp::B[~m/~x] s B[~m[s]/~x]
Proof. We prove (1) by induction on p and by cases. We treat only three representative
cases, those left out being obvious.
(1) B = ∀xC. Let n be a numeral. By inductive hypothesis, we have that
tp::∀xC [~m/~x]n = (λx tp::∀xC::C[~m/~x])n
= tp::∀xC::C[~m, n/~x, x] ∈ ‖[C]‖
Since [∀xC] = N→ [C], we have that
tp::∀xC [~m/~x] ∈ ‖[∀xC]‖
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(2) B = ∃xC. Let
t1 := Ω
N
0|p :: ∃xC|[~m/~x]
Since the terms in ~m are stable by hypothesis and Ω0 is stable by proposition
4.6.3 and by definition 4.6.8 of ΩN0, we have that t1 is a stable term of type N. By
inductive hypothesis
tp::∃xC::C[~m, t1/~x, x] ∈ ‖[C]‖
Since [∃xC] = N× [C] and
tp::∃xC[~m/~x] = 〈Ω
N
0|p :: ∃xC|[~m/~x], tp::∃xC::C[~m, t1/~x, x]〉
we have
tp::∃xC [~m/~x] ∈ ‖[∃xC]‖
(3) B atomic. Then
tp::B[~m/~x] = Ω1|p :: B|[~m/~x]
Since [B] = S and Ω1 is stable by proposition 4.6.3, we have that tp::B[~m/~x] ∈ ‖[B]‖.
We now prove (2) by induction on p and by cases.
(1) B = ∀xC. Let n be a numeral. By inductive hypothesis, we have that
tp::∀xC [~m/~x]n = (λx tp::∀xC::C[~m/~x])n
= tp::∀xC::C[~m, n/~x, x] s C[~m, n[s]/~x, x]
and hence
tp::∀xC [~m/~x] s ∀xC[~m[s]/~x]
(2) B = ∃xC. Suppose
t1[s] := Ω
N
0[s]|p :: ∃xC|[~m[s]/~x] = n
with n numeral. By definition 4.6.8 of ΩN0, we have that
Ω0[s]|q :: ∃xC|[~m[s]/~x] = |C[~m[s], n/~x, x]|
and so p :: ∃xC :: C[~m[s], n/~x, x] is Ω[s]-correct. By inductive hypothesis
tp::∃xC::C[~m, t1/~x, x] s C[~m[s], n/~x, x]
Since
tp::∃xC[~m/~x] = 〈Ω
N
0|p :: ∃xC|[~m/~x], tp::∃xC::C[~m, t1/~x, x]〉
we have
tp::∃xC [~m/~x] s ∃xC[~m[s]/~x]
(3) B = C0 ∧ C1. By inductive hypothesis
tp::C0∧C1::C0 [~m/~x] s C0[~m[s]/~x]
and
tp::C0∧C1::C1 [~m/~x] s C1[~m[s]/~x]
Since
tp::C0∧C1 [~m/~x] = 〈tp::C0∧C1::C0 [~m/~x], tp::C0∧C1::C1 [~m/~x]〉
we have
tp::C0∧C1 [~m/~x] s C0 ∧ C1[~m[s]/~x]
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(4) B = C0 ∨ C1. Suppose
t1[s] := Ω
B
0 [s]|p :: C0 ∨ C1|[~m[s]/~x] = True
Then, by definition 4.6.8 of ΩB0 , we have that
Ω0[s]|q :: C0 ∨ C1|[~m[s]/~x] = |C0[~m[s]/~x]|
and hence p :: C0 ∨ C1 :: C0[~m[s]/~x] is Ω[s]-correct. By inductive hypothesis
tp::C0∨C1::C0 [~m/~x] s C0[~m[s]/~x]
Analogously, for t1[s] = False, we have
tp::C0∨C1::C1 [~m/~x] s C1[~m[s]/~x]
Since
tp::C0∨C1 [~m/~x] = 〈Ω
B
0 |p :: C0 ∨ C1|[~m/~x], tp::C0∨C1::C0 [~m/~x], tp::C0∨C1::C1 [~m/~x]〉
we have
tp::C0∨C1 [~m/~x] s C0 ∨ C1[~m[s]/~x]
(5) B atomic. Then
tp::B[~m/~x][s] = Ω1[s]|p :: B|[~m[s]/~x]
Since p :: B[~m[s]/~x] is Ω[s]-correct and Ω is a learning strategy by lemma 4.6.2, if
tp::B[~m/~x][s] = ∅, then B[~m[s]/~x] = True.

Theorem 4.6.5 (Completeness theorem). Suppose there exists a recursive winning
strategy for player one in 1back(TA). Then there exists a term t of PCFClass such that
t  A.
Proof. By Lemma 4.6.2, point 1 and 2, applied to tA and the empty sequence of
terms. 
4.7. Conclusions
We have proved a soundness and completeness result for total recursive learning based
realizability with respect to 1-Backtracking game semantics, solving a conjecture left open
in Aschieri [4].
The contribution of the soundness theorem is semantical, rather than technical, and
it should be useful to understand the significance and see possible uses of learning based
realizability. We have shown how learning based realizers may be understood in terms
of backtracking games and that this interpretation offers a way of eliciting constructive
information from them. The idea is that playing games represents a way of challenging
realizers; they react to the challenge by learning from failure and counterexamples. In the
context of games, it is also possible to appreciate the notion of convergence, i.e. the fact
that realizers stabilize their behaviour as they increase their knowledge. Indeed, it looks
like similar ideas are useful to understand other classical realizabilities (see for example,
Miquel [37]).
The proof of the completeness theorem has been definitely more technically challenging.
In our view, moreover, it has two interesting features. In a sense, it is the first application
4.7. CONCLUSIONS 69
of the ideas of learning based realizability to a concrete non trivial classical proof, which
is our version of the one given by Berardi et al. [9]. This proof classically shows that if
Eloise has recursive winning strategy in the 1-Backtracking Tarski game associated to a
formula A, then she also has a winning strategy in the Tarski game associated to A (but
a strategy only recursive in an oracle for the Halting problem). Since the existence of this
latter strategy implies the truth of A, the argument can be seen as a proof of A in some
version of intuitionistic Arithmetic with EM1. We managed to associate a constructive
content to this seemingly ineffective proof and found out that it hides a learning mechanism
to gain correct oracle values from failures and counterexamples. We have then transformed
this learning mechanism into a learning based realizer of A. Secondly, we have shown
the interesting theoretical result that backtracking strategies in 1-Backtracking games can
interpreted as learning realizers. We have thus successfully established a close non trivial
relationship between two interpretations of classical proofs: game semantics and learning
based realizability.

CHAPTER 5
Constructive Analysis of Learning in Peano Arithmetic
Abstract. In this chaper we give a constructive analysis of learning as it arises in various
computational interpretations of classical Peano Arithmetic, such as our learning based
realizability, Avigad’s update procedures and epsilon substitution method. In particular,
we show how to compute in Go¨del’s system T upper bounds on the length of learning
processes, which are themselves represented in T through learning based realizability. The
result is achieved by the introduction of a new non standard model of Go¨del’s T, whose new
basic objects are pairs of non standard natural numbers (convergent sequences of natural
numbers) and moduli of convergence, where the latter are objects giving constructive
information about the former. As foundational corollary, we obtain that learning based
realizability is a constructive interpretation of Heyting Arithmetic plus excluded middle
over Σ01 formulas (for which it was designed) and of all Peano Arithmetic when combined
with Go¨del’s double negation translation. As byproduct of our approach, we also obtain
a new proof of Avigad’s theorem for update procedures and thus of termination of epsilon
substitution method for PA.
5.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to carry out a detailed and complete constructive analy-
sis of learning, as it arises in learning based realizability for HA + EM1 and in Avigad’s
[5] axiomatization of the epsilon substitution method for Peano Arithmetic through the
concept of update procedure. The importance of this analysis is both practical and foun-
dational. In the first place, we explicitly show how to compute upper bounds to the length
of learning processes, thus providing the technology needed to analyze their computational
complexity. Secondly, we answer positively to the foundational question of whether learning
based realizability can be seen as an interpretation of classical Arithmetic into intuitionistic
Arithmetic.
Our constructive framework is Go¨del’s system T and our metatheory will be purely intu-
itionistic. Our analysis will be accompIished by restating and then reproving constructively
the following convergence theorem.
Theorem 5.1.1 (Convergence). Let t : (N → N) → N be a closed term of T. Let
s : N→ (N→ N) be any closed term of T representing a weakly increasing chain of functions:
that is, assume that for every numerals n ≤ m, sn ≤ sm
1 holds. Then, there exists an n
such that for all m ≥ n, t(sn) = t(sm).
The intuitive meaning of the convergence theorem is the following. It is intended to be
an analysis of oracle computations. That is, given a non computable function f : N→ N
1Define sn ≤ sm iff for all numerals l, sn(l) 6= 0 implies sn(l) = sm(l). See the premise to definition
5.2.3 for intuitive meaning.
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one would like to “compute” t(f). Since this is not effectively possible, in order to obtain
significant results one may try nevertheless to define a weakly increasing chain s of functions
with the property that for all numerals n, sn ≤ f . Such a chain can be seen as a sequence of
more and more refined approximations of f and can for example be constructed by means of
learning processes as they arise in learning based realizability or epsilon substitution method
(see Mints [35]). The theorem says that if t is computed with respect to such a sequence
of approximations, then a stable answer about the value of t(f) is eventually obtained.
The convergence theorem is already interesting in itself, but its special significance lies
in its consequences, which we now describe and shall prove in the final part of the chapter.
Since most of them cannot be proved if the convergence theorem is not first restated and then
proven constructively, they provide an important motivation for working in this direction.
A first consequence of the convergence theorem is that any learning process represented
by a learning based realizer always terminates. Formally:
Theorem 5.1.2 (Zero Theorem). Let t be a type S term of TClass. Define s0 := ∅ and,
for every natural number n, sn+1 := sn ⋒ t[sn]. Then, there is an n such that t[sn] = ∅.
If the convergence theorem is proven constructively, also the above Zero theorem can
be and so one obtains a constructive analysis of the numbers of learning steps required to
complete the learning process. It has as a constructive consequence the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1.3 (Program Extraction via Learning Based Realizability). Let t
be a term of TClass and suppose that t  ∀x
N∃yNPxy, with Pxy atomic. Then, from t one
can define a term u of Go¨del’s system T such that for every numeral n, Pn(un) = True.
The above theorem sharpens the result obtained in chapter 3 and in Aschieri and Berardi
[3]. There, we have proved as well that from any t such that t  ∀xN∃yNPxy one can extract
a computable function v such that for every numeral n, Pn(vn) = True. However, the
extracted v made use of unbounded iteration, while the u of theorem 5.1.3 is a “bounded”
algorithm, that is, a program not explicitly using any kind of unbounded iteration. This is
an important point from a foundational point of view: the algorithms extracted via learning
based realizability construct witnesses, rather than searching for them. Let us make clear
that, however, u - from the computational point of view - is equal to v. In fact, u results
from v just by replacing its only unbounded iteration with a primitive recursive one (of an
appropriate type). Thus, u just adds to v information about the computational complexity
of the learning process generated by v. For practical purposes, therefore, v is as efficient as
u.
As corollary, one obtains the important result that from classical proofs in Peano Arith-
metic PA of ∀∃-formulas one can extract bounded algorithms via learning based realizability
. This is done by, first, extracting a realizer from any given proof and, then, by applying
theorem 5.1.3. In other words, one is able to give a novel proof of the following theorem
due to Go¨del (through its Dialectica interpretation, see e.g. [32]):
Theorem 5.1.4 (Provably Total Functions of PA). If PA ⊢ ∀xN∃yNPxy, then there
exists a term u of Go¨del’s system T such that for every numeral n, Pn(un) = True.
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The novelty, here, is the technique employed to prove the theorem and the new under-
standing of extracted programs as realizers able to learn in a constructive way.
From a constructive proof of the convergence theorem one can also provide new con-
structive proofs of Avigad’s [5] fixed point theorem for n-ary update procedures and hence
of the termination of the epsilon substitution method for PA. Hence, one also obtains a
constructive analysis of learning in Peano Arithmetic. The novelty, here, is the use of type
theory to reason about the learning processes generated by update procedures and hence
epsilon substitution method.
Theorem 5.1.1 can be proven easily, but ineffectively, in second order logic:
Proof of theorem 5.1.1 (Ineffective). The informal idea of the proof is the following.
Terms of system T use only a finite number of values of their function arguments. If we
“apply” t to the least upper bound fs of the sequence s (w.r.t the relation ≤ of definition
5.2.3), we find that the finite part of fs effectively used in the computation of t(fs) is already
contained in some sk. So, for every h ≥ k, t(sh) = t(sk).
Let us see the details. As proven by Kreisel (for a proof see Schwichtenberg [41]), t has a
modulus of continuity C, which is a term of system T of type (N → N) → N such that the
following statement is provable in extensional HAω:
∀fN→N, gN→N.(∀xN ≤ (Cf) f(x) = g(x))→ t(f) = t(g) (5.1)
By using the comprehension axiom, we can define the least upper bound fs of the sequence
s as follows
fs(n) =
{
m if ∃i such that si(n) = m 6= 0
0 otherwise
Let CM be the denotation of C in the full set theoretic model M of extensional HAω (see
Kohlenbach [32]). Then there exists an n such that for all m ≥ n
∀xN ≤ (CMfs) sn(x) = sm(x)
By 5.1, we get that for all m ≥ n, t(sn)
M = t(sm)
M . Hence by soundness of the model
with respect to formal equality of extensional HAω, t(sn) and t(sm) normalize to the same
numeral, since t(sn) = a and t(sm) = b, with a, b numerals, implies a
M = t(sn)
M =
t(sm)
M = bM and then a = b.

The convergence theorem is therefore true, but one cannot hope to prove it construc-
tively as it is stated. In fact, it is a formula of the form ∀∃∀ and the simplest incompleteness
of intuitionistic reasoning as compared to classical reasoning arises precisely for that kind of
formulas. It is known, for example, that classical finite type Peano Arithmetic PAω proves
the formula ∀fN→N∃xN∀yNf(x) ≤ f(y), while intuitionistic Heyting Arithmetic HAω does
not. In our case, one could associate to any Turing machine a weakly increasing sequence
s : N → (N→ N) such that for all m, sm(n) = 0 if n 6= 0, and sm(0) = 1 if the machine
terminates on input n in less than m steps, sm(0) = 0 otherwise. A constructive proof of
the convergence theorem relatively to the term λfN→Nf(0) would compute the limit of the
sequence λmNsm(0), thus determining whether the Turing machine terminates on input n.
By producing such a sequence s for every Turing machine, we would have a solution for the
Halting problem.
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Synopsis of the chapter. In the rest of the chapter, we develop a technology for construc-
tively reasoning about convergence in Go¨del’s system T and proving a classically equivalent
form of the convergence theorem. All proofs will be constructive and all their constructive
content will be made explicit. This constructive effort results in a longer and a bit more
complex presentation than it could be. However, if one is not interested in full explicit
details, the techniques used may be simplified in order to yield quite short and powerful
constructive proofs of the main results of the chapter.
Our approach has a semantical content. In fact, we starts from considering a kind of
constructive non standard model for Peano Arithmetic and then we reinterpret Go¨del’s
system T constants in order to manipulate the new individuals of the model. The reinter-
pretation of system T will turn out to be particularly suited to perform the computations
we need to do for constructively reasoning about convergence. From the high level point
of view, the proof techiques used amount to a combination of Kreisel’s no-counterexample
interpretation and Tait’s reducibility/logical-relations method. With the first one, we can
constructively reason about convergence. With the second, we prove the soundness of the
model with respect to our purposes.
In detail, the plan of the chapter is the following.
In section §5.2, we recall details of Go¨del system T.
In section §5.3 we define the first ingredient of our approach, which is a constructive
notion of convergence for sequences of objects, due to Berardi [6]. It is a no-counterexample
interpretation of the classical notion of convergence, but it is different from the usual in-
terpretation. Its main advantage is that it is very efficient from the computational point
of view, since it enables programming with continuations and hence the writing of powerful
and elegant realizers of its constructive content, which we will call moduli of convergence.
Intuitively, a modulus of convergence for a convergent function f : N→ A will be a term able
to find suitable intervals in which f is constant; moreover, the length of those intervals will
depend on a continuation. At the end of the section we use Berardi’s notion of convergence
to reformulate the convergence theorem (see theorem 5.3.1).
In section §5.4, we introduce the second ingredient of our approach: a model that
extends the usual full finite type structure generated over natural numbers by replacing
naturals by pairs 〈N , f〉 of a non standard natural number f (which is a function N→ N
as in ultrapower models of Peano Arithmetic) and its modulus of convergence N . We also
syntactically define a semantics [[ ]]s (where s is a weakly increasing chain of functions)
mapping terms of T in to elements of the model and in section §5.5 we show that, thanks
to [[ ]]s, we can evaluate every term t : (N→ N) → N, into a pair 〈N , f〉 such that N is a
modulus of convergence for the function f = λnNt(sn).
In section §5.6, we prove all the corollaries of the convergence theorem that we have
discussed before.
5.2. Term Calculus
In this chapter we will prove results that hold for any “simple” extension of Go¨del’s
system T (see chapter 2). In this section, we recall the definition and results we shall need
and introduce some useful notation.
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Notation. For notational convenience and to define in a more readable way terms of
type A×B → C, for any variables x0 : A and x1 : B we define
λ〈x0, x1〉
A×Bu := λxA×Bu[π0x/x0 π1x/x1]
where x is a fresh variable not appearing in u. We observe that for any terms t0, t1
(λ〈x0, x1〉
A×Bu)〈t0, t1〉 = u[t0/x0 t1/x0]
Often, as in chapter 3, it is useful to add to system T new constants and atomic types,
together with a set of algebraic reduction rules we call “functional”.
Definition 5.2.1 (Functional set of rules). Let C be any set of constants, each one
of some type A1 → . . .→ An → A, for some atomic types A1, . . . , An, A. We say that R is
a functional set of reduction rules for C if R consists, for all c ∈ C and all closed normal
terms a1 : A1, . . . , an : An of T , of one and exactly one rule ca1 . . . an 7→ a, where a : A is a
closed normal term of T .
If a system T is obtained from Go¨del’s T by adding a recursive set C of constants and a
recursive functional set of rules for C, we we call T a simple extension of T. As in chapter
3, by a standard reducibility argument it can be proved that T is strongly normalizing and
has Church-Rosser property. Moreover, any atomic-type term of any simple extension T of
T is equal either to a numeral, if it is of type N, or to a boolean, if it is of type Bool, or
to a constant of type A, if it is of type A. All results of this paper hold whatever simple
extension of T is chosen. Let us fix one.
Definition 5.2.2 (System T ). From now on, we denote with T an arbitrarily chosen
simple extension of Go¨del’s system T. We also assume that T contains constants for deciding
equality of constants of atomic type.
Throughout the paper, the intended interpretation of the natural number 0 will be as a
“default” value. That is, when we do not have any information about what value a function
has on argument n, we assume that it has value 0. That being said, it is natural to consider
a function f1 : N → N to be extending another function f2 : N → N, whenever it holds
that for every n such that f1(n) is a non default value (and hence different from 0), then
f1(n) = f2(n). f2 may hence have a non default value at some argument where f1 has a
default value, but it agrees with f1 at the arguments where f1 has not default value. So, f2
carries more information than f1.
Definition 5.2.3 (Ordering Between Functions and Terms). Let f1, f2 be func-
tions N→ N. We define
f1 ≤ f2 ⇐⇒ ∀n ∈ N f1(n) 6= 0⇒ f1(n) = f2(n)
Moreover, if t1, t2 are closed terms of T of type N → N representing respectively functions
g1, g2 : N→ N, we will write t1 ≤ t2 if and only if g1 ≤ g2.
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In the following, we will write “s ∈ w.i.” if is s : N→ (N→ N) is a closed term representing
a weakly increasing sequence of functions, that is, if for all numerals n,m, n ≤ m implies
sn ≤ sm.
5.3. The No-Counterexample Interpretation and Berardi’s Notion of
Convergence
In this paper, we are interested in arithmetical formulas stating convergence of natural
number sequences. Classically, we consider a sequence of natural numbers to be convergent
if it is definitely constant, that is, if the there is an element of the sequence which is equal
to all successive elements of the sequence. Hence, we will consider formulas of the form
(∀zA) ∃xN∀yNP (z, x, y) (5.2)
Since that kind of formulas cannot generally be proven constructively, a common standpoint
is to consider classically equivalent but constructively weak enough statements, as in Kreisel
no-counterexample interpretation:
(∀zA) ∀fN→N∃xNP (z, x, f(x))
If the statement 5.2 (with A = N) is provable in PA, then one can constructively extract
from any proof a term t : (N→ N)→ N of system T such that
(∀zN) ∀fN→NP (z, t(f), f(t(f)))
holds (see for example Kohlenbach [32]). In our cases, we have to deal with formulas of the
form
∃xN∀yN ≥ xf(x) = f(y)
where f is a term of type N→ N, and hence we may be tempted to consider their no-
counterexample interpretation
∀hN→N∃xN h(x) ≥ x→ f(x) = f(h(x)) (5.3)
If one introduces the notation
f ↓ [n,m]
def
≡ ∀xN. n ≤ x ≤ m→ f(x) = f(n)
one often finds in literature the following equivalent version of 5.3:
∀hN→N∃xN f ↓ [x, h(x)] (5.4)
which is the no-counterexample interpretation of
∃xN∀yN ≥ xf ↓ [x, y]
While the above notion of convergence 5.4 would be enough for our purposes, it seems
not to allow straightforward compositional reasoning when one has to deal with non trivial
interaction of convergent functions. Even when there is no complex interaction, the needed
reasoning is not direct. For example, one may want to prove that if two functions f, g
converge in the sense of 5.4, one can systematically find intervals in which they are both
constant. That is, if
∀hN→N∃xNf ↓ [x, h(x)] ∧ ∀hN→N∃xNg ↓ [x, h(x)]
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then one may want to prove that
∀hN→N∃xNf ↓ [x, h(x)] ∧ g ↓ [x, h(x)]
The above implication is provable in a non overly complicated way, but when interaction
increases (as we shall see in proposition 5.3.3 below), one begins to feel the need for a more
suitable formulation of convergence.
Berardi [6] introduced a notion of convergence especially suited for managing interaction
of convergent functions. If one consider the formula
∀zN∃xN ≥ z∀yN ≥ xf ↓ [x, y]
(with the intent of expressing very redundantly the fact that there are infinite points of
convergence for f) one obtains a very strong notion of constructive convergence by taking
its no-counterexample interpretation
∀zN∀hN→N∃xN ≥ z h(x) ≥ x→ f ↓ [x, h(x)]
which after skolemization becomes
∀hN→N∃αN→N ≥ id∀zN h(z) ≥ z → f ↓ [α(z), h(α(z))]
which is equivalent to
∀hN→N ≥ id∃αN→N ≥ id ∀zNf ↓ [α(z), h(α(z))] (5.5)
where we have used the notation
αN→N ≥ id
def
≡ ∀xNα(x) ≥ x
We observe that 5.4 and 5.5 are constructively equivalent. However, from a computational
point of view, their realizers are quite different: the realizers of 5.5 are able to interact
directly with each other, as we will see.
We are now ready to formally define a constructive notion of convergence for sequences
of numbers: a sequence of objects f : N → A is convergent if for any hN→N ≥ id there are
infinitely many intervals [n, h(n)] in which f is constant.
Definition 5.3.1 (Convergence (Berardi [6])). Let f : N→ A be a closed term of T ,
with A atomic type. We say that f converges if
∀hN→N ≥ id ∃αN→N ≥ id ∀zNf ↓ [α(z), h(α(z))]
Notation. If t : A → B and u : A we shall often write tu in place of tu, for nota-
tional convenience or for highlighting that tu is an element of a collection of type-B terms
parametrized by terms of type A.
We now make explicit the constructive information associated to the above notion of
convergence, through the concept of modulus of convergence. A modulus of convergence
takes an h : N→ N and returns an enumeration of intervals [n, h(n)] in which f is constant.
It is a intuitionistic realizer of the notion of convergence.
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Definition 5.3.2 (Modulus of Convergence). Let f : N → A be a closed term of T ,
with A atomic type. A term M : (N→ N) → (N→ N) of T is a modulus of convergence for
f if
(1) ∀hN→N ≥ id Mh ≥ id
(2) ∀hN→N ≥ id ∀zNf ↓ [Mh(z), h(Mh(z))]
If h : N→ N ≥ id and ∀zNf ↓ [N (z), h(N (z))], N is said to be an h-modulus of convergence
for f .
We observe that by definition, if one has a modulus of convergence M for a function
f , one can find an infinite number of intervals of any desired length in which f is constant.
For example, if one wants to find an interval of length 5, one just defines the function
h(x) = x + 5 and compute n := Mh(0). Then, f is constant in [n, n + 5]. Clearly, a
modulus of convergence carries a lot of constructive information about f .
5.3.1. Intuitive Significance of the Concept of Modulus of Convergence and
Restatement of the Convergence Theorem. As we said, Berardi’s notion of conver-
gence works remarkably well when convergent functions interact together, for instance, in
the definition of a new function. The fact that Berardi’s notion is a no-counterexample in-
terpretation of the classical notion of convergence, explains why it works. We can intuitively
describe the reasons why it does it well as follows.
A first reason is purely computational. Given a function hN→N ≥ id and a modulus of
convergence M, we can interpret the role of h in the computation of Mh as that of a con-
tinuation. Constructively, when a new convergent function is defined from other convergent
functions, one will need to produce intervals in which the new function is constant. One will
try to achieve the goal by finding intervals in which the functions involved in the definition
are all constant. The problem is that one may be able to find such intervals for every single
function, but not for them all together. For example, if one defines the function
β := λxNf(g(x), x)
then β is convergent if g and λxNf(n, x) are such for every choice of n. But an interval in
which g is constant need not be an interval in which β too is constant, because we have to
find some interval in which both g is constantly equal to somem and λxNf(m,x) is constant.
We solve the problem through the use of continuations.
We start by observing that it seems there is a strict sequence of tasks to be performed.
First, one tries to find an m1 such that g is constant in, say, [m1, l1] with m1 < l1. Then,
he computes g(m1) = n and pass n to a “continuation” h : N→ N which returns an h(n) =
m2 < l2 such that λx
Nf(n, x) is constant in [m2, l2]. If m1 < m2 < l1, a non trivial
interval in which g is constant has been found. But if m2 > l1? Then, g may assume
different values in all points of the interval [m2, l2] and one cannot hope that β is going to be
convergent in [m2, l2]. We anticipate the solution contained in the proof of proposition 5.3.3,
by lettingm1 =Mk(0), whereM is a modulus of convergence for g and, for example, k(x) =
h(g(x)) + 1. Then, by definition of modulus of convergence, g is constant in [m1, k(m1)]
and letting l1 = k(m1) we obtain that
m2 = h(n) = h(g(m1)) < h(g(m1)) + 1 = l1
5.3. NO-COUNTEREXAMPLE INTERPRETATION AND BERARDI’S NOTION OF CONVERGENCE 79
as required. In other words, we use k and hence h as continuations, thanks to M.
The issue we are facing may be further exemplified by the following sequential game
between k players. Suppose there are convergent functions f1, f2, . . . , fk ot type N→ N on
the board and an arbitrarily chosen number m. Players make their moves in order, starting
from player one and finishing with player k. A play of the game, is an increasing sequence
of numbers m,m1,m2, . . . ,mk, with mi the move of player i. Player i wins if fi is constant
in an interval [mk, lk], for some lk > mk. A strategy for player i is just a function h over
natural numbers, taking the move of the player i−1 (or the integer m if i = 1) and returning
the move of player i. The fact that the winning condition depends on the move of player k
makes very difficult for players 1, . . . k − 1 to win. In this game, each player hopes that in
the resulting final interval its own function will be constant but his hope is frustrated by
the following ones, which are trying to accomplish the same task but with respect to their
own functions. However, player i has a winning strategy effectively computable if he knows
the strategies of all subsequent players i + 1, . . . , k (we cannot assume the trivial winning
strategy returning the point of stabilization of fi to be effectively computable, since fi is
arbitrary)
We are now in a position to tell another reason why moduli of convergence are so useful.
A winning strategy for player i can be computed by a convergence module. More precisely, it
can be proved, as consequence of proposition 5.3.2, that if players i+1, . . . , k play strategies
hi+1, . . . , hk, then hi :=Mhk◦···◦hi+1 is a winning strategy for player i against hi+1, . . . , hk,
whenever M is a modulus of convergence for fi. Therefore, if a modulus of convergence for
each function f1, . . . , fk is given, one can compute a particularly desirable instance of Nash
equilibrium, that is, a sequence of functions h1, h2, . . . , hk such that, if every player i plays
according to the strategy hi, every play will be won by every player. Therefore, at the end
of the interaction, every participant will have accomplished its own task.
We now formulate the promised restatement of theorem 5.1.1 that we shall be able to
prove.
Theorem 5.3.1 (Weak Convergence). Let t : (N→ N) → S be a closed term of T ,
with S atomic type. Then we can effectively define a closed term M : (N → (N→ N)) →
(N→ N) → (N→ N) of T , such that the following holds: for all s : N → (N→ N), s ∈ w.i.
and numerals n, Ms is a modulus of convergence for λmNtn(sm).
5.3.2. Basic Operations with Moduli of Convergence. We now prove a couple
of propositions, both to illustrate the use of moduli of convergence and to provide lemmas
we will need in the following. First, we show that given two terms f1 and f2, if each
one of them has a modulus of convergence, then there is a modulus of convergence that
works simultaneously for both of them. In particular, we can define a binary operation
⊔ between moduli of convergence such that, for every pair of moduli M,N , M ⊔ N is
“more general” than both M and N . Here, for every M1,M2, we call M2 more general
than M1, if for every term f , if M1 is a modulus of convergence for f then also M2 is a
modulus of convergence for f . We this terminology, we may seeM⊔N as an upper bound
of the set {M,N}, with respect to the partial order induced by the relation “to be more
general than”. The construction of the pair Mh◦Nh ,Nh below may also be seen as a Nash
equilibrium for the two player version of the game we have discussed above.
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Proposition 5.3.2 (Joint Convergence). Let M and N be moduli of convergence re-
spectively for f1 and f2. Define
M⊔N := λhN→NλzNNh(Mh◦Nh(z))
Then M⊔N is a modulus of convergence for both f1 and f2.
Proof. Set
L :=M⊔N
First, we check property 1 of definition 5.3.2. For all hN→N ≥ id, Nh ≥ id by definition 5.3.2
point (1) and so h ◦ Nh ≥ id. Thus, for all h
N→N ≥ id and zN
Lh(z) = Nh(Mh◦Nh(z)) ≥ z
since M has property (1) of definition 5.3.2 and hence Mh◦Nh ≥ id. Therefore, for all
hN→N ≥ id, Lh ≥ id and we are done.
Secondly, we check property 2 of definition 5.3.2. Fix a term hN→N ≥ id and a numeral z.
We have that
f1 ↓ [Mh◦Nh(z), h ◦ Nh(Mh◦Nh(z))] (5.6)
since M is a module of convergence for f1. Moreover,
f2 ↓ [Nh(Mh◦Nh(z)), h(Nh(Mh◦Nh(z)))] (5.7)
since N is a modulus of convergence for f2. But the starting point of the interval in 5.7 is
greater or equal to the starting point of the interval in 5.6, for Nh ≥ id, while their ending
points are equal. Hence also
f1 ↓ [Nh(Mh◦Nh(z)), h(Nh(Mh◦Nh(z)))]
and hence both f1 and f2 are constant in the interval [Lh(z), h(Lh(z))] by definition of L.

We now consider a situation in which a family {fn}n∈N of convergent terms interacts
with a convergent term g and we show the result of the interaction is still a convergent
term. In the following, we call “object of type A” any closed normal term of type A.
Proposition 5.3.3 (Merging of Functions). Let f : A → (N → A) be a closed term,
with A atomic, and N : A→ (N→ N)→ (N→ N) be such that for every object a of type A,
Na is a modulus of convergence for fa. Let moreover g : N→ A and let M be a modulus of
convergence for g. Define
H1(M,N , g) := λh
N→NλzNN ′h(Mh◦N ′h(z))
with
N ′h := λn
N(Ng(n)h)n
Then H1(M,N , g) is a modulus of convergence for
λnNfg(n)(n)
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Proof. Property (1) of definition 5.3.2 follows by the same reasoning used in proposi-
tion 5.3.2. We check property (2) of definition 5.3.2. Set L := H1(M,N , g). The idea is
that L has to produce an interval i in which g is constant and equal to a, while the interval
produced by Na in which fa is constant will be contained in i. L does the job by using N
′
h
as a continuation.
Fix a term closed hN→N ≥ id and z a numeral. We have that
g ↓ [Mh◦N ′h(z), h ◦ N
′
h(Mh◦N ′h(z))] (5.8)
since M is a module of convergence for g. In particular,
g ↓ [N ′h(Mh◦N ′h(z)), h(N
′
h(Mh◦N ′h(z)))] (5.9)
since N ′h ≥ id. Say that for all n in the intervals in 5.8 and 5.9, g(n) = a. By definition of
N ′h
[N ′h(Mh◦N ′h(z)), h(N
′
h(Mh◦N ′h(z)))]
= [Nah(Mh◦N ′h(z)), h(Nah(Mh◦N ′h(z)))] (5.10)
Since Na is a modulus of convergence for fa, we have
fa ↓ [Nah(Mh◦N ′
h
(z)), h(Nah(Mh◦N ′
h
(z)))]
But for all x in the interval 5.10,
(λnNfg(n)(n))x = fa(x)
Hence
λnNfg(n)(n) ↓ [N
′
h(Mh◦N ′h(z)), h(N
′
h(Mh◦N ′h(z)))]
and so λnNfg(n)(n) is constant in the interval [Lh(z), h(Lh(z))] by definition of L.

5.4. Computations with non Standard Natural Numbers
For technical convenience we add now to system T a constant Φ : N→ N with no
associated reduction rules. In this way, each term t : A can be viewed as functionally
depending on Φ, but it is still considered as having type A, instead the more complicated
(N→ N) → A. Of course, terms of atomic type are not in general equal to a constant or a
numeral, if they contain Φ.
Definition 5.4.1 (Evaluation at u). Let t be a term. For any term u : N→ N, we
denote with t[u] the term t[u/Φ].
Adopting this notation, what we want prove is that if t : A, with A atomic, and s ∈
w.i., then the function λmNt[sm] constructively converges, that is, it has a modulus of
convergence. A natural attempt for achieving the goal is to recursively decompose the
problem. For example, suppose we want to study the convergence of the function
∗(+t1t2) := λm
N + t1t2[sm] : N→ N
where s ∈ w.i.. and + : N → N→ N represents a constant of T encoding the operation
of addition of natural numbers. Since t1 : N and t2 : N may have complex structure, it is
natural to recursively study the functions
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∗t1 := λm
Nt1[sm] : N→ N
and
∗t2 := λm
Nt2[sm] : N→ N
But if we want to study the function ∗(+t1t2) as a combination of
∗t1 and
∗t2, it is clear
that + cannot be interpreted as itself, but as a function ∗+ of ∗t1 and
∗t2. We would like
the following equation to hold
∗(+t1t2) =
∗+∗t∗1t2
As a consequence of our notation, also the following equation must be true for all numerals
n
∗(+t1t2)(n) = +(
∗t1(n))(
∗t2(n))
These considerations impose us to define
∗+ := λgN→N1 λg
N→N
2 λm
N + g1(n)g2(n)
At a first look, this may seem a rather strange way of doing computations. But it turns out
that it is strongly not the case. ∗t1 and
∗t2 may be interpreted as hypernatural numbers
and ∗+ as the operation of addition of hypernaturals as they are defined in ultrapower non
standard models of Peano Arithmetic.
5.4.1. Non Standard Models of Arithmetic. The first non standard model of
Arithmetic is due to Skolem [42]. The universe of that model is indeed made of functions
N→ N, but we instead describe a variant of the Skolem construction, which is the ultrapower
construction (see for example Goldblatt [23]).
Fix a non principal ultrafilter F over N. First, define an equivalence relation ≃ between
functions N→ N as follows:
f1 ≃ f2 ⇐⇒ {x ∈ N | f1(x) = f2(x)} ∈ F
(The intuition here is that an ultrafilter collects the “big” subsets of N and hence two
functions are to be considered equal if they have equal values for “great many” arguments.
For example, two functions which, as sequences, converge to the same natural number are
considered equal, for they agree on a cofinite set of N, which must belong to every non
principal ultrafilter). Secondly, define
∗
N := (N→ N)≃
that is, ∗N is the set of all natural number functions partitioned under the equivalence
relation ≃. Finally, set
∗0 := λnN0
∗S := λnNS(n)
∗+ := λfN→N1 λf
N→N
2 λn
Nf1(n) + f2(n)
∗· := λfN→N1 λf
N→N
2 λn
Nf1(n) · f2(n)
where S,+, · are the usual operations over natural numbers. In general, if one wants to
define the non standard version of a standard function f : Nk → N, he simply lets
∗f := λfN→N1 . . . λf
N→N
k λn
Nf(f1(n), . . . , fk(n))
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It can be proved that the structure
(∗N, ∗0, ∗S, ∗+, ∗·)
is a model of Peano Arithmetic as similar to the usual structure of natural numbers as to
satisfy precisely the same sentences which are true under the usual interpretation. Formally,
it is elementarily equivalent to the structure of natural numbers.
Elements of ∗N are usually called hypernatural numbers. Since they are so similar to
natural numbers, it perfectly makes sense to think about defining a model of system T
over hypernaturals. Indeed, Berardi [7] used hypernaturals, under a weaker equivalence
relation, to construct an intuitionistic model for ∆20 maps and Berardi and de’ Liguoro [12]
used them to interpret a fragment of classical primitive recursive Arithmetic.
5.4.2. A non Standard Model for the System T0. In order to approach gradually
our final construction, we first give a definition of a non standard model for T0, which is
Go¨del’s T restricted to having only a recursion operator R of type N→ (N→ N→ N)→ N→ N
and choice operator if : Bool → N→ N → N. Hence, T0 represents the primitive recursive
functions.
The definition of the model is purely syntactical and this is the key for our approach to
go through. In fact, we are defining an internal model, that is a representation of T0 into
T itself. First, define the new type structure as:
∗
N := N→ N
∗
Bool := N→ Bool
∗(A→ B) := ∗A→ ∗B
∗(A×B) := ∗A× ∗B
From a semantical point of view, we interpret natural numbers as functions. Since the
construction is syntactical, there is no need to describe an equivalence relation between those
functions. But, accordingly to which equivalence relation one has in mind, the definition we
are going to give will make sense or not from the semantical point of view. For the results
of this chaper, we have no utility in putting extra effort to define a model for T0, which
is also a model for Peano Arithmetic. Hence, we may assume that ∗N represents just all
functions over N without any partition.
Now, for every term u : T , define a term ∗u of type ∗T by induction as follows
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∗0 := λmN 0
∗
True := λmN True
∗
False := λmN False
∗S := λf
∗
NλmN S(f(m))
∗if := λg
∗
Boolλf
∗
N
1 λf
∗
N
2 λm
N iff(m)f1(m)f2(m)
∗R := λf
∗
N
1 λf
∗
N→∗N→∗N
2 λg
∗
NλmN (RBf1(λn
Nf2(λx
Nn))g(m))(m)
∗(xA) := x
∗A
∗(ut) := ∗u∗t
∗(λxAu) := λx
∗A∗u
∗〈u, t〉 := 〈∗u, ∗t〉
∗(πiu) := πi
∗u
with the type B of RB equal to
∗
N→ (N→ ∗N→ ∗N)→ N→ ∗N.
The definition of the constants and the functions ∗S and ∗if is exactly the one used in
the construction of ultrapower models of natural numbers. The definition of ∗R is different
because involves higher type arguments, but it is a straightforward generalization of the
ultrapower construction. Intuitively, ∗Rf1f2g has to iterate f2 a number of times given by
g. But since g is now an hypernatural number, the concept “g times” makes no direct
sense. Hence, ∗R also picks as input a number m, transform g into g(m) and iterates f2 a
number of times given by g(m). But since f2 is of type
∗
N → ∗N → ∗N, the function given
to RB is not directly f2, but a term λn
Nf2(λx
Nn) that transforms n into its hypernatural
counterpart and gives it as the first argument of f2. After all this work is done, one obtains
a hypernatural
h := RBf1(λn
Nf2(λx
Nn))g(m)
So if ∗R stopped here, it would not return the right type of object. Hence, it returns h(m),
consistently to the fact that g has been instantiated to m previously.
The above construction can be generalized to Go¨del’s T, with a little more effort to
be put in the generalization of ∗R and ∗if to all types. A version of T just manipulating
hypernaturals is not enough for our purposes, and will be included in our final construction,
so details are postponed to the next sections.
5.4.3. System T over Hypernaturals with Moduli of Convergence. In the con-
text of this work, we are not interested into the whole collection of hypernatural numbers,
but only in those who are convergent. Moreover, we want also to produce, for each one of
these convergent hypernaturals, a modulus of convergence. The idea therefore is to put more
constructive information into the model of hypernatural numbers and to define operations
that preserve this information. The new objects we are going to consider are hypernatural
numbers with moduli of convergence. They can be represented as pairs
〈N , f〉
where f : N → N is an hypernatural number and N : (N → N) → (N → N) is modulus of
convergence for f , as in definition 5.3.2. The resulting model will be a full type structure
generated over this basic objects and their equivalent in the other atomic types. We will
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call it the model of hypernaturals with moduli. In the following, for any s ∈w.i., [[u]]s will
be the denotation of a term u of T in this new model and the aim of this sections is to
syntactically define the interpretation function [[ ]]s.
In order to construct such a model, we will have to define new operations that, first,
generalize the ones over hypernaturals we have previously studied and, secondly, are also
able to combine moduli of convergence.
For example, how to define the non standard version [[+]]s of addition? The summands
are two objects of the form 〈N1, f1〉 and 〈N2, f2〉. The second component of the sum will
be the non standard sum
f1
∗+f2 := λm
Nf1(m) + f2(m)
of f1 and f2. The first component will be a modulus of convergence for f1
∗+f2, and so a
simultaneous modulus of convergence for both f1 and f2 is enough. From proposition 5.3.2,
we know how to compute it with ⊔ from N1 and N2. We can thus define
[[+]]s〈N1, f1〉〈N2, f2〉 := 〈N1 ⊔ N2, f1
∗+f2〉
We now launch into the definition of our syntactically described model for the whole
system T . First we define the intended interpretation MT of every type T .
Definition 5.4.2 (Interpretation of Types). For every type T of system T , we define
a type MT by induction on T as follows.
(1) T = A, with A atomic. Then
MA := ((N→ N)→ (N→ N))× (N→ A)
(2) T = A→ B. Then
MA→B := MA → MB
(3) T = A×B. Then
MA×B := MA ×MB
If A is atomic, the interpretation MA of A is the set of pairs formed by a function N→ A
and its modulus of convergence (if it happens to have one). This is an accord with our view
that whenever a s ∈w.i. is fixed, a term t of atomic type can be interpreted as a function
λmNt[sm] paired with a modulus of convergence. The model of hypernaturals with moduli
can be seen as the collection of sets denoted by types MT , for T varying on all types of T .
We now define a logical relation between the terms of our intended model of hyper-
naturals with moduli and the terms of system T . It formally states what properties any
denotation of any term of T should have. It formalizes of our previous description of what
the model should contain.
Definition 5.4.3 (Generalized Modulus of Convergence). Let t and M be closed
terms of T and s ∈w.i.. We define the relation M gmcs t - representing the notion “M is
a generalized modulus of convergence for t” - by induction on the type T of t as follows:
(1) T = A, with A atomic. Let M : MA. Then
M gmcs t ⇐⇒ M = 〈L, g〉, L is a modulus of convergence for g and g
ext
= λnNt[sn]
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where we have defined (g
ext
= λnNt[sn]) ≡ for all numerals m, g(m) = t[sm].
(2) T = A→ B. Let M : MA→B. Then
M gmcs t ⇐⇒ (∀u
A. N gmcs u =⇒ MN gmcs tu)
(3) T = A×B. Let M : MA×B. Then
M gmcs t ⇐⇒ (π0M gmcs π0t ∧ π1M gmcs π1t)
The aim of the rest of this section is to syntactically define a semantic interpretation
[[ ]]s of the terms of T into the model of hypernaturals with moduli, such that for every
term u : A and s ∈w.i., [[u]]s gmcs u. This means that, if A is atomic, u is evaluated in a
pair 〈L, g〉 such that g
ext
= λnNu[sn] and L is a modulus of convergence of g. Then, if given
any term t : (N→ N) → A, we set u := tΦ and consider [[u]]s, we automatically obtain a
constructive proof of theorem 5.3.1.
In the following, we will make repeated use of the fact that the notion of generalized
modulus of convergence is consistent with respect to equality.
Lemma 5.4.1 (Equality Soundness). Suppose M1 gmcs t1, M1 = M2 and t1 = t2.
Then M2 gmcs t2.
Proof. Trivial induction on the type of T .

We now define a fundamental operation on moduli of convergence. The construction is
a generalization of the one in proposition 5.3.3.
Definition 5.4.4 (Collection of Moduli Turned into a Single Modulus). Let
N : A → MT and 〈M, g〉 : MA, with A atomic. We define by induction on T and by cases
a term H(〈M, g〉,N ) of type MT .
(1) T atomic. Then
H(〈M, g〉,N ) := 〈H1(M, λa
Aπ0(Na), g), λn
Nfg(n)(n)〉
with f := λaAπ1Na and H1 as in proposition 5.3.3.
(2) T = C → B. Then
H(〈M, g〉,N ) := λLMCH(〈M, g〉, λaANaL)
(3) T = C ×B. Then
H(〈M, g〉,N ) := 〈H(〈M, g〉, λaAπ0Na),H(〈M, g〉, λa
Aπ1Na)〉
If we call “object of type A” any closed normal term of type A, then the role of the
term H is to satisfy the following lemma, which is one the most important pieces of our
construction. It provides a way of constructing the semantics of a term ut, with t of atomic
type A, if one is able to define a semantics for t and for ua for every object a of type A.
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Lemma 5.4.2 . Let u and t be closed terms respectively of types A → T and A, with A
atomic. Suppose that for every object a of type A, Na gmcs ua and 〈M, g〉 gmcs t. Then
H(〈M, g〉,N ) gmcs ut.
Proof. By induction on T and by cases.
(1) T atomic. We have
H(〈M, g〉,N ) := 〈H1(M, λa
Aπ0(Na), g), λn
Nfg(n)(n)〉
with
f := λaAπ1Na
and
g
ext
= λnNt[sn]
for by hypothesis 〈M, g〉 gmcs t. Moreover, for every object a of type A
fa
ext
= λnNua[sn]
since by hypothesis Na gmcs ua. We must show that
H1(M, λa
Aπ0Na, g)
is a modulus of convergence for the function λnNfg(n)(n) and that λn
Nfg(n)
ext
=
λnNut[sn]. For this last part, indeed, for every numeral m, there is an object
a = g(m) such that
(λnNfg(n)(n))m = fa(m)
ext
= u[sm](a)
= u[sm](g(m))
ext
= u[sm]((λn
Nt[sn])m)
= u[sm](t[sm])
= (λnNut[sn])m
Now, since 〈M, g〉 gmcs t, M is a modulus of convergence for g. Moreover, for
every object a of type A, Na gmcs ua by hypothesis, and therefore π0Na is a
modulus of convergence for λnN ua[sn]
ext
= fa. By proposition 5.3.3, we obtain that
H1(M, λa
Aπ0Na, g)
is modulus of convergence for λnNfg(n)(n), and we are done.
(2) T = C → B. Let v : C and suppose L gmcs v. We have to show that
H(〈M, g〉,N )L = H(〈M, g〉, λaANaL) gmcs utv
But for every object a of type A, Na gmcs ua. Therefore, for every object a of
type A
NaL gmcs uav = (λm
Aumv)a
By induction hypothesis
H(〈M, g〉, λaANaL) gmcs (λm
Aumv)t = utv
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which is the thesis.
(3) T = C ×B. We have to show that, for i = 0, 1,
πiH(〈M, g〉,N ) = πi〈H(〈M, g〉, λa
Aπ0Na),H(〈M, g〉, λa
Aπ1Na)〉
= H(〈M, g〉, λaAπiNa)〉 gmcs πi(ut)
Now, for every object a of type A, Na gmcs ua. Therefore, for every object a of
type A
πiNa gmcs πi(ua) = (λm
Aπi(um))a
By induction hypothesis
H(〈M, g〉, λaAπiNa) gmcs (λm
Aπi(um))t = πi(ut)
which is the thesis.

We are now in a position to define for each constant c of T a term [[c]]s, which is
intended to satisfy the relation [[c]]s gmcs c. [[c]]s can be seen as the non standard version of
the operation denoted by c.
Definition 5.4.5 (Generalized Moduli of Convergence for Constants). We de-
fine for every constant c : T a closed term [[c]]s : MT , accordingly to the form of c.
(1) c : A, A atomic. For any closed term u of atomic type, define
Mid,u := 〈λh
N→NλmNm,λnNu〉
Then
[[c]]s :=Mid,c
(2) c = Φ : N→ N. Let
N := λnN〈λhN→NλmNif sm(n) = sh(m)(n) then m else h(m), λm
N sm(n)〉
Then
[[Φ]]s := λ〈M, g〉
MNH(〈M, g〉,N )
(3) c 6= Φ, c 6= if, c : A0 → · · · → Am → A, with A,Ai atomic for i = 0, . . . ,m.
If m > 0, then define
[[c]]s := λ〈L0, g0〉
MA0 . . . λ〈Lm, gm〉
MAm 〈L0 ⊔ L1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Lm,
λnNc(g0(n)) . . . (gm(n))〉
assuming left association for ⊔.
If m = 0 (c : A0 → A), define
[[c]]s := λ〈M, g〉
MA0 〈M, λnNc(g(n))〉
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(4) c = RT , RT recursor constant with T = A→ (N→ A→ A)→ N→ A. Define
N := λnN RUI(λn
NLMid,n)n
with
U := MA → (N→ MA → MA)→ N→MA
Then
[[RT ]]s := λI
MAλLMN→A→Aλ〈M, g〉MNH(〈M, g〉,N )
(5) c = ifT with T : Bool→ A→ A→ A. Define
N := λbBoolif b then L1 else L2,
Then
[[ifT ]]s := λ〈M, g〉
MBoolλLMA1 λL
MA
2 H(〈M, g〉,N )
The definition of [[c]]s is a generalization of the operations done with hypernaturals.
In case (1), we transform basic objects into their hypernatural, hyperboolean and hyper-
constant counterparts (we call them hyperobjects) all paired with their trivial moduli of
convergence.
In case (2), the interpretation [[Φ]]s of Φ is obtained by first defining uniformly on the
numeral parameter n a collection of interpretations Nn = [[Φn]]s of Φn, and then using the
term H to put together the interpretations in such a way that [[Φ]]s〈M, g〉 interprets [[Φt]]s
whenever 〈M, g〉 = [[t]]s.
In case (3), we provide the non standard version of the function represented by c, which
is a function [[c]]s which combines both hyperobjects and their moduli of convergence.
In case (4) and (5) we have generalized the ideas of subsection 5.4.2. In particular, for
T = A → (N → A → A) → N → A and A atomic, the definition of [[RT ]]s is exactly the
same of ∗R in subsection 5.4.2, enriched with the information of how to combine moduli of
convergence. In fact, if we consider the term
[[RT ]]sIL〈M, g〉
=〈H1(M, λn
Nπ0(Nn), g), λn
Nfg(n)(n)〉
with f := λnNπ1(Nn), its right projection is equal to
λnNfg(n)(n)
which is equal to
λnN(π1RUI(λn
NLMid,n)g(n))(n)
which correspond exactly to the term
∗Rf1f2g = λn
N (RBf1(λn
Nf2(λx
Nn))g(n))(n)
of subsection 5.4.2.
We now prove that for any constant c, [[c]]s is a generalized modulus of convergence for
c.
Proposition 5.4.1 . For every constant c, [[c]]s gmcs c.
Proof. We proceed by cases, accordingly to the form of c.
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(1) c = Φ. Let t : N and suppose 〈M, g〉 gmcs t. We have to prove that
[[Φ]]s〈M, g〉 gmcs Φt
By definition 5.4.5 of [[Φ]]s
[[Φ]]s〈M, g〉 = H(〈M, g〉,N )
with
N := λnN〈λhN→NλmNif sm(n) = sh(m)(n) then m else h(m), λm
Nsm(n)〉
Since 〈M, g〉 gmcs t, if we prove that for every numeral n, Nn gmcs Φn, we obtain
by lemma 5.4.2 that H(〈M, g〉,N ) gmcs Φt and we are done. So let us show that,
given a numeral n, π0Nn is a modulus of convergence for the function
π1Nn = λm
Nsm(n)
ext
= λmN Φ(n)[sm]
We have to prove that given any closed term hN→N ≥ id and numeral n,
λmNsm(n) ↓ [(π0Nn)h(z), h((π0Nn)h(z))]
We have two possibilities:
i) sz(n) = sh(z)(n). Since s ∈ w.i., we have either sh(z)(n) = 0 and so
∀yN. z ≤ y ≤ h(z) =⇒ sy(n) = 0
or sz(n) = sh(z)(n) 6= 0 and so
∀yN. z ≤ y ≤ h(z) =⇒ sy(n) = sz(n)
Therefore
λmNsm(n) ↓[z, h(z)]
=[(π0Nn)h(z), h((π0(Nn)h(z))]
by definition of N .
ii) sz(n) 6= sh(z)(n). Since s ∈ w.i., we have sz ≤ sh(z) and hence 0 = sz(n). So
sh(z)(n) = sh(h(z))(n) and as above
λmNsm(n) ↓[h(z), h(h(z))]
=[(π0Nn)h(z), h((π0Nn)h(z))]
(2) c 6= Φ, c 6= if, c : A0 → · · · → Am → A.
i) m > 0. Suppose ti : Ai and 〈Li, gi〉 gmcs ti for all i = 0, . . . ,m. We have to
prove that
[[c]]s〈L0, g0〉 . . . 〈Lm, gm〉 gmcs ct1 . . . tm
We have that gi
ext
= λnNti[sn] for i = 0, . . . ,m. Moreover, since by definition 5.4.5
of [[c]]s
[[c]]s〈L0, g0〉 . . . 〈Lm, gm〉
=〈L0 ⊔ L1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Lm, λn
Nc(g0(n)) . . . (gm(n))〉
we must show that
π0([[c]]s〈L0, g0〉 . . . 〈Lm, gm〉)
=L0 ⊔ L1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Lm
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is a modulus of convergence for
λnNc(g0(n)) . . . (gm(n))
ext
=λnNc(t1[sn]) . . . (tm[sn])
=λnNct1 . . . tm[sn]
Since for i = 0, . . . ,m, Li is a modulus of convergence for gi, by repeated applica-
tion of proposition 5.3.2 we deduce that L0⊔L1⊔. . .⊔Lm is modulus of convergence
for all g1, . . . , gm simultaneously. Hence for all closed terms h : N→ N ≥ id and
numerals z, and for i = 0, . . . ,m
gi ↓ [(L0 ⊔ L1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Lm)h(z), h((L0 ⊔ L1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Lm)h(z))]
and therefore
λmN c(g1(m)) . . . (gn(m)) ↓ [(L0 ⊔ L1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Lm)h(z), h((L0 ⊔ L1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Lm)h(z))]
which is the thesis.
ii) m = 0. Straightforward simplification of the argument for i).
(3) c : A, A atomic. By definition 5.4.5
[[c]]s = 〈λh
N→NλmNm,λnNc〉
We have therefore to prove that λhN→NλmNm is a modulus of convergence for λnNc,
which is trivially true, and that λnNc[sn] = λn
Nc, which is also trivial. We conclude
[[c]]s gmcs c.
(4) c = RT , RT recursor constant with T = A → (N → A → A) → N → A. Suppose
I gmcs u : A, L gmcs v : N → A → A and 〈M, g〉 gmcs t : N. We have to prove
that
[[RT ]]sIL〈M, g〉 = H(〈M, g〉,N ) gmcs RTuvt
where
N := λnN RUI(λn
NLMid,n)n
If we show that for all numerals n, Nn gmcs RTuvn, by lemma 5.4.2 we obtain
that
H(〈M, g〉,N ) gmcs RTuvt
We prove that by induction on n.
If n = 0, then
N0 = RUI(λn
NLMid,n)0 = I gmcs u = RTuv0
If n = S(m), then
NS(m) = RUI(λn
NLMid,n)S(m)
= (λnNLMid,n)m(RUI(λn
NLMid,n)m)
= LMid,m(RUI(λn
NLMid,n)m)
= LMid,mNm
92 5. CONSTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS OF LEARNING IN PEANO ARITHMETIC
By induction hypothesis, Nm gmcs RTuvm. Moreover, Mid,m gmcs m and by hy-
pothesis L gmcs v. Hence
LMid,mNm gmcs vm(RTuvm) = RTuvS(m)
which is the thesis.
(5) c = ifT , with T : Bool → A → A → A. Suppose L1 gmcs u1 : A, L2 gmcs u2 : A
and 〈M, g〉 gmcs t : Bool. We have to prove that
[[ifT ]]s〈M, g〉L1L2 = H(〈M, g〉,N ) gmcs ifT tu1u2
where
N := λbBoolif b then L1 else L2
If we show that for all a ∈ {True, False}, Na gmcs (λb
BoolifT bu1u2)a, by lemma
5.4.2 we obtain that
H(〈M, g〉,N ) gmcs (λb
AifT bu1u2)t = ifT tu1u2
We prove that by cases.
If a = True, then
Na = L1 gmcs u1 = (λb
AifT bu1u2)a
If a = False, then
Na = L2 gmcs u2 = (λb
AifT bu1u2)a
Hence, we have the thesis.

We are finally ready to define the interpretation of every term of T in our model of
hypernaturals with moduli.
Definition 5.4.6 (Generalized Moduli of Convergence for Terms of T ). For
every term v : T of system T and s ∈w.i., we define a term [[v]]s : MT by induction on v and
by cases as follows:
(1) v = c, with c constant. We define [[c]]s as in definition 5.4.5.
(2) v = xA, x variable. Then
[[xA]]s := x
MA
(3) v = ut. Then
[[ut]]s := [[u]]s[[t]]s
(4) v = λxAu. Then
[[λxAu]]s := λx
MA [[u]]s
(5) v = 〈u, t〉. Then
[[〈u, t〉]]s := 〈[[u]]s, [[t]]s〉
(6) v = πiu. Then
[[πiu]]s := πi[[u]]s
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5.5. Adequacy Theorem
We are now able to prove our main theorem. For every closed term u, [[u]]s is an
inhabitant of the model of hypernaturals with moduli of convergence.
Theorem 5.5.1 (Adequacy Theorem). Let w : A be a term of T and let xA11 , . . . , x
An
n
contain all the free variables of w. Then, for all s ∈w.i.
λx
MA1
1 . . . λx
MAn
n [[w]]s gmcs λx
A1
1 . . . λx
An
n w
Proof. Let t1 : A1, . . . , tn : An be arbitrary terms. We have to prove that
M1 gmcs t1, . . . ,Mn gmcs tn =⇒ [[w]]s[M1/x
MA1
1 . . .Mn/x
MAn
n ] gmcs w[t1/x
A1
1 . . . tn/x
An
n ]
For any term v, we set
v := v[t1/x
A1
1 · · · tn/x
An
n ]
and
[[v]]s := [[v]]s[M1/x
MA1
1 . . .Mn/x
MAn
n ]
With that notation, we have to prove that [[w]]s gmcs w. The proof is by induction on w
and proceeds by cases, accordingly to the form of w.
(1) w = c, with c constant. Since [[c]]s is closed and c does not have free variables, by
proposition 5.4.1
[[w]]s = [[c]]s = [[c]]s gmcs c = c = w
which is the thesis.
(2) w = xAii , for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then
[[w]]s = x
MAi
i [M1/x
MA1
1 . . .Mn/x
MAn
n ] =Mi gmcs ti = x
Ai
i [t1/x
A1
1 · · · tn/x
An
n ] = w
which is the thesis.
(3) w = ut. By induction hypothesis, [[u]]s gmcs u and [[t]]s gmcs t. So
[[ut]]s = [[u]]s[[t]]s gmcs ut = w
which is the thesis.
(4) w = λxAu. Let t : A and supposeM gmcs t. We have to prove that [[w]]sM gmcs wt.
By induction hypothesis
[[λxAu]]sM = (λx
MA [[u]]s)M = [[u]]s[M/x
MA ] gmcs u[t/x
A] = wt
which is the thesis.
(5) w = 〈u0, u1〉. By induction hypothesis, [[u0]]s gmcs u0 and [[u1]]s gmcs u1. There-
fore, for i = 0, 1
πi[[〈u0, u1〉]]s = πi〈[[u0]]s[[u1]]s〉 = [[ui]]s gmcs ui = πiw
which is the thesis.
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(6) w = πiu, with i ∈ {0, 1}. By induction hypothesis, [[u]]s gmcs u. Therefore,
[[πiu]]s = πi[[u]]s gmcs πiu = w
which is the thesis.

5.6. Consequences of the Adequacy Theorem
In this section, we spell out most interesting consequences of adequacy theorem.
5.6.1. Weak Convergence Theorem. We can finally prove the constructive version
of theorem 5.1.1, our main goal. The following theorem is even stronger of the previously
enunciated theorem 5.3.1, because it states that one can find moduli of convergence for any
uniformly defined collection of terms.
Theorem 5.6.1 (Weak Convergence Theorem for Collection of Terms). Let
t : N → (N→ N) → S be a closed term of T not containing Φ, with S atomic type. Then
we can effectively define a closed term M : N → (N → (N→ N)) → (N→ N) → (N→ N)
of T , such that for all s : N → (N→ N), s ∈ w.i. and numerals n, Mns is a modulus of
convergence for λmNtn(sm).
Proof. Let
M := λyNλsN→(N→N)π0((λx
MN [[txNΦ]]s)Mid,y)
By the adequacy theorem 5.5.1,
λxMN[[txNΦ]]s gmcs λx
NtxNΦ
Since for every numeral n, Mid,n gmcs n, we have
(λxMN[[txNΦ]]s)Mid,n gmcs tnΦ
By definition of generalized modulus of convergence and of M, Mns is a modulus of con-
vergence for λmNtnΦ[sm] = λm
Ntn(sm).

5.6.2. Learning Based Realizability and Provably Total Functions of PA. If σ
is a state of knowledge, we mantain the notation
u[σ] := [ϕPσ/ΦP χPσ/XP addPσ/AddP ]
of chapter 3, since there is no confusion with the notation u[v] of the previous section, which
was defined for v of type N→ N.
Theorem 5.6.2 (Zero Theorem for Collections of Terms of TClass). Let t : N→ S
be a closed term of TClass, where S is the atomic type of knowledge states. Then, there exists
a term Zero : N→ S of TLearn such that for every numeral n, tn[Zeron] = ∅.
Proof. We may assume t contains as oracles only constants XP ,ΦP ,AddP for some
fixed predicate P . The general case is analogous and involves only a little bit more of trivial
coding.
In the first place, we have to carry out some simple coding. We have to represent states
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of knowledge by terms of type N→ N. This is straightforward since a state represents a
function over N. Define
f := λσSλnNif χPσn then ϕPσn+ 1 else 0
f takes a state σ and returns the function coding it; if n is a numeral, when χPσn = True,
fσn returns ϕPσn + 1 and not just ϕPσn, in order to ensure that 0 is returned only when
it is just a trivial value, i.e. when χPσ = False.
Given a term g : N→ N, intended to represent a state σ, define terms ϕgP , χ
g
P , add
g
P , intended
to code respectively ϕPσ, χPσ, addPσ, as follows
ϕgP := λn
Nif g(n) = 0 then 0 else g(n)− 1
χgP := λn
Nif g(n) = 0 then False else True
add
g
P := λn
NλmNif g(n) = 0 then addP∅nm else ∅
Moreover, for every term u, define
ug := u[ϕgP /ΦP χ
g
P/XP add
g
P /AddP ]
It is easy to see that for all terms u and all states σ, u[σ] = ufσ .
We can now give the important part of the argument. Fix a numeral n. Let σm := ∅ and
σm+1 := σm ⋒ tn[σm] be a recursive definition of a sequence of states (which can be coded
in T ). Our goal is to write down a term of system TLearn which is able to find a state σk+1
such that tn[σk] = tn[σk+1]: as we will see, this condition implies t[σk+1] = ∅. Let
U := λmNλgN→Ntgm
By the weak convergence theorem 5.6.1 applied to U , there exists a term M of TLearn such
that, for every numeral l and s ∈ w.i., Mls is a modulus of convergence for λm
NUl(sm).
Set s := (λmNfσm). Then s ∈ w.i., since σ0 ≤ σ1 ≤ σ2 · · · . Therefore Mns is a modulus of
convergence for λmN Un(sm). If we choose h := λm
Nm+1 and set k :=Mnsh, we have that
Un(sk) = Un(sk+1) by definition of modulus of convergence. We thus obtain, by definition
of U ad s, that t
fσk
n = t
fσk+1
n and so tn[σk] = tn[σk+1]. Let
Zero := λmNσ(Mmsh)+1
We have
Zeron ⋒ tn[Zeron] =σk+1 ⋒ tn[σk+1]
= (σk ⋒ tn[σk]) ⋒ tn[σk+1]
= (σk ⋒ tn[σk]) ⋒ tn[σk]
= σk ⋒ tn[σk]
= σk+1
= Zeron
Since tn[Zeron] is consistent and disjoint with Zeron, we conclude tn[Zeron] = ∅ and obtain
the thesis.

As anticipated in the introduction, from learning based realizers we can extract algo-
rithms of system T.
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Theorem 5.6.1 (Program Extraction via Learning Based Realizability). Let
t be a term of TClass and suppose that t  ∀x
N∃yNPxy, with P atomic. Then, from t
one can effectively define a term u of Go¨del’s system T such that for every numeral n,
Pn(un) = True.
Proof. Let
v := λmNπ1(tm)
v is of type N → S. By theorem 5.6.2, there exists a term Zero : N → S of TLearn such that
vn[Zeron] = ∅ for every numeral n. Define
w := λmN(π0(tm)[Zerom])
and fix a numeral n. By unfolding the definition of realizability with respect to the state
Zeron, we have that
tn Zeron ∃y
NPny
and hence
π1(tn) Zeron Pn(wn)
that is to say
vn[Zeron] = ∅ =⇒ Pn(wn) = True
and therefore
Pn(wn) = True
We observe that w : N→ N and w is a term of TLearn. By standard coding of states into
natural numbers and of all other constants of TLearn into terms of Go¨del’s T, one can code
every term of TLearn into Go¨del’s T. Hence, there exists a term u of Go¨del’s T such that for
all numerals n, u(n) = w(n), which is the thesis.

Remark 5.6.3 . We point out that the term u of theorem 5.6.1, modulo some trivial coding
of states into numbers, bears a strong resemblance to the term t from which it is defined. In
particular, u is straightforwardly obtained from a modulus of convergence M that carries
the constructive information associated to the convergence of t. In turn,M is obtained via
the translation [[ ]]s, which just replaces type-A constants and variables of t with new terms
of type MA. As an instance, recursion constants RA are replaced with recursion constants
RMA . Therefore, the type of recursion goes through a constant increase of 2, since MA is
obtained by changing the basic types C with MC .
We conjecture it is not possible to amend our translation as to preserve the types of recursion
constants. This should be due to Avigad’s theorem: if one is able to find zeros of finite
update procedures, than one can compute every provably total function of PA. But in the
next subsections, we show how to compute finite zeros of update procedures in Go¨del’s
system T, thanks to moduli of convergence. If the translation [[ ]]s did not increase the
recursion type, then the term computing the zero of an update procedure would have the
same recursion level of the latter. But since primitive recursive functionals are enough as
update procedures, one would get a contradiction to Avigad’s theorem, because one could
interpret all provably total functions of Arithmetic with primitive recursion.
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We are now able to prove a version of the classic theorem of Go¨del, characterizing the
class of functions provably total in PA as the class of functions representable in system T.
Theorem 5.6.4 (Provably Total Functions of PA). If PA ⊢ ∀xN∃yNPxy, then there
exists a term u of Go¨del’s system T such that for every numeral n, Pn(un) = True.
Proof. Starting from the assumption that
PA ⊢ ∀xN∃yNPxy
by Kolmogorov double negation translation (see for instance [43]), we have that
HA ⊢ ∀xN¬¬∃yNPxy
Therefore
HA+ EM1 ⊢ ∀x
N∃yNPxy
and so there is a term t of TClass such that
t  ∀xN∃yNPxy
By theorem 5.6.1, there exists a term u of Go¨del’s system T such that for all numerals n
Pnu(n) = True

5.6.3. Zeros for Update Procedures. Thanks to the adeguacy theorem, we are able
to give a new constructive proof of Avigad’s theorem for update procedures. Here, we give
a slightly different definition of update procedure. This is not a limitation, since the update
procedures which are actually used by Avigad [5] in proving 1-consistency of PA still fall
under the following definition.
Definition 5.6.1 (Update Operator, Typed Update Procedure). Fix a primitive
recursive bijective coding | | : (N3 ∪ {∅}) → N of ∅ and of triples of natural numbers into
natural numbers. Define a binary operation ⊕ which combine functions f : N→ N and codes
of the form |(1, n,m)| of pairs of natural numbers and returns a function N→ N as follows
f ⊕ |(1,m, n)| := λxNif x = m then n else f(x)
For convenience, define also f ⊕ |∅| = f .
A typed update procedure of ordinal k ∈ N (also said a k-ary typed update procedure)
is a term U : (N→ N)k → N of Go¨del’s T such that the following holds:
(1) for all sequences f = f1, . . . , fk of closed type-N→ N terms of T, Uf = |(i, n,m)| =⇒
1 ≤ i ≤ k.
(2) for all sequences f = f1, . . . , fk and g = g1, . . . , gk of closed type-N→ N terms of T
and for all 1 ≤ i < k, if
i) for all j < i, fj = gj ;
ii) Uf = |(i, n,m)|, gi(n) = m and Ug = |(i, h, l)|
then h 6= n.
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If U is a k-ary typed update procedure, a zero for U is a sequence f = f1, . . . , fk of closed
type-N→ N terms of T such that Uf = |∅|.
Every unary update procedure gives rise to a learning process, i.e. a weakly increasing
chain of functions.
Proposition 5.6.5 (Learning Processes from Unary Update Procedures). Let
U be a unary update procedure and define by recursion s0 := 0
N→N := λxN0 and sk+1 :=
sk ⊕ Usk. Then s ∈w.i..
Proof. Suppose si(n) = m 6= 0. We have to prove that for all j, si+j(n) = m. We
proceed by induction on j. Suppose j > 0. Since s0 = 0
N→N and si(n) 6= 0, it must be that
for some i0 < i, Usi0 = |(1, n,m)|. By induction hypothesis, si+j−1(n) = m. By definition
5.6.1, point 2-ii), Usi+j−1 6= |(1, n, l)| for all l. Since
si+j = si+j−1 ⊕ Usi+j−1
it must be that si+j(n) = m.

We first prove that unary typed update procedures have zeros.
Theorem 5.6.6 (Zero Theorem for Unary Typed Update Procedures). Let U :
(N→ N)k+1 → N be a term of T such that for all closed type-N→ N terms f1, . . . , fk of T,
Uf1 . . . fk is a typed unary update procedure. Then one can constructively define a closed
term ε : (N→ N)k → (N→ N) of T such that for all closed type-N→ N terms f1, . . . , fk of T
Uf1 . . . fk(εf1 . . . fk) = |∅|
Proof. First, for any term h : N→ N, define
Lh := λ〈M, g〉MN〈M, λnNh(g(n))〉
The same proof of proposition 5.4.1 (in the case of constants of type N→ N) shows that for
all closed terms h of T and s ∈w.i., Lh gmcs h. Define
Ns := λh
N→N
1 . . . λh
N→N
k [[U ]]sL
h1 . . .Lhk [[Φ]]s
and fix closed type-N→ N terms f1, . . . , fk of T. By the adeguacy theorem 5.5.1, for all
s ∈w.i., [[U ]]s gmcs U and hence
Ms := Nsf1 . . . fk gmcs Uf1 . . . fkΦ
So, for all s ∈ w.i., π0(Ms) is a modulus of convergence for λm
NUf1 . . . fk(sm). Define
by recursion a term s such that s0 := 0
N→N and sn+1 := sn ⊕ Uf1 . . . fksn. Then s ∈w.i.
by proposition 5.6.5, since Uf1 . . . fk is a typed unary update procedure. So π0(Ms) is
a modulus of convergence for λmN Uf1 . . . fk(sm). If we choose h := λm
Nm + 1 and set
j := π0(Ms)h, we have that
Uf1 . . . fk(sj) = Uf1 . . . fk(sj+1)
by definition of modulus of convergence. So let
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εf1 . . . fk := s(π0(Ms)h)+1
Then
sj+2 = sj+1 ⊕ Uf1 . . . fk(sj+1)
= (sj ⊕ Uf1 . . . fk(sj))⊕ Uf1 . . . fk(sj+1)
= (sj ⊕ Uf1 . . . fk(sj))⊕ Uf1 . . . fk(sj)
= sj ⊕ Uf1 . . . fk(sj)
= sj+1
and hence it must be that
Uf1 . . . fk(εf1 . . . fk) = Uf1 . . . fk(sj+1) = |∅|
which is the thesis.

We are now able to prove the zero theorem for n-ary typed update procedures, following
the idea of Avigad’s original construction.
Theorem 5.6.7 (Zero Theorem for n-ary Typed Update Procedures). Let U :
(N→ N)k → N be a typed update procedure of ordinal k ∈ N. Then one can constructively
define terms ε1, . . . , εk of Go¨del’s T such that
Uε1 . . . εk = |∅|
Proof. By induction on k. The case k = 1 has been treated in theorem 5.6.6. There-
fore, suppose k > 1. Define
Uk := λg
N→N
1 . . . λg
N→N
k−1 if Ug1 . . . gk−1 = |(k, n,m)| then |(1, n,m)| else |∅|
Since for all closed type-N→ N terms f1, . . . , fk−1 of T, Ukf1 . . . fk−1 is a unary typed update
procedure, by theorem 5.6.6, we can constructively define a term εk of T such that for all
closed type-N→ N terms f1, . . . , fk−1 of T
Ukf1 . . . fk−1(εkf1 . . . fk−1) = |∅|
and hence
Uf1 . . . fk−1(εkf1 . . . fk−1) 6= |(k, n,m)|
This implies that
λgN→N1 . . . λg
N→N
k−1 Ug1 . . . gk−1(εg1 . . . gk−1)
is a typed update procedure of ordinal k−1. By induction hypothesis, we can constructively
define terms ε1, . . . , εk−1 of Go¨del’s T such that
Uε1 . . . εk−1(εkε1 . . . εk−1) = |∅|
which is the thesis.

An important corollary of theorem 5.6.7, is the termination of the epsilon substitution
method for first order Peano Arithmetic.
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Theorem 5.6.8 (Termination of Epsilon Substitution Method for PA). The H-
process (as defined in Mints [35]) of the epsilon substitution method for PA always termi-
nates.
Proof. See Avigad [5] 
CHAPTER 6
Learning in Predicative Analysis
Abstract. We give an axiomatization of the concept of learning, as it implicitly appears
in various computational interpretations of Predicative classical second order Arithmetic.
We achieve our result by extending Avigad’s notion of update procedure to the transfinite
case.
6.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an abstract description of learning as it is appears
in various computational interpretations of predicative fragments of classical second order
Arithmetic. Our account has a twofold motivation and interest.
Its first purpose is to provide a foundation that will serve to extend learning based real-
izability to predicative fragments of Analysis: a possible path to follow is the one suggested
here. In particular, we describe the learning processes that arise when extending the ap-
proach of learning based realizability to predicative Arithmetic and prove their termination.
This is achieved by introducing the notion of transfinite update procedure.
Secondly, we continue the work of Avigad on update procedures [5] and - as anticipated
- extend them to the transfinite case. The concept of transfinite update procedure may be
seen as an axiomatization of learning as implicitly used in the epsilon substitution method
formulated in the work of Mints et al ([35], [36]). The notion is useful to understand
the core of the epsilon method and its fundamental ideas without having to deal with the
complicated formalism and non relevant details. Moreover, as interesting byproduct of
the conceptual analysis of the epsilon method through transfinite update procedures, one
can provide a combinatorial statement that is equivalent to the 1-consistency of various
fragments of predicative Arithmetic in a very scalable way. In particular, the informal
statement “U(α): every transfinite update procedure of ordinal less than α has a finite
zero” very rapidly acquires logical complexity even at small ordinals. For example:
(1) U(2) corresponds to the 1-consistency of HA+ EM1.
(2) U(n + 1), with n ∈ ω, corresponds to the 1-consistency of HA + EMn (excluded
middle over Σ0n formulas).
(3) U(ω) corresponds to the 1-consistency of PA
(4) U(ω · 2) corresponds to the 1-consistency of EA (Elementary Analysis)
(5) U(ωω) corresponds to the 1-consistency of PA2 plus ∆11-comprehension axiom.
(1), (4) are treated in this thesis, (3) has been proved by Avigad [5], (2) will follow by
extending learning based realizability. (5) should follow by straightforward extension of the
methods we will use to prove (4). In order to make precise the statement U(α) and prove
refined versions of (1)-(5), one has to choose a formal system in to which represent update
procedures. All the update procedures used in this thesis may be assumed to be represented
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in system T.
Plan of the Chapter. In section §6.2 we introduce and motivate the concept of transfinite
update procedure and give a very short non constructive proof of the existence of finite zeros.
In section §6.3 we explain the notion of “learning process generated by an update pro-
cedure” and prove that every learning process terminates with a zero for the associated
update procedure. The result represents a more constructive proof of the existence of finite
zeros and the learning processes are “optimal”, in the sense that one could provide con-
structively the expected ordinal bounds to their length and of the size of finite zeros (by
applying techniques of Mints [35])
In sections §6.4 and §6.5 we formalize the notion of update procedure in typed lambda
calculus plus bar recursion and prove the existence of zeros for update procedures of ordinal
less than ωω by writing down simple bar recursive terms.
In section §6.6 we devote ourselves to a case study: we show that U(ω · 2) implies the
1-consistency of EA by proving that it implies the termination of H-processes of the epsilon
substitution method for EA.
6.2. Transfinite Update Procedures for Predicative Analysis
From the computational point of view, classical predicative second order Arithmetic
poses very difficult problems. Axioms of comprehension ask for functions g able to decide
truth of formulas:
∃gN→N∀xN. g(x) = 0↔ φ(x)
Axioms of (countable) choice ask for functions g computing existential witnesses of truth
of formulas:
(∀xN∃yA φ(x, y))→ ∃gN→A∀xNφ(x, g(x))
A Kleene-style realizability interpretation for even the most simple form of the excluded
middle
EM1 : ∀n
N.∀yN¬Pny ∨ ∃xNPnx
asks for deciding the truth of semidecidable formulas of the form ∃xN Pnx, with P decidable.
In general, learning based computational interpretations of predicative fragments of
classical analysis (such as our learning based realizability, epsilon substitution method, up-
date procedures, Herbrand analysis) provide answers to the above computational challenges
by the following three-stage pattern:
(1) They identify a sequence F - possibly transfinite - of non computable functions
N→ N.
(2) They define classical witnesses for provable formulas by using programs recursive
in F .
(3) They define learning procedures through which it is possible to find, for every
particular computation, a suitable finite approximation of the functions of F such
that one can effectively compute the witnesses defined at stage two.
The functions in the F of stage (1) are the computational engine of the interpretation.
Given the difficulty of computing witnesses in classical Arithmetic, they are always non
computable. It is therefore not surprising that given this additional computational power,
one is able to define at stage (2) witnesses for classical formulas. If we picture the sequence
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F as a sequence of infinite stacks of numbers, the learning process of point (3) finds a
“vertical” approximation of F : functions of F are infinite stacks of numbers whereas their
finite approximations are finite stacks. Moreover, a crucial point is that the sequence F
is not an arbitrary sequence. In a sense, F is also “horizontally” approximated: for every
ordinal α, the recursion theoretic Turing degree of Fα is approximated by the degrees of
Fβ , for β < α. This property is very important: in this way, the values of the functions in
F can be gradually approximated and learned.
More precisely, F can be seen a sequence of functions obtained by transfinite iteration
of recursion theoretic jump operator (see for example Odifreddi [38]). That is, for every β,
if β is a successor, Fβ has the same Turing degree of an oracle for the halting problem for
the class of functions recursive in Fβ−1 (jump); if β is limit, Fβ has the same Turing degre
of the function mapping the code of a pair (α, n), with α < β, into Fα(n) (join or β-jump).
A fundamental property of such a sequence is that the assertion Fβ(n) = m depends only
on the values of the functions Fα, for α < β, and the values of Fβ are learnable in the limit
1
by a program g recursive in the join of Fα for α < β, which is a guarantee that learning
processes will terminate.
We now give an informal example of the kind of analysis which is needed to carry out
the first stage of a learning based interpretation, in the case of EA. A complete treatment
is postponed to section 6.6.
Example 6.2.1 (Elementary Analysis). Consider a subsystem of second order Peano
Arithmetic in which second order quantification is intended to range over arithmetical sets
and hence over arithmetical formulas (formulas with only numerical quantifiers and possibly
set parameters). Since one has to interpret excluded middle over arbitrary formulas, it
is necessary to provide at least programs that can decide truth of formulas. Numerical
quantifiers correspond to Turing jumps. That is, if we have a program t (with the same
function parameters of φ) such that for every pair of naturals n,m
t(n,m) = True ⇐⇒ φ(n,m)
then the truth of
∃xNφ(n, x)
is equivalent to the termination of a program Q(n) exhaustively checking
t(n, 0), t(n, 1), t(n, 2), . . .
until it finds - if there exists - anm such that t(n,m) = True. Applying the jump operator to
the Turing degree t belongs to, one can write down a program χt which is able to determine
whether Q(n) terminates. That is
χt(n) = True ⇐⇒ ∃x
Nφ(n, x)
Similarly, one eliminates universal numerical quantifiers, thanks to the fact that ∀ ≡ ¬∃¬.
Iterating these reasoning and applying 2k times the jump operator - and given a recursive
enumeration φ0, φ1, . . . , of arithmetical formulas - one can obtain for every Σ
0
2k formula
φn(m) := ∃x
N
1∀y
N
1 . . . ∃x
N
k∀y
N
k P (m,x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk)
a program tn such that
tn(m) = True ⇐⇒ φn(m)
1In the sense of Gold [22]: Fβ(n) = m ⇐⇒ limk→∞ g(n, k) = m
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Using the ω-jump operator, one can write down a program u such that
u(n,m) = True ⇐⇒ tn(m) = True
and hence
u(n,m) = True ⇐⇒ φn(m)
Now a Σ11 formula
∃fN→Boolφi
- provided we assume that fN→Bool ranges over arithmetical predicates - can also be ex-
pressed as
∃nNti[λm
Nu(n,m)/f ]
So applying again a jump operator to the recursive degree of ti[λm
Nu(n,m)/f ], one is able
to write a program determining the truth value of ∃fN→Boolφi. Iterating this reasoning, one
can decide the truth of arbitrary Σ1n formulas.
Summing up, in order to decide truth in Elementary Analysis, one needs to apply the jump
operator ω + ω times and thus produces a sequence F of non computable functions F of
length ω+ω. All the programs that we have described are recursive in some initial segment
of F .
We are now in a position to understand the following axiomatization of the learning
procedures cited in point (3) above.
Definition 6.2.1 (Transfinite Update Procedures). Let α ≥ 1 be a numerable
ordinal. An update procedure of ordinal α is a function U : (α → (N → N)) → (α × N ×
N) ∪ {∅} such that:
(1) U is continuous. i.e. for any f : α → (N → N) there is a finite subset A of α × N
such that for every g : α → (N → N) if fγ(n) = gγ(n) for every (γ, n) ∈ A, then
Uf = Ug.
(2) For all functions f, g : α→ (N→ N) and every ordinal β ∈ α, if
i) for every γ < β, fγ = gγ ;
ii) Uf = (β, n,m), gβ(n) = m and Ug = (β, i, j);
then i 6= n.
The concept of transfinite update procedure is a generalization of Avigad’s notion of
update procedure [5]. A transfinite update procedure, instead of taking just a finite num-
ber of function arguments, may get as input an arbitrary transfinite sequence of functions,
which are intended to approximate a target sequence F ; as output, it may return an update
(β, n,m), which means that the β-th function taken as argument is an inadequate approx-
imation of Fβ and must be updated as to output m on input n. Condition (2) in definition
6.2.1 is a little bit stronger than Avigad’s requirement, which would be:
(2)’ For all functions f, g : α→ (N→ N) and every ordinal β ∈ α, if
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i) for every γ < β, fγ = gγ ;
ii) Uf = (β, n,m), gβn = m, fβ ≤ gβ and Ug = (β, i, j) (where fβ ≤ gβ is defined as
fβ(x) 6= 0 implies fβ(x) = gβ(x));
then i 6= n.
But in fact, the update procedures which are actually used by Avigad [5] in proving 1-
consistency of PA still fall under our definition.
Condition (2) means that the values for the β-th function depend only on the values of
functions of ordinal less than β in the input sequence and an update procedure returns only
updates which are relatively verified and hence need not to be changed. In this sense, if
Uf = (β, n,m), one has learned that Fβ(n) = m; so if gβ is a candidate approximation of
Fβ and gβ(n) = m, then Ug does not represent a request to modify the value of gβ at point
n, whenever f and g agree on all ordinals less than β.
We remark that the choice of the type for an update procedure is somewhat arbitrary: we
could have chosen it to be
(α→ (X → Y ))→ (α×X × Y ) ∪ {∅}
as long as the elements of the setsX and Y can be coded by finite objects. Since such coding
may always be performed by using natural numbers, we choose to consider X = Y = N.
The use of transfinite update procedures made by learning based computational inter-
pretations of classical arithmetic can be described as follows. Suppose those interpretations
are given a provable formula with an attainable computational meaning, for example one of
the form ∀xN∃yN Pxy, with P decidable. Then, for every numeral n, they manage to define
a term tn : (α→ (N→ N))→ N and an update procedure Un of ordinal α such that
Un(f) = ∅ =⇒ Pn(tn(f))
for all f : α → (N → N). The idea is that a witness for the formula ∃yNPny is calculated
by tn with respect to a particular approximation f of the sequence F we have previously
described. If the formula Pn(tn(f)) is true, there is nothing to be done. If it is false, then
Un(f) = (β, n,m) for some β, n,m: a new value for Fβ is learned. This is what we call
“learning by counterexamples”: from every failure a new positive fact is acquired. We have
studied an instance of this kind of learning in the chapter on learning based realizability
for HA+ EM1 (for the case of α = 1), when we defined realizability for atomic formulas: in
that case the pair (n,m) was produced by the realizer of the excluded middle. We will see
another instance in section 6.6 in the case α = ω + k, with k ∈ N: the triple (β, n,m) will
be produced through the evaluation of axioms for epsilon terms.
The effectiveness of the above approach depends on the fact that every update procedure
has a finite zero, as defined below.
Definition 6.2.2 (Finite Functions, Finite Zeros, Truncation and Concatena-
tion of Function Sequences). Let U be an update procedure of ordinal α.
(1) f : α→ (N→ N) is said to be a finite function if the set of (γ, n) such that fγn 6= 0
is finite.
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(2) A finite zero for U is a finite function f : α→ (N→ N) such that Uf = ∅.
(3) Let f : α → (N→ N) and β < α. Let f<β : β → (N→ N) be the truncation of f
at β:
f<β := γ ∈ β 7→ fγ
(4) Let α1, α2 be two ordinals, f1 : α1 → (N→ N) and f2 : α2 → (N→ N). Then the
concatenation f1 ∗ f2 : (α1 + α2)→ (N→ N) of f and g is defined as:
(f ∗ g)γ(n) :=
{
fγ(n) if γ < α1
gβ(n) if γ = α1 + β < α1 + α2
(5) With a slight abuse of notation, a function f : N→ N will be sometimes identified
with the corresponding length-one sequence of functions 0 7→ (n ∈ N 7→ f(n)).
We now prove that every update procedure has a finite zero. We will give other more
and more constructive proofs of this theorem, that will allow to compute finite zeros for
update procedures and thus witnesses for classically provable formulas, thanks to learning
based interpretations. But for now we are only interested into understanding the reason of
the theorem’s truth and give a very short non constructive proof. All the subsequent proofs
can be seen as more and more sophisticated and refined constructivizations of the following
argument.
Theorem 6.2.3 (Zero Theorem for Update Procedures of Ordinal α). Let U be
an update procedure of ordinal α. Then U has a finite zero.
Proof. We define, by transfinite induction, a function f : α → (N→ N) as follows.
Suppose we have defined fγ : N→ N, for every γ < β. Define the sequence f<β : β →
(N→ N) of them all
f<β := γ ∈ β 7→ fγ
Then define
fβ(x) =
{
0 if ∀g(α−β)→(N→N) ∀zN U(f<β ∗ g) 6= 〈β, x, z〉
y otherwise, for some y such that ∃g(α−β)→(N→N) U(f<β ∗ g) = 〈β, x, y〉
By axiom of choice and classical logic, for every β, f<β and fβ are well defined. So we can
let
f := f<α
Suppose U(f) = 〈β, x, z〉, for some β < α: we show that it is impossible. For some
h : (α− (β + 1))→ (N→ N), f = f<β ∗ fβ ∗ h. Hence, for some g : (α− β)→ (N→ N)
U(f<β ∗ g) = 〈β, x, y〉 ∧ fβ(x) = y
by definition of f . But U is an update procedure and so
(U(f<β ∗ g) = 〈β, x, y〉 ∧ fβ(x) = y ∧ U(f<β ∗ fβ ∗ h) = 〈β, x, z〉) =⇒ x 6= x
which is impossible. We conclude that U(f) = ∅ and, by continuity, that U has a finite zero.

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6.3. Learning Processes Generated by Transfinite Update Procedures
In this section we show that every update procedure U generates a learning process and
this learning process always terminates with a finite zero of U . This result is an abstract
version of the termination of the H-process as defined in the various versions of epsilon sub-
stitution method (see Mints et al. [35]). The proof of termination is non-constructive and
is similar to the one in Mints et al. [35] (which however is by contradiction while ours is not).
If U is an update procedure and U(f) = 〈γ, n,m〉, then the value of fγ at argument n
must be updated as to be equal to m. But as explained in the introduction, we may imagine
that all the values of all the functions fβ, with β > γ, depend on the values of the current
fγ . Therefore, if we change some of the values of fγ , we must erase all the values of all the
functions fβ, for β > γ, because they may be inconsistent with the new values of fβ. In a
sense, f is a fragile structure, that may be likened to an house of cards: if we change some
layer all the higher ones collapse. We define an update operator ⊕ that performs those
operations.
Definition 6.3.1 (Controlled Update of Functions). Let f : α → (N→ N) and
〈γ, n,m〉 ∈ α× N×N. We define a function f ⊕ 〈γ, n,m〉 : α→ (N→ N) such that
(f ⊕ 〈γ, n,m〉)β(x) :=


fβ(x) if β < γ or (β = γ and x 6= n)
m if γ = β and x = n
0 otherwise
We also define f ⊕ ∅ := f .
We now define the concept of “learning process generated by an update procedure U”.
It may be thought as a process of updating and learning new values of functions, which
is guided by U . It corresponds to the step three of the learning based computational
interpretations of classical arithmetic we have described in the introduction. Intuitively,
such a learning process starts from the always zero function 0α. If U says that some value
of 0α must be updated - i.e. U(0α) = 〈γ, n,m〉 - then the learning process generates
the function U (1) := 0α ⊕ 〈γ, n,m〉. Similarly, if U says that some value of U (1) must be
updated - i.e. U(U (1)) = 〈γ′, n′,m′〉 - then the learning process generates the function
U (2) := U (1) ⊕ 〈γ′, n′,m′〉. The process goes on indefinitely in the same fashion.
Definition 6.3.2 (Learning Processes Generated by U). Let U be an update pro-
cedure of ordinal α. For every n ∈ N, we define a function U (n) : α→ (N→ N) by induction
as follows:
U (0) := 0α := γ ∈ α 7→ (n ∈ N 7→ 0)
U (n+1) := U (n) ⊕ U(U (n))
Moreover, a function f : α → (N→ N) is said to be U -generated if there exists an n such
that f = U (n).
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The aim of the learning process generated by U is to find a finite zero for U . Indeed, if
for some n, U(U (n)) = ∅, then for all m ≥ n, U (m) = U (n) and we thus say that the learning
process terminates. We now devote ourselves to the proof that learning processes always
terminate. In other words, every update procedure U has a U -generated finite zero.
Given an update procedure U , its useful to define a new “simpler” update procedure,
obtained from U by fixing some initial segment of its input, ignoring all updates relative to
this fixed part of the input and adjusting their indexes.
Definition 6.3.3 . Let U be an update procedure of ordinal α. Then, for any function
g : β → (N→ N), with β < α, define a function
Ug : ((α− β)→ (N→ N))→ (α− β)× N× N ∪ {∅}
as follow
Ug(f) =
{
〈γ, n,m〉 if U(g ∗ f) = 〈β + γ, n,m〉
∅ otherwise
(We point out that if β = 0 = ∅, Ug = U as it should be)
Indeed Ug as defined above is an update procedure.
Fact 1 . Let U be an update procedure of ordinal α. Then, for any function g : β →
(N→ N), with β < α:
(1) Ug is an update procedure of ordinal α− β.
(2) For every h : N→ N, Ug∗h = (Ug)h.
Proof. Immediate.

The strategy of our termination proof can be described as follows. Given an update
procedure U of ordinal α, we shall define a sequence of functions g : α → (N→ N) such
that a “reduction lemma” can be proved: if, for some β < α, Ug<β has a Ug<β -generated
finite zero, then for some γ < β also Ug<γ has a Ug<γ -generated finite zero (for definition of
g<β, recall definition 6.2.2 ). But the greater the ordinal β the easier is to compute with
a learning process a finite zero for Ug<β because the sequence g<β becomes so long that
the input for U<β becomes short. So we shall be able to show that for some large enough
β, β < α, Ug<β has a Ug<β -generated finite zero, which proves the theorem in combination
with the reduction lemma. This technique can be seen as a generalization of Avigad’s [5]
to the transfinite case.
We now prove the reduction lemma in the limit case.
Lemma 6.3.4 (Reduction Lemma, Limit Case). Let U be an update procedure of ordinal
α and g : β → (N→ N), with β limit ordinal and β < α. Then
(1) If f : (α−β)→ (N→ N) is Ug-generated, then there exists γ < β such that 0
β−γ ∗f
is Ug<γ -generated.
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(2) If Ug has a Ug-generated finite zero, then there exists γ < β such that Ug<γ has a
Ug<γ -generated finite zero.
Proof. (1) Let n be the smallest among the i such that f = U
(i)
g . If k < n and
Ug(U
(k)
g ) = ∅, then
U (k+1)g = U
(k)
g ⊕ Ug(U
(k)
g ) = U
(k)
g
So we have that for all k < n, Ug(U
(k)
g ) 6= ∅. Since β is a limit ordinal and U is continuous,
there exists a γ < β such that for every k ≤ n
U(g ∗ U (k)g ) = U(g<γ ∗ 0
β−γ ∗ U (k)g )
and
U(g<γ ∗ 0
β−γ ∗ f) = 〈δ, n,m〉 ∧ δ < β =⇒ δ < γ (6.1)
We prove by induction on k ≤ n that
U (k)g<γ = 0
β−γ ∗ U (k)g
which is the thesis. If k = 0,
U (0)g<γ = 0
α−γ = 0β−γ ∗ 0α−β = 0β−γ ∗ U (0)g
If k + 1 ≤ n, then for some δ, l,m
Ug(U
(k)
g ) = 〈δ, l,m〉
Then, by definition of Ug,
U(g ∗ U (k)g ) = 〈β + δ, l,m〉
and hence
U(g<γ ∗ 0
β−γ ∗ U (k)g ) = 〈β + δ, l,m〉 = 〈γ + (β − γ) + δ, l,m〉
Therefore, by definition of Ug<γ
Ug<γ (0
β−γ ∗ U (k)g ) = 〈(β − γ) + δ, l,m〉
By the help of induction hypothesis, we conclude that
U (k+1)g<γ = U
(k)
g<γ ⊕ Ug<γ(U
(k)
g<γ )
= U (k)g<γ ⊕ Ug<γ(0
β−γ ∗ U (k)g )
= U (k)g<γ ⊕ 〈(β − γ) + δ, l,m〉
= (0β−γ ∗ U (k)g )⊕ 〈(β − γ) + δ, l,m〉
= 0β−γ ∗ (U (k)g ⊕ 〈δ, l,m〉)
= 0β−γ ∗ (U (k)g ⊕ Ug(U
(k)
g ))
= 0β−γ ∗ U (k+1)g
(2) We continue the previous proof. Suppose that f is also a finite zero of Ug. If
∅ = U(g ∗ f) = U(g<γ ∗ 0
β−γ ∗ f)
then by definition of Ug<γ
Ug<γ (0
β−γ ∗ f) = ∅
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Therefore, suppose
〈δ, l,m〉 = U(g ∗ f) = U(g<γ ∗ 0
β−γ ∗ f)
Since Ug(f) = ∅, by definition of Ug we have that δ < β. By 6.1, we have also that δ < γ.
So, by definition of Ug<γ
Ug<γ (0
β−γ ∗ f) = ∅
which is the thesis.

We now prove the reduction lemma in the successor case.
Lemma 6.3.5 (Reduction Lemma, Successor Case). Let U be an update procedure of
ordinal α. Define g : N→ N as follows:
g(x) :=
{
y if ∃i. U(U (i)) = 〈0, x, y〉 ∧ i = min{n | ∃z U(U (n)) = 〈0, x, z〉}
0 otherwise
Then:
(1) For every finite function g0 ≤
2g, if g0∗0
α−1 is U-generated and f is Ug0-generated,
then g0 ∗ f is U-generated.
(2) If Ug has a Ug-generated finite zero, then U has a U-generated finite zero.
Proof. (1) By induction on the number m such that U
(m)
g0 = f . If f = U
(0)
g0 = 0
α−1,
then g0 ∗ f = g0 ∗ 0α−1 is U -generated by hypothesis.
If
f = U (k+1)g0 = U
(k)
g0 ⊕ Ug0(U
(k)
g0 )
then g0 ∗ U
(k)
g0 is U -generated by inductive hypothesis, i.e. for some n, g0 ∗ U
(k)
g0 = U
(n) . We
have two cases:
i) Ug0(U
(k)
g0 ) = 〈γ, x, z〉. Then, by definition of Ug0
U(g0 ∗ U
(k)
g0 ) = 〈γ + 1, x, z〉
Therefore,
U (n+1) = U (n) ⊕ U(U (n))
= (g0 ∗ U
(k)
g0 )⊕ U(g0 ∗ U
(k)
g0 )
= (g0 ∗ U
(k)
g0 )⊕ 〈γ + 1, x, z〉
= g0 ∗ (U
(k)
g0 ⊕ 〈γ, x, z〉)
= g0 ∗ f
ii) Ug0(U
(k+1)
g0 ) = ∅. Then
f = U (k)g0 ⊕ ∅ = U
(k)
g0
Hence g0 ∗ f is U -generated by induction hypothesis.
2As in chapter 4, g0 ≤ g iff for all x g0(x) 6= 0 =⇒ g0(x) = g(x)
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(2) Let f be a Ug-generated finite zero of Ug. By definition of g, for every m such that,
for some numbers x, y,
U(U (m)) = 〈0, x, y〉
we have that U (m+1) = hm ∗ 0
(α−1) for some finite function hm ≤ g. hm ∗ 0
(α−1) is U -
generated by definition. The sequence of all hm is increasing, and, by definition of g, the
limit of all hm is indeed g. Thus, for every finite function h ≤ g we have h ≤ hm ≤ g for
some finite hm such that hm ∗ 0
(α−1) is U -generated.
By assumption f is Ug-generated, that is, f = U
(n)
g for some n. By continuity of U(g∗f)
in g, and by continuity of U
(m)
g in g for any m ≤ n, we deduce that there is some finite
function h ≤ g such that for all functions h ≤ g0 ≤ g the two conditions below hold:
U(g0 ∗ f) = U(g ∗ f)
f = U (n)g0
that is, f is an Ug0-generated finite zero of Ug0 . By the discussion above, we may choose
some finite g0 such that h ≤ g0 ≤ g and g0 ∗ 0
(α−1) is U -generated. By point (1), g0 ∗ f is
U -generated:
g0 ∗ f = U
(n) (6.2)
for some n. Suppose
U(g0 ∗ f) = 〈0, x, z〉 (6.3)
for some x, z: we show it is impossible and hence obtain that U(g0 ∗f) = ∅, by the fact that
Ug0(f) = ∅ and definition of Ug0 . Combining (6.2) and (6.3), we obtain
U(U (n)) = 〈0, x, z〉
By definition of g, for some m ≤ n
U(U (m)) = 〈0, x, y〉 ∧ g(x) = y
This last fact plus (6.3) imply that x 6= x, since by definition U is an update procedure:
impossible.

We are now able to prove the main theorem: update procedures generate terminating
learning processes.
Theorem 6.3.6 (Termination of Learning Processes). Let U be an update procedure
of ordinal α. Then, U has a finite zero. In particular, there exists k ∈ N such that U(U (k)) =
∅.
Proof. We define, by transfinite induction, a function g : α → (N→ N) as follows.
Suppose we have defined gγ : N→ N, for every γ < β < α. Define the sequence g<β : β →
(N→ N) of them all
g<β := γ ∈ β 7→ gγ
Then define
gβ(x) :=
{
y if ∃i. Ug<β(U
(i)
g<β ) = 〈0, x, y〉 ∧ i = min{n | ∃z Ug<β(U
(n)
g<β ) = 〈0, x, z〉}
0 otherwise
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By axiom of choice and classical logic, for every β, g<β and gβ are well defined. So we can
let
g := g<α
We first want to show that there exists a β such that Ug<β has a Ug<β -generated finite zero.
We have two cases:
(1) α is a successor ordinal. Then, by fact 1, Ug<α is an update procedure of ordinal
1, which has a Ug<α-generated finite zero (see chapter 4).
(2) α is a limit ordinal. Then, by continuity of U , there is some β < α such that for
all β ≤ δ < α
U(g) = U(g<δ ∗ 0
(α−δ))
If U(g) = ∅, then by definition 6.3.3
Ug<β(0
(α−β)) = ∅
and we are done. If U(g) = 〈γ, n,m〉, without loss of generality we can assume we
have chosen β such that γ < β. Again by definition 6.3.3 of Ug<β
Ug<β(0
(α−β)) = ∅
and we are done.
Let now
β0 := min{β | Ug<β has a Ug<β -generated finite zero}
β0 cannot be a successor, otherwise if we let β0 = β1 + 1
g<β0 = g<(β1) ∗ gβ1
and hence by fact 1 point (2)
Ug<β0 = (Ug<β1 )gβ1
and by reduction lemma 6.3.5 Ug<β1 would have a Ug<β1 -generated finite zero. But β0 also
cannot be a limit ordinal, otherwise by reduction lemma 6.3.4, for some γ < β0, Ug<γ would
have a Ug<γ -generated finite zero. We conclude that β0 = 0. Since Ug<0 = U , we obtain the
thesis. 
6.4. Spector’s System B and Typed Update Procedures of Ordinal ωk
Zeros of transfinite update procedures cannot in general be computed in Go¨del’s system
T: as we will show, already update procedures of ordinal ω+ k, with k ∈ ω, can be used to
give computational interpretation to Elementary Analysis and hence their zeros can be used
to compute the functions provably total in Elementary Analysis. We will show however that
Spector’s system B is enough to compute zeros.
Definition 6.4.1 (Bar Recursion Operator, Spector’s System B, Type Level of
Bar Recursion). In the following, we will work with Spector’s system B which is Go¨del’s
T augmented with constants BRτ,σ,Ψτ,σ respectively of type
T1 → T2 → T3 → T4 → τ
and
T1 → T2 → T3 → T4 → Bool→ τ
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with
T1 = (N→ σ)→ N
T2 = σ
∗ → τ
T3 = σ
∗ → (σ → τ)→ τ
T4 = σ
∗
where σ∗ is a type representing finite sequences of objects of type σ. The meaning of BRτ,σ
is defined by the equation
BRτ,σY GHs
τ
=
{
Gs if Y sˆ < |s|
Hs(λxσBRτ,σY GH(s ∗ x)) otherwise
(6.4)
where s ∗x denotes the finite sequence s followed by x, sˆ denote the function mapping n to
sn, if n < |s|, to 0
σ otherwise, where sn is the n-th element of s and |s| is the number of
elements in s. If σ, τ, Y,G,H are determined by the context, we we will just write BR(s) in
place of BRτ,σY GHs.
BRτ,σ is said to be bar recursion of type σ. The type level of bar recursion BRτ,N of type
N (said also type 0), is the type level of the constant BRτ,N, that is, assuming N
∗ = N,
max(1, typelevel(τ)) + 2.
In order to obtain a strongly normalizing system such that equation 6.4 holds, we have to
add to system B the following reduction rules (see Berger [13]):
BRτ,σY GHs 7→ Ψτ,σY GHs(Y sˆ < |s|)
Ψτ,σY GHs(True) 7→ Gs
Ψτ,σY GHs(False) 7→ Hs(λx
σBRτ,σY GH(s ∗ x))
where < is a term coding the correspondent relation on natural numbers.
Since we are interested only in computable update procedures, we now fix a system
for representing them. For the aim of computationally interpreting Elementary Analysis,
update procedures can be assumed to belong to system T. However, for more powerful
systems one may need more capable update procedures, so we define them to belong to
B. Here, we limit ourselves to the ordinal ωk, for k ∈ ω, since this ordinal is enough to
interpret Elementary Analysis and even fragments of Ramified Analysis (see for example,
Mints et al. [36])
Definition 6.4.2 (Representation of Ordinals and Typed Update Procedures
of Ordinal ωk). We will represent ordinal numbers of the form ωk, with k ∈ ω, by
exploiting the order isomorphism between ωk and Nk lexicographically ordered. So, for
k ∈ ω, k > 0, we set
[ω0] := ν, [ωk] := Nk
where ν is the empty string and
[ω0 → (N→ N)] := N→ N
and, if k ∈ ω
[ωk+1 → (N→ N)] := N→ [ωk → (N→ N)]
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where N is the type representing N in typed lambda calculus. Define moreover
[(ωk × N× N) ∪ {∅}] := [ωk]× N× N
Unfortunately, ∅ does not have a code. So we have to use an injective coding | | of the
set (ωk × N × N) ∪ {∅} into the set of closed normal terms of type [(ωk × N × N) ∪ {∅}].
To fix ideas, we define |(β, n,m)| = 〈β′, n + 1,m + 1〉, with β′ : Nk the code of β, and
|∅| = 〈0, . . . , 0〉.
A typed update procedure of ordinal ωk is a term of Spector’s system B of type:
[ωk → (N→ N)]→ [(ωk × N× N) ∪ {∅}]
satisfying point (2) of definition 6.2.1, where for simplicity function quantification is assumed
to range over functions definable in system B. Equality as it appears in the definition is
supposed to be extensional.
6.5. Bar Recursion Proof of the Zero Theorem for Typed Update Procedures
of Ordinal ωk
In this section we give a constructive proof of the Zero theorem for typed update pro-
cedures of ordinal less than ωk. In particular we show that finite zeros can be computed
with bar recursion of type 1. We start with the base case.
Theorem 6.5.1 (Zero Theorem for Update Procedures of Ordinal 1=ω0). Let
U be a typed update procedure of ordinal 1. Then U has a finite zero σ. Moreover, σ can
be calculated as the normal form of a bar recursive term Zero(U) (defined uniformly on the
parameter U) of system T plus bar recursion of type 0.
The result follows by Oliva [39]. We give below another proof, which is a simplification
of Oliva’s one, made possible by the slightly stronger condition we have imposed on the
notion of update procedure.
The informal idea of the construction - but with some missing justifications - is the following.
We reason over the well-founded tree of finite sequences of numbers s such that U(sˆ) =
|(n,m)| and n ≥ |s|. We want to construct a function σ : N → N which is a zero of U .
Suppose that we have constructed a “good” initial approximation σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i) of σ; we
want to prove that it can be extended to a long enough approximation of σ. Our first step
is to continue with σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i) ∗ 0. If this is a good guess, by well-founded induction
hypothesis, we can extend σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i) ∗ 0 to a complete approximation σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n)
of σ, with n > i. Since we are not sure that our previous guess was lucky, we compute
U(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n)). If for all m
U(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n)) 6= |(i+ 1,m)|
then our approximation for σ(i+ 1) is adequate, and we claim that σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n) is the
approximation of σ we were seeking. Otherwise
U(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n)) = |(i+ 1,m)|
for some m: U tells us that our guess for the value of σ(i + 1) is wrong. But now we
know that σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i) ∗ m is a good initial approximation of σ and we have made
progress. Again by well-founded induction hypothesis, we conclude that we can extend
σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i) ∗m to a good approximation of σ.
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Proof of Theorem 6.5.1. We formalize and complete the previous informal argument. In
the following s will be a variable for finite sequences of numbers. Using bar recursion of
type 0, we can define a term which builds directly the finite zero we are looking for and is
such that:
BR(s) =


sˆ if U sˆ = |(n,m)| and n < |s|
sˆ if U sˆ = |∅|
BR(s ∗m) if U(BR(s ∗ 0)) = |(|s|,m)|
BR(s ∗ 0) if U(BR(s ∗ 0)) 6= |(|s|,m)| for all m
(we assume that BR(s) checks in order every condition in its definition and executes the
action corresponding to the first satisfied condition). We let σ as the normal form of
Zero(U) := BR(〈〉)
where 〈〉 is the empty sequence. Let us prove that σ is a finite zero of U . Suppose Uσ =
|(n,m)|: by showing that this is impossible, we obtain that Uσ = |∅|. The normalization of
BR(〈〉) leads to the following chain of equations:
BR(〈〉) = BR(σ(0))
= BR(σ(0) ∗ σ(1))
. . .
. . .
. . .
= BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i))
= ̂σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i)
= σ
with
n < |σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i)| = i+ 1
In particular
BR(〈〉) = BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n− 1))
Now, we have two cases:
(1) U(BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n− 1) ∗ 0)) = |(n, l)|. Then
BR(〈〉) = BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n − 1) ∗ l)
and so σ(n) = l, which is impossible, by definition 6.2.1 of update procedure, point
(2), for Uσ = |(n,m)|.
(2) for all l, U(BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n− 1) ∗ 0)) 6= |(n, l|). Then by definition
BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n − 1)) = BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n− 1) ∗ 0)
Therefore
|(n,m)| = Uσ = U(BR(〈〉)) = U(BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(n− 1) ∗ 0))
again impossible, by assumption of this case.
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We have then proved that σ is the sought finite zero.

We now prove that every typed update procedure of ordinal ω has a finite zero.
Theorem 6.5.2 (Zero Theorem for Typed Update Procedures of Ordinal ω).
Let U be a typed update procedure of ordinal ω. Then U has a finite zero σ. Moreover, σ
can be calculated as the normal form of a bar recursive term Zeroω(U) (defined uniformly
on the parameter U) of system T plus bar recursion of type 1 := N→ N.
Proof. The finite function σ : [ω → (N → N)] we are going to construct can be
represented as a finite function sequence σ(0)∗σ(1)∗ · · · ∗σ(n), for a large enough n. In the
following s is a variable ranging over finite sequences of natural number functions. Using
bar recursion of type 1, we can define in a most simple way a term which builds directly
the finite zero we are looking for. We present the construction gradually. To begin with,
suppose we are able to define - uniformly on s - terms BR(s) and gs : (N→ N) satisfying the
following equation for every s:
BR(s) =


sˆ if U sˆ = |(γ, n,m)| and γ < |s|
sˆ if U sˆ = |∅|
BR(s ∗ gs) otherwise, where ∀n,m U(BR(s ∗ gs)) 6= (|s|, n,m)
Let
σ := Zeroω(U) := BR(〈〉)
We prove that σ is a finite zero of U . We show this by proving that Uσ = (γ, n,m) is
impossible. As in the proof of theorem 6.5.1
BR(〈〉) = BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i)) = ̂σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i)
with γ < i+ 1. Let
r := σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(γ − 1)
By some computation
Uσ = U(BR(〈〉))
= U(BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(γ − 1)))
= U(BR(r))
= U(BR(r ∗ gr))
Since by construction for all n,m
U(BR(r ∗ gr)) 6= |(|r|, n,m)| = |(γ, n,m)|
we obtain that Uσ 6= (γ, n,m): impossible.
It remains to show that a gs such that appears in the definition of BR(s) exists. Indeed, it
is enough to set
gs := Zero(λf
N→NU|s|(BR(s ∗ f)))
where, for i ∈ N, we have defined
Ui := λf
N→(N→N). if U(f) = |(i, n,m)| then |(n,m)| else |∅|
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We prove now that in fact U(BR(s ∗ gs)) 6= |(|s|, n,m)| for all n,m. First, observe again
that for every s
BR(s) = ̂s ∗ h1 ∗ · · · ∗ hn
for some terms h1, . . . , hn of type N→ N. Now, fix any finite sequence s of type-N→ N terms.
We want to show that
Fs := λf
N→NU|s|(BR(s ∗ f))
is an update procedure of ordinal 1. Suppose Fsg1 = |(n,m)|, g2(n) = m and Fsg2 = |(h, l)|.
Then, by definition of Fs, it must be that
U(BR(s ∗ g1)) = |(|s|, n,m)|
and
U(BR(s ∗ g2)) = |(|s|, h, l)|
Moreover,
BR(s ∗ g2)|s|(n) = g2(n) = m
Since U is an update procedure, h 6= n must hold; therefore Fs is an update procedure of
ordinal 1. But by definition of gs, Zero and theorem 6.5.1, this means that
|∅| = Fs(Zero(Fs)) = U|s|(BR(s ∗ gs))
By definition of U|s| it must be true that U(BR(s ∗ gs)) 6= |(|s|, n,m)| for all n,m.

The previous argument can be generalized in order to prove the Zero theorem for typed
update procedures of ordinal ωk.
Theorem 6.5.3 (Zero Theorem for Typed Update Procedures of Ordinal ωk,
with k ∈ ω). Let U be a typed update procedure of ordinal ωk. Then U has a finite zero
σ. Moreover, σ can be calculated as the normal form of a bar recursive term Zeroωk(U)
(defined uniformly on the parameter U) of system T plus bar recursion of some type A,
where typelevel(A) = 1.
Proof. By induction on k. The cases k = 0, 1 have already been taken care. Now, we
want to prove the thesis for k+1, with k > 0. The finite function σ : [ωk+1 → (N→ N)] we
are going to construct can be represented as a finite function sequence σ(0)∗σ(1)∗· · · ∗σ(n),
for a large enough n, with each σ(i) of type [ωk → (N→ N)]. In the following s represents
a sequence of functions of type [ωk → (N → N)]. We recall that an ordinal less than ωk+1
is coded as a pair (γ, β), with γ ∈ N and β ∈ Nk. We again present the construction
gradually. To begin with, suppose we are able to define - uniformly on s - terms BR(s) and
gs : [ω
k → (N→ N)] satisfying the following equation for every s:
BR(s) =


sˆ if U sˆ = |((γ, β), n,m)| and γ < |s|
sˆ if U sˆ = ∅
BR(s ∗ gs) otherwise, where ∀β, n,m U(BR(s ∗ gs)) 6= ((|s|, β), n,m)
Let
σ := Zeroωk+1(U) := BR(〈〉)
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We prove that σ is a finite zero of U . We show this by proving that Uσ = ((γ, β), n,m) is
impossible. As in the proof of theorem 6.5.1
BR(〈〉) = BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i)) = ̂σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(i)
with γ < i+ 1. Let
r := σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(γ − 1)
By some computation
Uσ = U(BR(〈〉))
= U(BR(σ(0) ∗ · · · ∗ σ(γ − 1)))
= U(BR(r))
= U(BR(r ∗ gr))
Since by construction
U(BR(r ∗ gr)) 6= |((|r|, β), n,m)| = |((γ, β), n,m)|
we obtain that Uσ 6= ((γ, β), n,m): impossible.
It remains to show that a gs such that appears in the definition of BR(s) exists. Indeed, it
is enough to set
gs := Zeroωk(λf
[ωk→(N→N)]U|s|(BR(s ∗ f)))
where, for i ∈ N, we have defined
Ui := λf
[ωk+1→(N→N)]. if U(f) = ((i, δ), n,m) then (δ, n,m) else ∅
We prove now that in fact U(BR(s ∗ gs)) 6= |((|s|, β), n,m)| for all β, n,m. First, observe
that for every s
BR(s) = ̂s ∗ h1 ∗ · · · ∗ hn
for some terms h1, . . . , hn of type N→ N. Now, fix any finite sequence s of type-N→ N terms.
First, we want to show that
Fs := λf
[ωk→(N→N)]U|s|(BR(s ∗ f))
is an update procedure of ordinal ωk. Suppose for some δ of type [ωk]: Fsg1 = |(δ, n,m)|,
∀δ0 < δ. (g1)δ0 = (g2)δ0 , (g2)δ(n) = m and Fsg2 = |(δ, h, l)|. Then, by definition of Fs, it
must be that
U(BR(s ∗ g1)) = |((|s|, δ), n,m)|
and
U(BR(s ∗ g2)) = |((|s|, δ), h, l)|
Since U is an update procedure and
BR(s ∗ g2)|s|δ(n) = (g2)δ(n) = m
then h 6= n must hold; therefore Fs is an update procedure of ordinal ω
k. But by definition
of gs and induction hypothesis, this means that
U|s|(BR(s ∗ gs)) = Fs(Zeroωk(Fs)) = |∅|
By definition of U|s| it must be true that U(BR(s ∗ gs)) 6= |((|s|, β), n,m)| for all β, n,m.

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6.6. Case Study: Elementary Analysis
In this section, we give a three-step description of the epsilon substitution method for
Elementary Analysis. Every step corresponds to one of the three stages in which - according
to section 6.2 - learning based computational interpretations of predicative classical Arith-
metic can be decomposed. As main foundational result one obtains a constructive proof that
the zero theorem for update procedures of ordinal less that ω · 2 implies the 1-consistency
of Elementary Analysis. More precisely, any zero of such an update procedure can be used
to compute witnesses for Π20 formulas.
The content of this section is based on Mints et al. [35] and may be considered as an
informal survey and a general guide to the reading of the epsilon substitution method in
the light of our ideas on learning. Neither full details nor full proofs will be provided, but
our description should be clear enough for the reader to gain an understanding of the basic
ideas underpinning the epsilon method and its learning based interpretation.
We first define the language of Elementary Analysis, which is a fragment of second order
Arithmetic in which second order quantification ranges over arithmetical formulas (possibly
with free set variables).
Definition 6.6.1 (Language LEAof EA). The terms of LEA are inductively defined as
follow:
(1) Numerical variables x, y, z, . . . are terms of type 0.
(2) Set variables X,Y,Z, . . . are terms of type 1.
(3) 0 is a term of type 0.
(4) If t is a term of type 0, S(t) is term of type 0.
The formulas of LEA are inductively defined as follows:
(1) For every natural number n, there is a denumerable set of n-ary predicate con-
stants, one for every computable predicate over n-uples of natural numbers. If P
is a n-ary predicate constant and t1, . . . , tn are terms of type 0, then Pt1 . . . tn is
an atomic formula.
(2) If t is a term of type 0 and X a variable of type 1, then t ∈ X is an atomic formula.
(3) If A and B are formulas, then A ∧B, A→ B, ¬A are formulas.
(4) If A is a formula and v is a variable, ∃vA is a formula and ∀vA is defined as ¬∃v¬A.
If A is a formula and z a variable of type 0 free in A, then λzA is a lambda set ; λzA is
said to be arithmetical if it contains no bound set variables. The formula B(λzA/X) is
defined as the formula obtained from B by substituting each atomic formula t ∈ X of B
with A(t/z), as usual without capture of variables.
We now define the axioms and inference rules of EA.
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Definition 6.6.2 (Axioms and Inference Rules of EA). The axioms of EA are for-
mulas of LEA defined as follows:
(1) Propositional tautologies are axioms.
(2) Definitions of predicate constants are axioms, e.g. for add predicate
add(x, 0, x) and add(x, y, z) → add(x,S(y),S(z))
(3) x = x and x = y → A(x)→ A(y) are equality axioms.
(4) ¬S(x) = 0 and S(x) = S(y)→ x = y are axioms.
(5) A(0)→ (∀x.A(x)→ A(S(x)))→ ∀xA(x) is the induction axiom scheme.
(6) A(t/x)→ ∃xA is an axiom for every term t of type 0.
(7) A(T/X)→ ∃XA is an axiom if T is a set variable or an arithmetical lambda set.
The inference rules of EA are modus ponens
A→ B A
B
and
A→ C
∃vA→ C
with the standard proviso that v does not occur free in C.
We are now ready to take the first step of a learning based interpretation.
6.6.1. First Stage: Identification of a Sequence of non Computable Functions
F . We now define the sequence of non computable functions needed to give a computational
interpretation of EA. We do that by first introducing the concept of epsilon term.
Definition 6.6.3 (Language LEAǫ). We define by simultaneous induction the terms and
the formulas of LEAǫ:
(1) Numerical variables x, y, z, . . . are terms of type 0.
(2) Set variables X,Y,Z, . . . are terms of type 1.
(3) 0 is a term of type 0.
(4) If t is a term of type 0, S(t) is term of type 0.
(5) For every n-ary predicate constant P of LEA, if t1, . . . , tn are terms of type 0, then
Pt1 . . . tn is an atomic formula.
(6) If t is a term of type 0 and T a term of type 1, then t ∈ T is an atomic formula.
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(7) If A and B are formulas, then A ∧B, A→ B, ¬A are formulas.
(8) If A is a formula and v is a variable, then ǫvA is an epsilon term (of type equal to
the type of v) and v is considered bound in ǫvA.
If A is a formula and z a variable of type 0 free in A, then λzA is a lambda term (but we
do not ask it is in LEAǫ). A formula or a lambda term or a term is said to be an expression
of EAǫ and is arithmetical if it contains no bound set variables and canonical if it is closed
(i.e. no free variables occurs in it) and does not have closed epsilon terms as subterms. λzA
is regular if it is of the form (λzB)[t1/v1 . . . tn/vn] with λzB arithmetical and t1, . . . , tn any
terms.
Canonical epsilon terms are the ones that are assigned a meaning. The intended deno-
tation of a canonical epsilon term ǫxA is the least number n such that A(n) is true while
the denotation of ǫXA is an arithmetical canonical lambda term λzG (which represents
an arithmetical set) such that A(λzG/X) is true. In other words, the following critical
formulas should be true:
A(t/x)→ A(ǫxA/x)
A(T/X)→ A(ǫXA/X)
where t is any term of type 0 and T is an epsilon term of type 1 or a regular lambda term.
The notion of truth for formulas of EAǫ requires further explanation: in order to evaluate
their truth, first epsilon terms must be evaluated and hence eliminated.
Definition 6.6.4 (Substitutions, Evaluations of Epsilon Terms). We define:
(1) An epsilon substitution S is a function from the set of canonical epsilon terms to
the set of numerals and arithmetical canonical lambda terms such that S(ǫxA) is
always a numeral and S(ǫXA) is always an arithmetical canonical lambda term.
(2) Let t1, t2 be expressions of EAǫ and S an epsilon substitution. We write t1 7→S t2 if
t2 is obtained from t1 either by substituting one of its canonical epsilon subterms
ǫxA with S(ǫxA) or replacing one of its subformulas t ∈ ǫXA with G(t), where
S(ǫXA) = λzG.
(3) An expression t of EAǫ is said to be in S-normal form if there is no t1 such that
t 7→S t1. We indicate with |t|S the unique S-normal form of t, which exists by
theorem 6.6.1 below.
The truth value of a closed formula A of EAǫ is the truth value of |A|S (which does not
contain epsilon terms): so it is always relative to a epsilon substitution S.
The relation 7→S is well founded and has Church-Rosser property (see Mints et al. [35]).
Theorem 6.6.1 (Normalization and Church-Rosser). For every S, the relation 7→S
is well founded and every expression t of EAǫ has an S-normal form.
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We now need to measure the “computational strength” of an expression t of EAǫ. In-
tuitively, from the computational point of view, an epsilon term ǫxA represent a recursion
theoretic jump, because in general one has to enumerate all natural numbers in order to
decide if an n exists such that |A(n)|S is true. So, closed arithmetical expressions will
have a computational strength below ω, because no more than a finite number of jumps
is done inside them by their epsilon subterms. Instead, an epsilon term ǫXA must have a
computational strength of at least ω because one has to know all the values of arithmetical
canonical epsilon terms in the first place if he wants to determine whether there exists a
canonical arithmetical lambda term λzG such that |A(λzG/X)|S is true. Indeed one can
assign to expressions a computational strength which is always less that ω · 2. This is done
through the so called rank function, which we introduce only by exposing the properties
that it must have (for the actual definition and details, see Mints et al. [35]).
Theorem 6.6.2 (Rank Function). There exists a function rk from the set of expressions
of EAǫ to ω · 2 such that the following holds. For every epsilon substitution S and ordinal
α, denote with S≤α the function mapping e to S(e) if rk(e) ≤ α, to 0 or 0
1 := (λz.z = z)
otherwise (according to the type of e); then
(1) For every canonical epsilon term ǫvA
rk(ǫvA) > rk(A(e/v))
whenever e is a numeral or an arithmetical canonical lambda term.
(2) For every expression e of EAǫ and epsilon substitutions S1, S2, if rk(e) = α and
(S1)≤α = (S2)≤α, then |e|S1 = |e|S2 .
The above theorem 6.6.2 is crucial and its meaning is the following. Given any canonical
epsilon term ǫxA, any substitution S and natural number n = S(ǫxA), in order to check
whether n is a correct denotation for ǫxA, we have to determine the truth value of
|A(n/x)|S
Since rk(ǫxA) is strictly greater than rk(A(n/x)), the truth of |A(n/x)|S depends only on
the values that S assigns to epsilon terms of rank strictly less than that of ǫxA. So the
meaning of ǫxA is predicatively determined by the meaning of epsilon terms of lower rank.
The same holds for canonical epsilon terms of type 1.
We are now able to define the sequence of functions that will enable us to define classical
witness for formulas in EA and that we shall try to approximate. Suppose that for every
ordinal α < 2 · ω we have a primitive recursive enumeration ǫα0 , ǫ
α
1 , . . . of canonical epsilon
terms of rank equal to α and a primitive recursive enumeration λ0, λ1, . . . , of canonical
arithmetical lambda terms. We associate to any function f : ω · 2 → (N → N) the epsilon
substitution Sf such that:
fα(n) =
{
m if Sf (ǫ
α
n) = m ∧ ǫ
α
n = ǫxA
l if Sf (ǫ
α
n) = λl ∧ ǫ
α
n = ǫXA
It is easy to see - using classical logic - that there exists an epsilon substitution S which
makes true every critical formula C, i.e. |C|S is true: just start by assigning values to
canonical epsilon terms of rank 1, then to those of rank 2 and so on. Then our target
collection F : ω · 2→ (N→ N) of functions is the one such that S = SF .
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6.6.2. Second Stage: Definition of Classical Witnesses by Programs Recur-
sive in F . Using epsilon terms one can define classical witness for any provable formula of
EA by first translating formulas of EA into formulas of EAǫ, using the equivalence
∃vA ≡ A(ǫvA/v)
Definition 6.6.5 (Translation of Formulas of EA into Formulas EAǫ). We define
a translation of Formulas of EA into Formulas EAǫ by induction as follows:
(1) If P is atomic, P ∗ := P .
(2) (¬A)∗ := ¬A∗.
(3) (A ∧B)∗ := A∗ ∧B∗.
(4) (A→ B)∗ := A∗ → B∗.
(5) (∃vA)∗ := A∗(ǫvA∗/v)
We now define the axioms and inference rules for EAǫ.
Definition 6.6.6 (Axioms and Inference Rules of EAǫ). The axioms of EAǫ are
formulas of LEAǫ defined as follows:
(1) Propositional tautologies are axioms.
(2) Definitions of predicate constants are axioms, e.g. for add predicate
add(x, 0, x) and add(x, y, z) → add(x,S(y),S(z))
(3) x = x and x = y → A(x)→ A(y) are equality axioms.
(4) ¬S(x) = 0 and S(x) = S(y)→ x = y are axioms.
(5) Minimality axioms: ǫxA = S(t)→ ¬A(t)
(6) Critical formulas:
¬s = 0→ s = S(ǫxs = S(x))
A(t/x)→ A(ǫxA/x)
A(T/X)→ A(ǫXA/X)
where t is any term of type 0 and T is either a term of type 1 or a regular lambda
term.
The only inference rule of EAǫ is modus ponens.
The following theorem shows that EA can be embedded in the quantifier free system
EAǫ. This allows one to extract witnesses for existential statements provable in EA. As
usual ⊢ denotes provability.
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Theorem 6.6.3 (Classical Witnesses for Provable Formulas of EA). The fol-
lowing holds:
(1) Suppose that EA ⊢ A. Then EAǫ ⊢ A∗.
(2) Suppose that EA ⊢ ∃xA, with A atomic. Then there exists a finite sequence
C1, . . . , Cn of closed critical formulas of EAǫ and a closed term t of EAǫ such
that if for all i, |Ci|S is true, then |t|S = n and A(n) is true.
By the above theorem 6.6.3, it is now clear that witnesses for EA can be computed by
programs recursive in F , because F represent an epsilon substitution SF which makes every
critical formula true.
6.6.3. Stage Three: Learning Processes Approximating F . In order to compute
witnesses for EA is necessary to find a good finite approximation of F , in order to satisfy
some finite set of critical formulas. This is the point when update procedures come into the
scene. The fundamental property of a closed critical formula C, for example of the form
A(t/x)→ A(ǫxA/x)
is that from the fact |C|S is false one can always learn something. Suppose |C|S is false.
In this case, if S(ǫx|A|S) = m, one has that |A(m/x)|S is false. Fortunately, if |t|S = n,
the formula |A(n/x)|S is true since |C|S is false and so |A(n0/x)|S is true for some minimal
n0 ≤ n. So one learns a new value n0 that can be assigned to ǫx|A|S . Analogously, if C is
a closed critical formula of the form
A(T/X)→ A(ǫXA/X)
and |C|S is false, if we suppose S(ǫX|A|S) = λzG, one has that |A(λzG/X)|S is false.
Fortunately, if |T |S = λzH, the formula |A(λzH/X)|S happens to be true. So one learns a
new value λzH that can be assigned to ǫX|A|S . Observe that is not a priori obvious that
λzH is an arithmetical lambda term, but in fact this can be proved given the assumptions
we have made on T (again, for details see Mints et al. [35]).
From now on, fix a finite sequence of critical formulas C0, . . . , CN (for brevity only of the
two forms considered above). We want to define an update procedure of ordinal ω + k out
of it (with k ∈ ω), any of whose finite zeros will represent an epsilon substitution making
all the critical formulas true.
Definition 6.6.7 (Update Procedure for C0, . . . , CN ). We define an update procedure
U of ordinal ω + k. Let f : ω + k → (N→ N). If for every i, |Ci|Sf is true, we set
U(f) = ∅
Otherwise, consider the first i such that |Ci|Sf is false. If
Ci = A(t/x)→ A(ǫxA/x)
and |t|Sf = m and ǫx|A|Sf = ǫ
α
n, we set
U(f) = 〈α, n,m0〉
where m0 ≤ m is the smallest among the i such that |A(i/x)|Sf is true (which exists since
|A(m/x)|Sf is true). If
Ci = A(T/X) → A(ǫXA/X)
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and |T |Sf = λzH = λm and ǫX|A|Sf = ǫ
α
n, we set
U(f) = 〈α, n,m〉
We now show that U is a well defined update procedure.
Theorem 6.6.4 (Adequacy of U). U is an update procedure of ordinal ω + k, for some
k ∈ ω.
Proof. We skip the proof that U is well defined, which amounts to show that for every
substitution S, if rk(e) ≥ ω, then rk(|e|S) ≤ rk(e): this ensures an upper bound on the rank
of the terms that are evaluated by U in its computations and so U never updates values for
epsilon terms of rank greater than ω + k, if k is chosen large enough.
We prove instead that U is an update procedure. U is continuous, since for every f only a
finite number of values of Sf and hence of f are used to compute U(f). Suppose now that
U(f) = 〈β, n,m〉, for all γ < β fγ = gγ , gβ(n) = m and U(g) = 〈β, h, l〉. Suppose h = n:
we have to prove it is impossible. Consider the first i such that |Ci|Sf is false. Suppose Ci
is of the form
Ci = A(t/x)→ A(ǫxA/x)
Then by definition of U(f), ǫx|A|Sf = ǫ
β
n and m is the smallest among the i such that
|A(i/x)|Sf is true. Furthermore, consider the first j such that |Cj |Sg is false. By definition
of U(g) and since h = n we have
Cj = B(t/v)→ B(ǫvB/v)
with ǫv|B|Sg = ǫ
β
n. Therefore, |A|Sf = |B|Sg . Moreover, let
δ := rk(|B|Sg (m/x))
By theorem 6.6.2, point (1), δ < β = rk(ǫx|B|Sg). By hypothesis
(Sg)≤δ = (Sf )≤δ
So by theorem 6.6.2, point (2)
|A(m/x)|Sf = ||A|Sf (m/x)|Sf = ||B|Sg(m/x)|Sf = ||B|Sg(m/x)|Sg = |B(m/x)|Sg
Since gβ(n) = m, we have
Sg(ǫv|B|Sg ) = Sg(ǫ
β
n) = m
Thus
|B(ǫvB/v)|Sg = |B(m/x)|Sg
But |A(m/x)|Sf is true by construction and so |B(ǫvB/v)|Sg itself must be true, which
contradicts the assumption that |Cj |Sg is false.
An analogous reasoning yields a contradiction when Ci is of the form
A(T/x)→ A(ǫXA/X)

Theorem 6.6.1 (1-Consistency of Elementary Analysis). If for all k ∈ ω every
update procedure of ordinal ω+k has a finite zero, then Elementary Analysis is 1-consistent.
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Proof. By theorem 6.6.3, it is enough to show that, given any finite sequence of critical
formulas (C1, . . . , CN without loss of generality), there exists a finite epsilon substitution
that makes true every formula. This amounts to show that U has a finite zero, which is
true by theorem 6.6.4 and hypothesis. 
6.7. Further Work
Much remains to be done and we plan to address the following issues in the future.
Our constructive proof of the zero theorem for typed update procedures of ordinal ωk
is not optimal, in the sense that, by Howard [30], it should be possible to use only system
T plus bar recursion of type 0.
Moreover, a more self contained proof that the zero theorem for update procedures of
ordinal less that ω · 2 implies the consistency of EA is a major aim.
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